THE ONE CHRIST

St. Augustine's Theology of Deification

David Vincent Meconi, SJ

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Abbreviations

BA Oeuvres of Saint Augustine, Bibliothèque Augustinienne

CCL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina

CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum

PG Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca

PL Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina

SC Sources Chrétiennes

Introduction

. . . et ubi haeret, quod non diuellit satietas
—conf. 10.6.8

Deification of the human person is central to how St. Augustine presents a Christian's new life in Christ. Augustine accordingly presents the Christian life in terms of the Son of God's becoming human so humans can become God. This transformative union thus allows the Bishop of Hippo to exhort his congregation: "Let us thus rejoice and give thanks, for we have been made not Christians, but we have been made Christ."[1] Or employing his preferred scriptural idiom, the Holy Spirit's pouring charity into our hearts (cf. Rom. 5:5), Augustine could teach those before him that through charity [*per dilectionem*] they have become members of the body of Christ: "and through love become incorporated [*in compage*] into the body of Christ; and there will be one Christ loving himself."[2] Passages of this kind are surprisingly numerous. The subject of this book is to show in what indispensable ways Augustine relies on images of union between God and creation. In particular, this work will argue against much of previous scholarship to show that the deification of the human

1. *Jo. eu. tr.* 21.8: "Ergo gratulemur et agamus gratias, non solum christianos factos esse, sed Christum" (my translation); CCL 36.216.

2. *Ep. Jo.* 10.3: "Et diligendo fit et ipse membrum, et fit per dilectionem in compage corporis Christi; et erit unus Christus amans seipsum" (my translation); PL 35.2056.

person is in fact a central doctrine in the overall thought of St. Augustine of Hippo.

The classical Christian formula of humanity's deification, *God became human so humans could become God*, finds expression in St. Augustine's "in order to make gods of those who were merely human, one who was God made himself human."[3] The humanity God assumes to himself in Christ is fundamental: for, in Christ, divinity and humanity meet and thus it is here that Christ identifies himself with his adopted brothers and sisters. This new life ushered in by the Son's incarnation is therefore an interrelationship between Christ and the Christian because the Son has come to "identify his members with himself [*transfigurauit in se suos*], just as he did when he said, *I was hungry and you fed me* (Matt. 25:35), and as he identified us with himself when he called from heaven to the rampaging Saul who was persecuting God's holy people, *Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?* (Acts 9:4), though no one was laying a finger on Christ himself.… 'See yourself reflected in me,' Christ says."[4] At times Augustine will explain this transformation in terms of deification explicitly. He will also talk about becoming divinely adopted sons and daughters, while at other times he will present the goal of Christian-

3. *s*. 192.1; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 46: "deos facturus qui homines erant, homo factus est, qui deus erat"; PL 38.1012. The first to express this exchange language of God's humanity for our divinity so explicitly was Irenaeus at *Adu. Haeres*. V, preface (PG 7.1120B): "Out of his boundless love for us, the Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, became what we are so that he might make us what he himself is"; while Athanasius's phrase is perhaps the most celebrated: "For the Son of God became man so that we might become God," *De Incarnatione* §54.3 (PG 25.192B).

4. *en*. *Ps*. 32, exp. 2.2; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/15), 393; we shall see how Augustine treats these two pivotal passages below as well; cf. xx. See also *s*. 305A for another strong instance of Augustine's use of *transfigurare* to illustrate an identification between Christ and the faithful. For more on Augustine's understanding of the transfiguration, see Édouard Divry, *La Transfiguration selon l'Orient et l'Occident* (Paris: Pierre Téqui, 2009), 223–48. Divry's comments here focus mainly on the transformative importance Augustine gives to the metaphor of light (*lumen*, *lux*), and less on the union of Christ and Christian, but he does at one point ask if this illumination of the Christian, "S'agit-il d'une divinisation?" 238.

ity as "becoming gods," or becoming a member of the whole Christ (*Christus totus*), or even as becoming Christ himself. By examining such a wide range of metaphors, this present work explores Augustine's teaching on humanity's divine transformation in Christ, and seeks to argue that deification is a pivotal metaphor in his presentation of the Christian life.

Those familiar with the standard interpretations of Augustine will quickly see that such a reading conflicts with how Augustine's teaching on salvation has traditionally been presented. Convention has unfortunately forbidden such a reading, exemplified by a 1925 study by Joseph Mausbach where he contrasted the East's understanding of human divinization with what he represented as the West's stress on humanity's enslavement and eventual freedom from sin, naming Augustine as the one responsible for advocating such pessimism. Mausbach singled out Augustine as the sole antagonist to the Greeks, the lone representative of a theological vision centered on humanity's depravity. Consequently, as Mausbach suggested, Augustine is to blame for the Latin West's dismissing Christian salvation as theosis and transformation, favoring a remedial and reconciliatory construal. Mausbach's judgment is not an isolated case, but has been encountered in various ways throughout the twentieth century.[5]

In her groundbreaking work on deification in the Greek Fathers, for example, Myrrha Lot-Borodine argued quite strongly that Augustine was unable to account for any sort of union or *compénétration* between God and humanity. According to Lot-Borodine, deification has historically been a foreign way

5. Joseph Mausbach, "The Greek understanding of grace is a marvelous elevation, enlightenment, and deification of the human person; with Augustine grace is a healing, a freeing, and a reconciliation of a decrepit, enslaved, person far away from God. . . . Augustine sees the human person in his sinfulness, how he is filled with the tragedy of the internal fight, and from this starting point he builds his ethics and spirituality." *Thomas von Aquin als Meister christlicher Sittenlehre unter Berücksichtigung seiner Willenslehre* (Munich: Theatiner Verlag, 1925), 37–38.

of understanding the Christian life in the West because of Augustine's inability to conceive of how God and humanity could ever come into contact without ever lessening the former or obliterating the latter. This is why, she argues, the Augustinian vision of Christianity may be motivated by a promise of beatitude, but never by deification (*mais non à la déification*).[6] Others have made the similar case that Augustine's rendering divinity "non-participable and unknowable,"[7] caused an absolute barrier between God and the human soul, concluding that such a theology was responsible for the eventual divide between the Western and the Eastern understandings of the relationship between creator and creation. That is, whereas the West could not explain how the created order could interact with God's immutable otherness, the East made a distinction between the divine essence and God's "uncreated energies," a move "Augustine could not admit."[8] Each of these scholars has argued that the purported lack of deification language in Augustine parallels his supposed inability to bring God and creation into any kind of harmonious relationship.

Unfortunately, this point of view is constantly reproduced in many popular works today as well. As one more recent example, note Linda Woodhead's *An Introduction to Christianity*, in which she maintains that deification was "a theme that had long been central in Christian life, particularly in asceticism and monasticism … the purpose of prayer, of the liturgy, of the incarnation itself: God became human so that man could become divine."[9] This central tenet thrived in the

6. Myrrha Lot-Borodine, *La déification de l'homme selon la doctrine des Pères grecs* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1970), 39. The key phrase follows this claim: "celle-ci lui reste interdite, puisqu'il ne peut y avoir, pour Augustin, consubstantialité, donc compénétration, de la nature divine et de la nature humaine," 40.

7. Philip Sherrard, *The Greek East and the Latin West: A Study in the Christian Tradition* (Oxford University Press, 1959), 143.

8. Ibid., 144.

9. Linda Woodhead, *An Introduction to Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80.

East only, she maintains, because "the Latin tradition, under the influence of Augustine, tended to set an unbridgeable gulf between man and God by way of their doctrine of the fall and original sinfulness."[10] Augustine is once again presented as denying humanity's possible divinization in Christ and thereby charged as *the* Western proponent of humanity's supposed disparagement and lack of union with God. Given the rarity of deification language within Augustine's writings, the position of Mausbach and those who have leveraged similar conclusions is certainly understandable. However, a fuller assessment demands that we situate Augustine's understanding of the concept of deification within the wider framework of his theology. To achieve this goal, I propose two main theses.

The first is that, while the limitations of Augustine's approach will be highlighted and examined, the Bishop of Hippo strongly advocates a theology of deification in a manner hitherto unappreciated. He uses the term *deificare* both in number and in ways unprecedented in the Christian West. Furthermore, the reality of humanity's deification is clearly present in ways and in places where the term deification fails to appear. Augustine's ability to use the term deification without defense or comment follows from his wider and consistent understanding of the nature of Christian salvation. Life in Christ is ultimately a creature's participation in the divine life and the renovation of the Christian believer by the Holy Spirit in and through Christ's church. If we were to simply take the eighteen instances of *deificare*, we would suffer from limiting deification

10. Ibid. Such facile accusations abound. In almost any popular history of Christian theology wherever deification is addressed, Augustine is the foil opposing the conviction that human salvation can be formulated as theosis and godliness: e.g., Alan Johnson and Robert Webber, *What Christians Believe* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishers, 1989): "Deification is a process of salvation through which God heals the wounded sinner, bringing her or him more and more into the wholeness of being like God. This Eastern view of salvation as process stands in contrast to the Western view, which is more punctiliar and stresses forgiveness as an act of God. Let us examine the Western view as it is articulated in Augustine," 304.

to a nominal reality; but even more unfortunate would be to often miss what Augustine is doing. By proceeding thematically we come to a more comprehensive understanding of the many diverse roles deification plays in Augustine's theology.

The second thesis thus asserts that a wider metaphor of divine union runs throughout Augustine's thought in ways indispensable to his overall theological concerns. I argue that the creature's union with God is the one constant theological principle found throughout Augustine's thought. Or, as Robert Wilken has recently written with reference to Augustine's use of the term "cleave" (*adhaerere*), "No other biblical word seemed to Augustine to embody the entire mystery of the faith so fully."[11] As I shall argue, Augustine's cleaving to God ultimately means to be transformed into God in a nonliteral yet real way. In order to display this extensive imagery of deification, this volume proceeds by way of primary texts representative of Augustine's reliance on various images and concepts of communion between God and creature. As such, the following chapters do not simply chronicle terms but rather investigate the many ways Augustine describes how creation is united to God. Such a method allows this work to correct those studies on Augustine's sense of divine union which focus solely on his use of the term *deificare*, while also showing how the language of deification does not rise up uninfluenced from the rest of his wider concerns.

This is the first book-length study of Augustine's theology of deification. Until now, there has been one unpublished dissertation treating Augustine's use of the term *deificare* in his sermons.[12] In addition there have been a handful of illuminating articles on Augustine's theology of deification.[13] Finally,

11. Robert Wilken, *The Spirit of Early Christian Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 72.

12. Jan A. A. A. Stoop, *Die Deificatio Hominis in die Sermones en Epistulae van Augustinus* (Leiden: Drukkerij Luctor et Emergo, 1952), 87 pages.

13. Among the first exclusive focuses on deification in Augustine is an article

there are encyclopedia entries on his theology of deification.[14] However, the most helpful examinations of Augustinian deifi-

by the Augustinian canon, Victorino Capánaga, which has proved very influential, being quoted throughout most of the subsequent studies in the twentieth century: Victorino Capánaga, "La deificación en la soteriología agustiniana," *Augustinus Magister* 2 (1954): 745–54. Capánaga stresses the anthropological capacities and effects involved in Augustine's view of divinization. The result is human sanctification in Christ through his church's sacraments. Of the twentieth century scholars who build on the work of Capánaga, Gerald Bonner emerges as the most influential. His 1986 essay treats the (then available) 15 instances of *deificare*, providing both the context and the implication for each of these examples: Gerald Bonner, "Augustine's Concept of Deification," *Journal of Theological Studies* 37 (1986): 369–86. Other studies of note include: Georges Folliet, "*Deificari in otio:* Augustin, *Epistula 10*," *Recherches Augustiniennes* 2 [supplement: *Hommage au R. P. Fulbert Cayré*] (1962): 225–36; Francisco Juberias, *La Divinización del hombre* (Madrid: Editorial Coculsa, 1972), 115–18; Patricia Wilson-Kastner, "Grace as Participation in the Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo," *Augustinian Studies* 7 (1976): 135–52; Roland Teske's response to Folliet in "Augustine's Epistula X: Another Look at Deificari in Otio," *Augustinianum* 32 (1992): 289–99; José Oroz Reta, "De l'illumination à la déification de l'âme selon saint Augustin," *Studia Patristica* 27 (1993): 364–82; a one-page treatment in Steven Botterill, *Dante and the Mystical Tradition: Bernard of Clairvaux in the Commedia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 206–07; a paragraph in A. N. Williams, *The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 29; Pedro Urbano López de Meneses, *Theosis: La doctrina de la divinización en las tradiciones cristianas: Fundamentos para una teología ecuménica de la gracia* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A., 2001), 112–24. Treating the recently discovered sermons is Augustine Casiday's analysis of Dolbeau 23B in "St. Augustine on deification: his homily on Psalm 81," *Sobernost* 23 (2001): 23–44; two works by Henry Chadwick: "Note sur la divinisation chez saint Augustin," *Revue des sciences religieuses* 76.2 (2002): 246–48 where Chadwick reproduces most of the standard primary texts first found in Capánaga, showing how participation in the divine life is at the heart of Augustine's understanding of salvation; see also the passing remarks of Henry Chadwick, *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 211 and 236, admitting that Augustine would not have found Boethius's language of "becoming gods" intolerable; and finally, Robert Puchniak, "Augustine's Conception of Deification, Revisited," *Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology*, edited by Stephen Finland and Vladimir Kharlamov (Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick Publications, 2006), 122–33. Perhaps the most salutary aspect of this essay is simply its inclusion in a collection examining the history of theosis, indicating that Augustine is finally being recognized as a theologian for whom the divinization of humanity was not unknown.

14. While Capánaga's 1954 article is not quoted directly, his work is evident in the encyclopedia entries by Gustave Bardy in the *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1957), edited by M. Viller et al., and continued by C. Baumgartner et al., Tome 3, section 3: Gustave Bardy, "Divinisation: Chez les Pères Latins"; Augustine is treated at 1395–97. Bonner has also been called upon to include two very helpful encyclopedia entries: "Deificare," *Augustinus-Lexicon*, 2.265–67; "Deification, Divinization," *Augustine Through the Ages*, 265–66.

cation have appeared as brief contrasts with the Greek Fathers who are regarded for their use of theosis.[15] Upon examining these works, we encounter an unfortunate habit of treating Augustine's theology of deification in isolation, namely, only where he relies on the explicit terminology of *deificare*. This is unfortunate for two reasons: (1) it inevitably forces Augustine's uses of *deificare* to appear more robust and indispensable than they actually are, and (2) such an approach ignores the fact that deification language can appear in Augustine's sermons and tracts because it very easily fits into what he has been saying all along. In other words, it is my contention here that the explicit language of *deificare* turns up only sporadically and only without detailed explanation because it is simply one more way Augustine can stress the divinizing union between the human and the divine, between the Christian and Christ. Therefore Augustine does not labor to develop what he means by *deificare* because he sees it as one metaphor among many possible images of divine union.

This study accordingly begins by examining how Augustine conceives of the connection between creator and creation. Those dismissive or at least critical of Augustine's theology of deification are correct that, according to Augustine, the relationship of God to the created order fundamentally underlies any theology of deification. We must therefore ask

15. Comparing the Johannine commentaries of Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine, Daniel Keating concentrates on Augustine's understanding of participation in order to elucidate how a contingent creature can find communion with divinity. Keating's two dozen pages of reflection serve as a good introduction to what is at stake in recovering the theme of deification in Augustine; Daniel Keating, *The Appropriation of Divine Life in Cyril of Alexandria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 227–51. A second work of significance to this study is that of Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Here Russell offers a brief look (329–32) at deification in Augustine, concentrating mainly on the Platonic influences as well as the Bishop of Hippo's battles with the Pelagians, which certainly colored how he depicted human perfection. Obviously the number of studies on the deifying theology of Augustine is surprisingly few, especially when compared with the immense amount of scholarship already treating other facets of his theology.

if Augustine sees this as a hostile relationship or one of inherent communion. To answer this question as thoroughly as possible, we begin by reflecting on the life of the Trinity, with a special emphasis on the Word's role in the act of creation. To understand the dynamics of how the triune God creates, chapters 1 and 2 focus on Augustine's theology of created order. Chapter 1 centers around a text from Augustine's most mature commentary on Genesis, the *De Genesi ad Litteram*, chosen because it provides us with an illuminating example of how all of creation "turns" to the Father in imitation of the Son. Augustine's questioning of creation always leads him to the human person, so chapter 2 next treats the question of scripture's claim that men and women are made in the divine image and likeness. What does Augustine glean from the creation story of Genesis and how does he understand the nature of an *imago?* After analyzing this understanding of "image," we turn to *De Trinitate* 7.3.5 where Augustine argues that the human person as a created (and therefore an unequal) image becomes one with God as he imitates and draws nearer to the Son, the perfect image of the Father.

Chapters 3 and 4 form the second unit, treating the Son and the Spirit's role in uniting the faithful with God. In keeping the roles of the Son and the Spirit in the economy of salvation in concert, Augustine's use of deification language takes on its proper perspective. All instances of *deificare* are analyzed in chapter 3, but only as one metaphor among many. Yet, this metaphor acts to signal basic Christian images of salvation which also denote the identification between the human and the divine: becoming gods, divine adoption, and language of the "great exchange" all serve to unpack what Augustine means by the Christian life. While *deificare* (and its cognates) is used only in relationship to the incarnate Son, it cannot be understood in isolation from the Holy Spirit. Chapter 4 thus treats the Spirit as the divine person who unites men and

women to the Son and the one who makes of the created soul a living temple of God on earth.

The final section then looks at the human person's appropriation of the divine life as realized first in the church and then forever in heaven. For Augustine, the movement from sinner to saint is made real always through the visible Christian faith and always in communion with others. Chapter 5 accordingly treats the church as the locus of deification, the place on earth where Christ's life is extended to his faithful members. Chapter 6 rounds off our study with a brief examination of the heavenly life. While the deified life is achievable on earth, it is fully perfected only after the sanctified soul is reunited with the resurrected body. The ecclesial process which brings about our filiality here on earth *in spe* is realized only heavenly *in re*.

THE ONE CHRIST

One

CREATION AS THE UNIFYING PROLOGUE

non omnino essem, nisi esses in me
—conf. 1.2.2

As our introduction chronicled, critics of Augustine are correct to point out how the degree of communion between God and creation parallels the extent to which a creature can be divinized. In his *Saint Augustin*, Patric Ranson likewise uses this relationship to argue that the absence of deification in Augustine forbids any union between creator and creature.[1] Ranson rightly sees how creation and salvation are organically linked in Augustine's thought; he is also accurate in stating that the *mariage* of the created and the uncreated is the *sens premier* of Christianity. However, is he correct in judging that a close union between the created and the uncreated is actually forbidden in Augustine's thinking? Exactly how does Augustine describe this relationship between creator and creature?

This chapter shows how creation is a dialogue between the Word who never ceases receiving the Father, and the created

1. Patric Ranson, *Saint Augustin* (Paris: l'Âge d'homme, 1988), 33, where he maintains that the absence of the doctrine of deification consequently forbids the "marriage" (*interdit ce mariage*) of creation with the uncreated God.

beings he never stops forming. The world's very first moment bespeaks a type of contingent existence which can never be self-sufficient but must receive all it is by turning back with and in the Logos to the Father. In this way we shall see how creation for Augustine is essentially a *conuersio ad Deum*. The Trinity brings other beings into existence by creating them to adhere instantaneously to God and thus to receive existence and all their specific attributes. As such, contingent existents are created so as to turn toward God, thereby receiving what the creator continuously bestows. This is how Augustine's theology of creation is clearly Logocentric: each created existent must imitate the Word's eternal turn toward and presence before the Father in order to receive existence and the qualities which make it what it is.

This chapter proceeds by way of three main sections. We begin by seeking to understand what this world tells us of God. Augustine sees in all creatures a triadic ontology pointing us not only to an omnipotent God, but to a Trinity of persons. Augustine clearly desires to emphasize how it is not some incommunicable power that creates, nor is it any one divine person, but it is the Trinity who has chosen to create. Second, we examine the life of this Trinity as rooted in eternal reciprocity, a timeless relatedness whose very being is constituted by the Father's eternal begetting of the Son, these two being joined by the Holy Spirit. The third and final section considers the purpose of God's creating. Augustine carefully distinguishes two ways to answer the question "*Quare fecerit?*"—"Toward what end did he create?" The first way of asking this question is to demand an answer of God's will. Fiercely intent on preserving divine freedom, however, Augustine admonishes those who presume God must have created out of some lack or need. Instead, he constantly emphasizes God's free will in creating. God creates out of neither coercion nor obligation. But what then is the purpose of creation itself? This is the second way

to ask "quare fecerit?" not by asking what motivated God to create but by asking what purpose did God implant within creation when he willed it. We thus discover Augustine's two-fold answer for why creation was brought about: for the sake of creation's union as well as for praise of the supreme Trinity.

Readers may recognize how the divisions of this chapter follow Augustine's suggestion at *De Ciuitate Dei* 11.21, that there are always three factors one should know about a created thing: who made it [*quis fecerit?*], how he made it [*per quid fecerit?*], and why he made it [*quare fecerit?*]. For within the Augustinian narrative, it is impossible to talk of a creature without also talking about its creator (*quis*) as well as the efficient (*per quid*) and final (*quare*) causes for that existent. To answer these questions this chapter will analyze mainly selections from Augustine's various commentaries on Genesis, the latter books of the *Confessions*, and selections from *De Genesi ad litteram*.

QUIS FECERIT? THE TRIUNE GOD'S ACT OF CREATION

Since creation is God's original revelation of self *ad extra*, we approach it as the fundamental prologue to divine union. For Augustine, creation and deification are related in two ways. First, they are both utterly free, traceable only to God's graciousness. Second, in their own measure, both creation and salvation reflect the interpersonal life of the Trinity. Both creation and salvation show us how God is utter goodness, incapable of any jealousy, instead revealing himself as one who wills to share his life. As Augustine would have learned from Plato's *Timaeus*, God generated the visible world because his goodness disallows any jealousy (φθόνος): God is not only good and free, but actually desires all things to be like him insofar as their natures permit.[2] God has no need of creation

2. Cf. *Timaeus* 29D–30A.

and he is neither conditioned nor improved upon in the act of creation.[3] It is therefore fitting that God chooses to bring other beings into existence in a wholly gratuitous manner, seeking to perfect and not destroy the integrity of the other.

In his *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Augustine argues that it is unfitting that the Father would have the ability to perform a beautiful act and yet refuse to do so. But since he is both *omnipotens et bonus*, he chose not only to create, but to create all things "very good."[4] Years earlier (c. 391), Augustine used this same argument of God's lack of jealousy (*inuidia*) to show the fittingness of the Father's eternal begetting of the Son. Because God is both omnipotent and wholly good, and therefore incapable of jealousy, Augustine relied on this coupling of the Father's power and goodness to account for the Son's eternal procession: "Him whom God begot, because he could not beget one better than himself (for nothing is better than God), he begot as his equal. For if he wanted to do so and could not, he is weak; if he could do so and did not want to, he is envious. From this it is clear that he begot his Son as his equal."[5]

Our author could describe God's tri-relational substance as either a *simplex multiplicitas* or a *multiplex simplicitas*.[6] The Father and Son and Holy Spirit are consummately united as well as perfectly individuated. Because God's very nature is constituted by personal relationship with the other, the Father is the Father for no other reason than that he begets the Son, the Son is entirely identified with his being begotten by the Father, while the Holy Spirit is defined by a simultaneous origination and uniting of both Father and Son. As Augustine would argue, against any Arian tendencies, the only difference

3. Cf. *en. Ps.* 113, *exp.*1.14.

4. *Gn. Litt* 4.16: "sed bona facere si non, nulla esset inuidentia. quia ergo est omnipotens et bonus, omnia ualde bona fecit"; CSEL 28.113.

5. *diu. qu.;* Teske, *Miscellaneous Questions* (I, 12), 62.

6. *Trin.* 6.4.6; CCL 50.234.

between the persons of the Trinity is relational, never substantial. As such, this interrelatedness of the Trinity demonstrates an unequaled type of being whose identity is completely constituted by personal relation.[7]

Augustine sees this equality of the divine persons as a constant teaching of all the Catholic commentators (*catholici tractatores*) who have written before him, namely that, "Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity; and therefore there are not three gods but one God; although indeed the Father has begotten the Son, and therefore he who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son is begotten by the Father, and therefore he who is the Son is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, himself coequal to the Father and the Son, and belonging to the threefold unity."[8] Augustine could see such generosity in the very life of the Trinity. That is, the Christian distinction of the divine persons reveals how union with a divine person does not obliterate personal characteristics or differences. While of course the unity enjoyed within the Trinity and the unity God grants to creatures is not identical, we nonetheless see how the perfect otherness of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit prepares us to understand how creatures can be called to be partakers of the divine life without foregoing their alterity as well.

Augustine was aware that the triune agents of Genesis 1 were not conspicuously clear.[9] Nonetheless, in spite of the lack

7. Augustine clarifies to his Arian opponents that there are only two ways to speak of God: "substance-wise" and "relationship-wise," not only because there can be neither change nor modification within the Godhead (thus no speaking of God "accident-wise"), but because the only personal identity each of the divine persons possesses is spoken of in terms of substantial relationship. This is his argument in the first half of Trin. 5.

8. *Trin.* 1.4.7; Hill, *Trinity,* 69; CCL 50.35.

9. Cf., *Trin.* 2.10.17: "Contextio quidem ipsa scripturae nusquam transire sentitur a persona ad personam"; CCL 50.102.

of conspicuous clarity, he was delighted to see how a careful reading of Genesis 1 revealed how the entire Trinity is found there.[10] In the opening two lines of scripture he thus discerned how: "The Father in the word 'God' and the Son in the word 'beginning'; the beginning, not for the Father but for the creation created at the start through himself, and chiefly for the spiritual, and consequently for the totality of creation; while with scripture saying: *And the Spirit of God was being borne over the water* (Gen. 1:2), we recognize the complete indication of the Trinity."[11] God's act of creating mirrors the self-giving that eternally occurs within the Trinity: the Father is the one who speaks, the Son is the *principium* in whom all things are made, and the Spirit hovers over the waters as a sign of God's unifying order and dominion.

Both Augustine's Platonism as well as his Christianity allowed him to see how the corporeal world images the intelligible world. Together, both schools of thought equipped him to see the visible world as the externalization of God's goodness which participates in and consequently manifests signs of God's life. Eugene TeSelle also suggests that the concept of God's holding all things together in a purposeful whole (*continet*, συνέχει) could have easily come to Augustine by way of Cicero, Varro, and Porphyry.[12] Moreover, in Plotinus's final treatise against those Gnostics who denigrate the material universe, Augustine would have gladly read there that to love God is also to love the visible world which God has providentially brought about.

Evident throughout his *Timaeus*, Plato presented this world as an imitation of the imitable and perfect pattern.[13] Plotinus

10. Cf., *ciu. Dei* 11.32; CCL 47.352.

11. *Gn. litt.* 1.6; CSEL 28.10; Hill, *Genesis*, 173. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 5.11, 11.24; *Gn. litt.* 9.15; *s.* 126.10, *s.* 182.3.

12. Eugene TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1970), 117.

13. Both an intelligible pattern as well as a visible imitation of that pattern which

would later maintain that visible existents in this world are beautiful because of that original beauty in the other world.[14] Plotinus came to liken those who belittle the material order to ingrates who, ignorant of the goodness of the lodging provided them, have the audacity to revile both the house and its maker.[15] The philosophical tradition from which Augustine works clearly maintains that the visible world is (1) a good work and (2) an icon capable of lifting human minds to the creator. Accordingly, Augustine recounts in his *Confessions:* "I put my question to the earth, and it replied, 'I am not he' .... And to all things which stood around the portals of my flesh I said, 'Tell me of my God.... You are not he, but tell me something of him.' Then they lifted up their mighty voices and cried, 'He made us.' My questioning was my attentive spirit, and their reply, their beauty."[16]

If the Platonic books prepared Augustine to find vestigial traces of the divine within this acclamatory creation, his study of scripture poised him to look for a triad within creation. Pierre Courcelle correctly argues that Augustine was present for Ambrose's preaching on Genesis after 385, and accordingly would have heard the Bishop of Milan develop his triadic structure of creation.[17] Drawing from Paul's *a quo, per quem, in quo* (Rom. 11:36), Ambrose delineated the creative act as one of beginning and origin [*principium et origo*], the continuation of all being [*continuatio*], and the end for which all creatures have been brought into being [*finis*]. These three properties are then reinterpreted as the material [*materia*],

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is subject to becoming (μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος ... γένεσιν καὶ ὁρατόν) are essential to the argument throughout: cf. *Timaeus* 48E–49A.

14. *Enneads* 2.9.17; Armstrong 2.292.

15. Cf. *Enneads* 2.9.18.

16. *conf.* 10.6.9; Boulding, *Confessions*, 242–43; cf. *s.* 241.2: "Pulchritudo eorum, confessio eorum"; PL 38.1134.

17. Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin* (Paris: Boucard, 1950), 98–103.

the binding and linking [*ligauit atque constrinxit*], as well as the endurance [*manent*] of all creation.[18] We shall see how Augustine reworks these triads, but it is Ambrose who first comes to provide him with a new way of reading Genesis.

Departing from Milan, Augustine quickly made this schema operative. In Rome (387–88), he initially utilizes Rom. 11:36 to describe how all things come to be.[19] Later, having landed in North Africa, he next discovers how the triad found at Ws 11:21 could be a way to identify the Father with Measure, the Son with Number, and the Holy Spirit with Order.[20] Very early on in his intellectual development, then, creation is understood to be *doxologically deiform* in that all creatures are iconic and derivatively divine. Each creature is ontologically good and perpetually confesses its triune creator.

By 389, Augustine arrived at the understanding of how such divine symmetry clearly manifests triadic traces in all created substances. He eagerly writes to his dear friend, Nebridius, that he now sees how every substance displays three characteristics: that it exists [*sit*], that it is either this or that [*hoc uel illud*], and that it remains in so far as it is able [*maneant*, *quantum potest*].[21] By contemplating this triadic nature of every creature he encountered, Augustine came to realize how: "Every particular thing, you see, or substance or essence or nature, or whatever else you like to call it, has simultaneously these three aspects: that it is one something, and that it is distinguished by its own proper look or species from other things, and that it does not overstep the order of things."[22]

18. Ambrose, *Hexameron* 1.5.19; CSEL 32.16.

19. Cf. *quant.* 34.77 and *mor.* 1.14.24.

20. The first instance of this passage is found at *Gn. adu. Man*. 1.16.26 in 388–89; cf. Cornelius Mayer, "Creatio, creator, creatura," *Augustinus Lexikon*, 56–116; 84.

21. *ep.* 11.3; PL 33.76.

22. *uera rel.* 7.13; Hill, *On True Relgion*, 38: "Omnis enim res uel substantia uel essentia uel natura uel si quo alio uerbo melius enuntiatur, simul habet haec tria: ut et unum aliquid sit et specie propria discernatur a ceteris et rerum ordinem non excedat"; CCL 32.196–97.

Even though Augustine's taxonomy varies throughout his writing, he consistently sees how every creature displays three distinct factors. In this passage from *De Vera Religione* we see how every creature (1) is one thing [*unum aliquid sit*], (2) is a particular kind of something [*species propria*], and (3) strives to remain in its proper ordering [*ordinem non excedat*]. Later on, these created triads would be indiscriminately described as *esse*, *essentia*, *manentia.*[23] Augustine also calls these triads *mensura*, *numerus*, and *pondus*.[24] At other times he presents them as *mensura*, *numerus*, *modus*,[25] *modus*, *species*, *ordo*.[26] Or, finally, they are called *unitas*, *species*, and *ordo*.[27] While the terms may differ, Augustine is consistent in expressing how (1) the first term of each of these triads is always a capacity or "measure" of existence, (2) the second term is a certain reason or formed beauty, and (3) the third represents an existent's importance or place within the divine arrangement of things.[28]

May we simply attribute these three effects to each person of the Trinity respectively? Picking up on St. Paul's counsel to find the invisible God in his visible creation, Augustine advises that we should know the creator by *understanding the things that are made* (Rom. 1:20) and to understand him as triune [*trinitatem*], as traces [*uestigium*] of this Trinity appear fitting-

23. Cf. *ep.* 11.3.

24. Cf. *conf.* 5.4.7; *Trin.* 3.9.18. Note also the triad of *esse*, *nosse*, *uelle* at *conf.* 13.11.12 when Augustine turns explicitly to the creation of the human mind; CCL 27.247.

25. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 4.3.

26. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 11.15; *c. Faust.* 21.6.

27. *Trin.* 6.10.12. For more on these triads, see the tables at TeSelle, *Augustine The Theologian*, 120–21.

28. James O'Donnell raises many possible sources for this triadic structuring. He first enlists Willi Theiler's conjecture that it comes from the Neoplatonic *ousia*, *eidos*, and *taxis* [cf. Willi Theiler, *Porphyrios und Augustin* (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1933), 11–12, 32–34]; but then also admits that Olivier du Roy has a "careful refutation" of this position [cf. Olivier du Roy, *L'Intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin* (Paris: Études augustinnienes, 1966), 402–08]. O'Donnell next states that this triad has "evident connections" with the opening of Ambrose's *Hexameron* where the Bishop of Milan acknowledges an Aristotelian influence (cf. *Hexameron*, *dies primus* 1.1; CSEL 32.1), *Augustine:* Confessions *II: Commentary*, 48.

ly throughout creation.[29] Although evidence of the Trinity is discernible in creatures, are we able to delineate the proper action of each divine person? Are we able to predicate bestowal of all existence to the Father, the nature of what something is to the Son, and the continual sustaining of a creature's being to the Holy Spirit? One noted authority does just that. Commenting on the letter to Nebridius mentioned above (*ep.* 10), Serge Lancel writes that, "Each of these three dimensions—or properties—of the substance refers to one of the persons of the Trinity: the first, existence [*esse*] makes known the Principle (or Cause) of nature and relates to its creator, the Father; the second, Form [*species*], refers to the Son, while one must recognize in the Holy Ghost the Permanence [*manentia*] in which all things are."[30]

Although he fails to admit that Augustine nowhere puts forth such a crisp equation as he suggests here, Lancel's interpretation does hold up when we examine other primary texts. First, it is clear that ontological primacy lies with the Father. All that exists does so because of his willingness to impart existence.[31] The Father is the agent, with all *esse* attributed to him. Accordingly, Genesis's depiction of God's "rest" on the seventh day must be understood to imply the heavenly sovereignty in creating and not in the Father's ceasing to create. The Father is at work (cf. John 5:17) during every temporal moment because every contingent creature necessarily relies on an existence that it cannot possess through its own nature.[32]

29. *Trin.* 6.10.12: "Oportet igitur ut creatorem *per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicientes* trinitatem intellegamus cuius in creatura quomodo dignum est apparet *uestigium*"; CCL 50.242.

30. Serge Lancel, *St. Augustine*, translated by Antonia Nevill (London: SCM Press, 2002), 133.

31. Cf. *uera rel.* 31.58.

32. Cf. *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.22.33; *conf.* 13.24.35-37. John 5:17 is Augustine's corrective to a possible deistic reading of his other beloved passage when discussing creation, Sir 18:1, "he created all things simultaneously together." In a single moment God initially brought about all that is but continues to bring new individuals out of that

The working of the Father is a continuation [*continuationem*] of the same work achieved at the world's original foundation [*conderet*].[33] Since all is continuously derived from the Father, his work must be incessant. The inability of the creature to sustain itself is the result of the nothingness from which God makes all things (a point we shall return to later). All existents are in constant need of the Father's agency and ceaseless bestowal of being.

The Father creates with and through the Son. Interpreting the first pages of sacred scripture in light of John's Prologue, Augustine reads Genesis's *in principio* as *in Verbo* since "God made heaven and earth in the beginning, not in the beginning of time but in Christ, since he was the Word with the Father, through which and in which all things were made."[34] At one point Augustine even interprets the beginning of the cosmos in light of the Son's nuptial relationship with his people. Patterned on the Trinity's love, creation is a beloved expression of the Son's joy before the Father, never his rival or opposition:

> When some changeable creature advises us, we are but led to that stable Truth, where we truly learn as we stand still and listen to him, and are filled with joy on hearing the Bridegroom's voice, and surrender ourselves once more to him from whom we came. He is "the Beginning" for us in the sense that if he were not abidingly the same, we should have nowhere to return to after going astray.[35]

The one in whom all is made is also the one through whom we return: created in the Word, creation approaches the Father only through the Son, proving to be both the Father's earthly *exitus* and humanity's heavenly *reditus* as well. The Word thus

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original genesis. Augustine distinguishes between the initial *conditio* and the ongoing *administratio* (cf. *uera rel*., 43). See section 6 of Cornelius Mayer, "Die Lehre von der Simultanschöpfung," s.v. "Creatio, creator, creatura," *Augustinus Lexikon*, 76–78.

33. cf. *Gn. litt*. 4.12; CSEL 28.208-09.

34. *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.2.3; Hill, *Genesis*, 40.

35. *conf.* 11.8.10; Boulding, *Confessions*, 291–92; CCL 27.199.

bridges Augustine's theology of creation with his doctrine of salvation.[36] Since the divine Word is itself perfect likeness of unity and absolute truth, every created existent shines that Word forth insofar as each existent participates in the unity and in the truth of the imitable Beginning.[37]

When describing the trinitarian act of creating, Augustine's overt reliance upon the role of the Holy Spirit seems to pale when compared with the work attributed to the Father who imparts existence and the Son who forms it.[38] Augustine rightly sees how the Holy Spirit is the one divine person by whom the other two are joined: by which the begotten is loved by the begetter and in whom he loves the begetter.[39] Here he may have very well encountered a concept of unitive love found in Marius Victorinus's hymns on the Trinity, where the Spirit is defined as *copula* or *connexio*.[40] As the eternal unity between the Father and the Son, the Spirit continues his role of uniting in the economy: first, by holding all creatures in existence and, second, by ordering each of them into a beautiful whole.

First, Augustine places the existential permanence of creatures under the domain of the Holy Spirit (as we read above in his letter to Nebridius). Augustine finds this a fitting role for the Spirit: a holy and fitting courtesy [*benignitas summa, et sancta et iusta*], a love coming not from any need but from his generosity.[41] He then goes on to delineate the two effects of

36. The Word's uniting the "beginning" with the "end" is also found in Irenaeus, *Aduersus Haereses* 4.20.4; "Est autem hic Verbum eius, Dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui in nouissimis temporibus homo in hominibus factus est, ut finem coniungeret principio, hoc est hominem Deo"; SC 100.634.

37. Cf. *uera. rel.* 36.66.

38. "Creatio, creator, creatura," Mayer, s.v., *Augustinus Lexikon*, 72.

39. *Trin.* 6.5.7; CCL 50.235.

40. *Hymnus Primus*, line 4, *SC* 68. 620; *Hymnus Tertius*, line 242, SC 68.650, respectively.

41. *Gn. litt.* 1.5: "inest enim deo benignitas summa et sancta et iusta et quidam non ex indigentia, sed ex beneficientia ueniens amor in opera sua"; CSEL 28.9. John

this love: (1) that God creates and (2) that this creation should abide.[42] Here the love of God and the existence of creatures are again united. The Spirit preserves and orders by giving all things a share in divine immutability or permanence [*manentia*], thereby not only actualizing creatures but also holding them in existence.

The second type of union achieved by the Spirit has to do with the cosmos as a whole, described by Augustine at times as an *ordo* or at other times as a *pondus*. As Augustine imagines, "weight" leads to a sort of harmonious order, which is a sign of the Spirit's unifying love: "A body gravitates to its proper place by its own weight.... They are not at rest as long as they are disordered, but once brought to order they find their rest. Now, my weight is my love, and wherever I am carried, it is this weight that carries me."[43] The cause of such movement is attributed here, first, to the *donum Dei* and, next, to the *ignis Dei*, clear allusions to the Holy Spirit. Through the Spirit, a creature finds both communion with God as well as its proper positioning within the Father's creation. This is how the cosmos manifests a magnificent arrangement of creatures; and although Augustine might not personally understand why God chose to make such things as mice and worms, flies and frogs, he nonetheless praises God for the order he has imposed upon creation.[44] Here Augustine helps us see that right relationship with God results in a rightly ordered creation. The created order is always an order of love, which James O'Donnell argues is "the animating and governing force of

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Burnaby, *Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine* (London: Canterbury Press, 1989), 164, calls this line "the classical passage on creation as the expression of God's love" but also reminds us that Augustine preferred *bonitas* over *amor* when describing the creator's motive in creating.

42. *Gn. litt.* 1.8: "duo quippe sunt, propter quae amat deus creaturam suam, ut sit et ut maneat"; CSEL 28.11.

43. *conf.* 13.9.10; Boulding, *Confessions*, 348.

44. Cf. *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.16.26; *ciu. Dei* 12.4, 19.13; *Jo eu. tr.* 1.14 where Augustine,

the third person of the trinity."[45] As manifestations of God's love, *manentia*, *ordo*, and *pondus* demonstrate how the Spirit does not merely "hold" creatures in existence, but in so doing arranges them beautifully and purposefully according to the Father's Logocentric plan.

While Augustine always treats the Spirit third in his discussion of the Trinity, this does not imply that the Holy Spirit "arrives" later and completes what the Father and the Son-Logos began. In his work on the ecological implications of Augustine's doctrine of creation, Scott Dunham writes, "The Holy Spirit does not come after the fact to finish the creation.... The Holy Spirit's work is also from the Father, drawing the Father into the delight of his good creation that has found its form in the Eternal Word of the Father."[46] As Dunham would have us imagine it, the Son forms every creature, while the Spirit lifts each to the Father so he may delight in his good creation. With Dunham's help, we are able to see how each person of the Trinity acts in perfect unison with the others: the Father initiates existence (that something is), the Son bestows being and intelligibility (what something is), and the Spirit holds these creatures in a purposeful ordering (how each existent is interconnected within the cosmos). We will have to wait to see how this triune agency fully effects the divinized creature, but the hints are already detected *in principio:* the Father creates in and according to his perfect image, the Word, and through his Spirit, God's love unites the cosmos into a decorous order. If deification is the free sharing of God's uncreated life with an order of being which in no way could otherwise merit or expect such an existential exaltation, creation first prepares the way for such communion.

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of course maintaining that *all* of creation is from God, taunts the Manichees regarding at what level of creation, at what insect, God's creative power begins.

45. O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessions*, vol. 1.47.

46. Scott Dunham, *The Trinity and Creation in Augustine: An Ecological Analysis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 79.

PER QUID FECERIT? THE MECHANICS OF AUGUSTINIAN CREATION

From "the beginning," creation has had a definite filial stamp. The Word's manner and way of being God is the foundation and pattern of all creation; the Son's eternal stance before the Father is the model which all creatures imitate. Although this next section focuses on the Word's forming of all creatures, we must first examine the significance of *creatio ex nihil*, a principle which serves as Augustine's way of protecting both the omnipotence and the otherness of God. Contingent being is not made out of some co-eternal principle set alongside God (thus preserving the divine omnipotence), nor is it made out of God's own substance (preserving the divine otherness). Neither coerced nor rewarded to create, God brings about other beings only out of his desire to share what he himself is.

Within Christianity's argument for God's sole dominion, the doctrine of creation out of nothing had to be clarified. Some earlier thinkers, like Justin Martyr, were content to see God's majesty as one which skillfully altered shapeless matter.[47] However, later theologians argued that if God is God of *all*, it is unthinkable that something exists alongside of him or that he fashioned the world out of some primordial matter. A doctrine only implicit in scripture (cf. 2 Macc. 7:28; Rom. 4:17; Heb. 11:3), by Augustine's day, *creatio ex nihil* distinguished Christian cosmologies from those positions of thought which found it necessary to separate the good God of salvation from the evil god of matter and corporeality.[48]

Augustine's doctrine of *creatio ex nihil* involves other central theological principles as well. We see evidence, for example, of how creation out of nothing and the goodness of

47. Cf. 1 *Apol.* §59.

48. For the gradual emergence of this distinction, see Gerhard May, *Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of "Creation Out of Nothing" in Early Christian Thought*, translated by A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994).

creation and the consequent parasitic nature of evil are connected. At *Confessions* 7.12.18, where he extols the intellectual strengths of Neoplatonism and recalls how it freed him from the crude and carnal bonds of Manichaeism, he weaves together the sole majesty of God, the goodness of creation, and the insubstantiality of evil:

> Everything that exists is good, then; so evil, the source of which I was seeking, cannot be a substance, because if it were, it would be good. Either it would be an indestructible substance, and that would mean it was very good indeed, or it would be a substance liable to destruction—but then it would not be destructible unless it were good. I saw, then, for it was made clear to me, that you have made all good things, and that there are absolutely no substances that you have not made.[49]

Because all things come from God, it is clear that nothing is equal to God. Furthermore, only God's existence is supreme and therefore immutable; yet, to say that God alone is immune from destruction [*corruptio*] is by no means to conclude that all other existents are evil. On the contrary: because all things come from God, all things are good. Evil can no longer be understood as a separate rival but always as a corruption parasitically dependent upon an ontologically good substance.[50]

But from this nothingness, what does God create? Here Augustine invents the term *formabilitas* in order to describe the "ability to be formed" inhering in all creatures.[51] This

49. *conf.* 7.12.18; Boulding, *conf.* 128–29: "Ergo quaecumque sunt, bona sunt, malumque illud, quod quaerebam unde esset, non est substantia, quia si substantia esset, bonum esset. Aut enim esset incorruptibilis substantia, magnum utique bonum, aut substantia corruptibilis esset, quae nisi bona esset, corrumpi non posset. Itaque uidi et manifestatum est mihi, quia omnia bona tu fecisti et prorsus nulla substantiae sunt, quas tu non fecisti"; CCL 27.104–05.

50. Against the possibility that some other first principle may have given rise to the fallen angels, this argument is developed at *ciu. Dei* 12.2 where Augustine's interpretation of Exod. 3:14 reveals God as supreme being while all other existents are beings, "some more," "some less": "Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit: rebus, quae ex nihilo creauit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse; aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinauit"; CCL 47.357.

51. *Gn. litt.* 5.5, but notice how the only usage of *formabilitas* given in Lewis and

formability enjoys a certain priority amongst creation because it precedes the formation of all else: it is not any definable creature, but it is "that from which all else" can be formed by God's Word. Formability is conceptually prior to any determinate creature because it comes into existence along with time. To express this difficult topic, Augustine writes: "This therefore is the book of created heaven and earth: That in the beginning God created heaven and earth, according to a certain formability of matter, if I may put it so, which consequently had to have been formed by his Word, preceding its own formation, not in time, but in origin."[52] Immediately after introducing this novel concept, Augustine moves right on to Genesis 2:5, unfortunately leaving what he means by *formabilitas* undeveloped.

However, by turning to *Confessions* 12 we detect two important characteristics of this formability. Although he was not in possession of this precise term *formabilitas* in his earlier writings, Augustine had come to the realization that there must be some primal creature, a *nihil aliquid* or an *est non est* as he then called it.[53] It seems that such *formabilitas* is "almost nothing" because it is "almost anything." So what can we learn about formability from this section of the *Confessions?*

First, formability is the pure capacity to receive every other kind of form and definition. This is why Augustine can also name this initial creature a *quaedam informitas sine ulla specie*,[54] or a *capax formarum omnium*.[55] This initial creature is

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Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, is Augustine's *Gn. Ad Lit. 5,4* (London: Clarendon Press, [1879] 1958), 768, due to the difference in textual divisions between the PL as found in Lewis and Short and the CSEL where this term appears at 5.5, CSEL 28.147.

52. *Gn. litt.* 5.5; Hill, *Genesis*, 284: "Hic est ergo liber creaturae caeli et terrae, quia in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, secundum materiae quandam, ut ita dicam, formabilitatem, quae consequenter uerbo eius formanda fuerat, praecedens formationem suam, non tempore, sed origine"; CSEL 28.147.

53. *conf.* 12.6.6; CCL 27.218.

54. *conf.* 12.3.3; CCL 27.218.

55. *conf.* 12.6.6; CCL 27.219; cf. *s.* 214.2 where *creatio ex nihil* and formability are discussed together.

so named for out of this primal creature the formation of all other contingent existents, spiritual and material alike, is understood. Secondly, the latter books of the *Confessions* assist us in understanding what is meant by the rather enigmatic phrase found above, *praecedens formationem suam, non tempore, sed origine*, a phrase which appears two more times in the same commentary to describe this inherent capacity to be formed.[56] Formability is created simultaneously with time but is said to precede all else because it is that out of which all else (including time) comes. It is the way a voice "precedes" distinct words.[57] Formability could also be the way a sound has logical priority before the song that it forms (as imagined earlier in the *Confessions*).[58] We shall see this relationship between the discursive unfolding of created things and the genesis of formability when we next turn to our key text where Augustine wonders if formability had to be spoken into being at all, because formability is not the same as a kind of created thing that must adhere to the Father in the Word. Yet, as a creature, formability is indeed contingent, remaining so completely undetermined that it is not susceptible to the alterations of temporality. It is not so much changeable as it is changeable-ness. Augustine can therefore juxtapose this "lowest" creature with the "highest"—formlessness with the "heaven of heaven"—as both are unaffected by vicissitudes of temporality, and yet neither is co-eternal with God.[59]

As we saw above, by the time the later *De Genesi ad Litteram* (401–15) is composed, *formabilitas* always appears in terms of its need to be formed by the Word of God. In order not to remain indistinct, formability must be fashioned into a definite creature by the Word [*uerbo eius formanda*].[60] The

56. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 7.27 and 8.20.
57. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 1.15; CSEL 28.21.
58. Cf. *conf.* 12.29.40: "Sed prior est origine, quia non cantus formatur, ut sonus sit, sed sonus formatur, ut cantus sit"; CCL 27.239.
59. *conf.* 12.12.15; CCL 27.223.
60. *Gn. litt.* 5.5; CSEL 28.147.

Word bestows form and thus bestows particular natures. In fact, there is no creature that escapes this formative process: all levels of creation must be open to the activity of the Son and thus become like him in receptively turning toward the Father. But why is this discussion important when we examine Augustine's understanding of creation's unity with the divine? It is significant because it prepares us to see how all of creation (even at its most formless) both comes from God and is constantly being formed by adhering to God. From this indeterminate formability to the highest of angels, all creatures are instantaneously good, are inseparably united with and in the Word, and are thus simultaneously deiform.

Augustinian cosmology is an existential *dia-logue* between creator and creation, a formative *con-vers*(*at*)*ion* carried on through the Word which makes creatures what they are to be. Such a cosmology allowed Augustine to see how contingent creation bears a kind of "silent testimony" to both its original nothingness as well as to its gracious maker who "could have been none other than God, the ineffably and invisibly great, the ineffably and invisibly beautiful."[61] Creation for Augustine is wonderfully dramatic because it bespeaks both God and nothingness: it tells of God insofar as it shares in the good and the beautiful, but it points to nothingness insofar as it suffers change and the tendency toward non-being. Augustine explains, "Heaven and earth plainly exist, and by the very fact that they undergo change and variation they cry out that they were made.... Heaven and earth proclaim that they did not make themselves."[62] Brought out of nothing [*ex nihil*] in the Word, creation receives its existence, form, unity, and beauty from the Word by imitating him in adhering to the Father and thus receiving these otherwise unattainable attributes. In the

61. *ciu. Dei* 11.4; Bettenson, *City of God*, 432.
62. *conf.* 11.4.6; Boulding, *Confessions*, 288.

Father's *fiat,* all creatures instantaneously turn toward God in order to receive existence and to participate in being itself.[63] To understand this concept, let us now take up our next key text, *De Genesi ad Litteram* 1.4.

Augustine began his most sustained commentary on Genesis sometime between 399 and 404, working on it with different degrees of intensity until its completion in 415.[64] It is divided into three main parts. Books 1–5 continue the church's established practice of Hexameron commentary, exegeting Gen. 1:1 through God's rest on the seventh day as evidenced in Gen. 2:3. Books 6–11 treat the rest of Genesis 2 as well as Genesis 3, while the final book looks at St. Paul's understanding of the "third heaven" as depicted in 2 Cor. 12:2–4. By a "literal" reading, Augustine intends to read the narrative of Genesis as describing real events and not simply as a figurative text whose meaning could be fulfilled only in reference to something else, as if each word could be understood only with reference to enigmatic events in the future.[65]

To explain the *fiat* of Genesis, Augustine weaves many key protological principles together. The Father speaks only in his Word whose life is portrayed as one of eternal adherence. As we traced at this chapter's beginning, the relationship between God the Father and God the Son becomes the model for all created being, all things imitating the Word's conforming adherence to the Father. Augustine accordingly asks:

> Or is it that when the unformed basic material, whether of spiritual or bodily being, was first being made, it was not appropriate to say

63. For Augustine's choice to follow a Porphyrian and not a Plotinian lead in referring to God more as "being itself" rather than "the One," cf. John Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 258.

64. Cf. Marie-Anne Vannier, *"Creatio," "conversio," "formatio" chez S. Augustin* (Paradosis 31: Fribourg, 1991), 88; for a summary of this work, see her "Conversio, Creatio, Formatio chez S. Augustin," *Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum* (Rome: Augustinianum, 1987), 9–21.

65. *Gn. litt*. 1.17: "secundum proprietatem rerum gestarum, non secundum aenigmata futurarum"; CSEL 28.25.

God said, Let it be made, because it is by the Word, always adhering to the Father, that God eternally says everything, not with the sound of a voice nor with thoughts running through the time which sounds take, but with the light, co-eternal with himself, of the Wisdom he has begotten; and imperfection or incompleteness does not imitate the form of this Word, being unlike that which supremely and originally is, and tending by its very want of form toward nothing? Rather, it is when it turns, everything in the way suited to its kind, to that which truly and always is, to the creator that is to say of its own being, that it really imitates the form of the Word which always and unchangingly adheres to the Father, and receives its own form, and becomes a perfect, complete creature.[66]

Although Augustine's main concern in this passage is to make sense of the origin of formability, there are four aspects of this passage that help us to see how he understood creation's adherence to God. The first is the relationship between the Father and the Word, setting the pattern for how creatures are to be united to God. The second is creation's conversion toward God, apart from which there could be no definite natures. The third aspect is how all must imitate the Word, marking all of creation with a clear Logocentric stamp. From this imitation comes the fourth point, the Word's bestowal of form on every created thing.

First, the relationship between the Father and his Word is introduced in terms of an unending adherence [*cohaerere*]. This is an eternal and equal bond, and here the Father speaks all else into being through his very Word. He speaks with neither audible sounds nor with discursive thoughts, but with a co-eternal light. Notice the change in possible images to explain how the Father operates with the Word: Augustine first entertains how this operation might be likened to speaking and then to thinking, but then settles on the image of light, perhaps relying on the biblical and creedal imagery of the Son as light as well as possibly also drawing from the Platonic in-

66. *Gn. litt.* 1.4; Hill, *Genesis*, 171; CSEL 28.7-8.

sistence that light is an illuminating medium which brings all else into visible existence.[67]

At the end of the preceding section, Augustine proposed that a creature is simultaneously made as well as illumined by the creator's calling all contingent being back to himself (*eam* [*lucem*] *reuocante ad se creatore, conuersio eius facta atque inluminata intellegatur*).[68] A creature's turn toward God is synonymous with its being made as well as with its being "illumined" into a particular nature.[69] Seemingly, Augustine settles on light as an apt image with which to describe the divine initiative of creation because it better highlights the simultaneous nature of the creative act. As God's power is not weakened or threatened in the act of creation, so too is light not diminished when distributed. Not only is light an ecclesially sanctioned image for the Son (Nicaea's *lumen de lumine*), it also seems to admit more readily of co-equality with the Father than either speech or thought. In this way, light can come from light without gradation or subordination while also illumining others without their becoming equal in nature to the light which shines upon them.[70]

Such adherence of the Word to the Father becomes the pattern from which God creates. In so doing, creation is constituted to follow its creative Word and imitate that same divine adherence. Completely one with—yet, not personally identical with—the Father, the Son's filial adherence is *the* paradigm of creation's essential turn to the divine. This is the second important component of this passage: creation's conversion.

Conversion for Augustine is an equivocal term, taking on different meanings in different contexts. Borrowed from the philosophical world of his day, terms such as *strépho* and *epis-*

67. Cf. Plato, *Republic,* 508D.

68. *Gn. litt.* 1.3; CSEL 28.7.

69. At *s.* 170.11 this metaphor will be used again: to turn to God is to enter into light whereas divine aversion translates into darkness.

70. Cf. *f. et sym.* 6; CSEL 41.

trépho could generically mean a turning back or a changing of direction. They also, more specifically, could refer to a conversion of mind, namely an alteration in one's intellectual or religious convictions. Pierre Hadot provides a helpful definition: "*épistrophè*, qui signifie changement de direction, implique l'idée de retour."[71] Such a return, *epistrophe*, is the fundamental requirement of all creatures, while the free conversion or *metanoia* demanded by higher creatures is our focus when we treat the human person as an *imago Dei*, the only visible creature capable of such free conversion.

Before Adam and Eve, "conversion" could still be synonymous with every created being's essential reliance upon God. When commenting on the first five days of creation as found in Genesis, for example, Augustine cannot yet use "conversion" as a deliberate or rational choice, but as an ontological necessity by which every creature becomes what it is. Before it takes on any personal dimension, Augustinian conversion first denotes the necessitated act of turning toward the origin of all existence. At this level, Augustinian *conuersio* thus evokes the movement of Neoplatonic *epistrophe*, which he certainly found in the philosophical books of his earlier years. Plotinus, for example, relies on conversion to show how a being, and the nature of that being, is brought about only when the being turns back to its higher reality. For example, Nous comes into being *qua* Nous by turning back to the One: "This, when it has come into being [γενόμενον], turns back upon [ἐπεστράφη] the One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being."[72] This process of turning to the source of

71. Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1981), 175, as in Vannier, *Conversio*, 11.

72. *Enneads* 5.2.1; Armstrong, 5.58-59.

an existent's being continues throughout the Plotinian cosmos, thus uniting the world into a harmonious whole. There are four important points to highlight in order to understand how Augustine envisions creation's conversion toward God. From these we see four key aspects of Augustine's doctrine of creation as conversion.

First, this "turn" toward the One reveals the ultimate dependence of all derived existents upon the One. Second, this turn is the means by which the One is represented throughout the visible cosmos. Here Augustine must have found a convenient way of explaining creation's need to be converted continuously toward God as well as a way of showing how God is manifest in all of his good creation. Third, Augustine calls this conversion an imitation: creatures imitate the Word insofar as they come to the Father. Brought from nothing, creation is given existence and a definable nature only in the Word. Like the Word, then, creation must cleave and remain fast to the Father. This is how all existents brought about *ex nihil* must be formed by adhering to the immutable and everlasting. Because of their status as contingent beings, creatures must necessarily imitate the Word's adherence to the Father. All creation is thus like the Word and is essentially constituted so as to emulate the Word's union with the Father.

Fourth, and finally, creation's deformity is overcome by the Logos's self-disclosure of form.[73] As early as the completion of Book 2 of *De Libero Arbitrio* (391–95), Augustine understood how the reception of form is the acquiring of existence and perfection, while the loss of form is a reduction to non-being. Form is what perfects and completes a creature. Form is received as each existent turns back to the divine, thereby acquiring existence and the perfections inherent in each created nature.[74] In the words of Gerhart Ladner, this formation is

73. Cf. *lib. arb*. 2.16.44-17.46.

74. Cf. Vannier, *Creatio,* 14.

not a "reformation" because there is not yet any estrangement from the divine. Ladner writes that for Augustine's optimistic doctrine of creation, "there can be no *reformatio* because there had been no *forma*, there can be no *formatio* of a still *informis creatura;* this *formatio* consists in *reuocatio* to God of a creature, which, when it was drawn out of nothingness, found itself outside God, and in *conuersio* of that creature to Him."[75] Ladner accurately portrays Augustine's doctrine of creation as an initial moment of formation: divinely desired and good, creation does not stand in need of any reformation prior to humanity's free misuse of it.[76]

Let us now take up the next few lines of *De Genesi ad Litteram* 1.4 which follows the passage just analyzed above. Here Augustine recapitulates the four themes we just discussed and brings them into clearer focus. The Word is the Father's perfect likeness and equality; the Son is defined again by his constant adherence to the Father; and creation's conversion, formation, and imitation are again the means *per quid fecerit:*

> By so turning back and being formed creation imitates, every element in its own way, God the Word, that is the Son of God who always adheres to the Father in complete likeness and equality of being, by which he and the Father are one; but it does not imitate this form of the Word if it turns away from the creator and remains formless and imperfect, incomplete … when it says, *In the beginning God made heaven and earth* (Gen. 1:1); here he is being suggested as the source of creation still in its formless imperfection. But the Son is being alluded to as being also the Word where the text runs *God said, Let it be made*. Thus his being the beginning implies his being

75. Gerhart B. Ladner, "St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God," *Augustinus Magister* II (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1954–55), 867–78; 872.

76. This is in line with what James K. A. Smith, "Staging the Incarnation: Revisioning Augustine's Critique of Theatre," *Literature and Theology* 15 (June, 2001): 123–39, argues when he writes that Augustine's "most unPlatonic moment [is] located in his affirmation of the goodness of materiality based on a logic of creation rather than emanation," 131.

the source of creation as it comes into being from him while still imperfect, while his being the Word implies his conferring perfection on creation by calling it back to himself, so that it may be given form by adhering to the creator, and by imitating in its own measure the form which adheres eternally and unchangingly to the Father, and which instantly gets from him to be the same thing as he is.[77]

Logocentric and filial in nature, creation must inescapably imitate the Son's turn *toward* and loving communion *with* the Father. Only God has existence *in se* and everything else must receive from God the being upon which all their other natural attributes will be predicated. A creature's conversion back to and subsequent formation by [*conuersione et formatione*] the Father is of course neither eternal nor equal as is the Son's eternal conversion. Yet by adhering to the Father and thereby receiving their form, creatures imitate the perfect and eternal Form. The more a creature is turned toward that Word, the more that creature becomes like the Word.

This is how creation's perfection and completion is determined: by its imitation of the Word's adherence to the Father. After the Trinity's perfect unity of persons, of course, this is the most basic and necessary type of divine communion: in and through the Word, the Father grants *esse* to contingent being through a constant and uninterrupted conversion back to himself. Such inseparableness grants every creature, each in its own way, divine imitability. Without creation's inherent formation by and subsequent conversion toward God, there is no creation of which to speak. This total dependence of creation on its creator underscores the deiform nature of all of creation. Or as Michael Hanby puts it:

God is not one actor alongside others whose agency can be treated as an efficient quantifiable force in relation to the force of other agencies. Nor are creatures patients awaiting actualization prior to God's

77. *Gn. litt.* 1.4; Hill, *Genesis*, 171–72; CSEL 28.8.

gift of being. Prior to this gratuity they are simply nothing at all. None of the usual binaries are adequate to the representation of the act of *creation*. Indeed creation, properly speaking, cannot be *represented* at all.[78]

In other words, creation essentially turns toward God so as to receive God's goodness; the notion of "creation" without an ever-active creator is unthinkable for Augustine. Creation is nothing if not a faint imitation of the Son's eternal and unchanging adherence to the Father [*sempiterne atque incommutabiliter inhaerentem patri*].

Examining the components which constitute the central question of creation—*per quid fecerit?*—we have thus far looked at the Word's unity with the Father, the *formabilitas* God first brings about, and the needed conversion and formation of contingent being as it imitates the Son's stance before the Father. Let us now turn to the third and final question Augustine poses about creation: *quare fecerit?*

QUARE FECERIT? GOD'S GOODNESS AND CREATION'S COMMUNAL PRAISE

This final section begins by distinguishing the two senses of "*quare fecerit?*": "Why did God choose to create?" or "Toward what goal did God create?" Only by distinguishing the dual meaning of "*quare?*" can we answer this question for Augustine, as he refuses to entertain answering "*quare?*" in the first sense, "Why did God choose to create?" Augustine knows that in trying to answer the initial sense of "*quare?*" one must always keep in mind that God never acts from compulsion or out of neediness. As self-subsisting joy, God's *gaudium* is in no way increased by what he makes.[79] Yet in the second sense of "*quare fecerit?,*" "Toward what goal did God create?" the

78. Michael Hanby, *Augustine and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2004), 85.
79. Cf. *conf.* 13.4.5.

simplest answer Augustine gives is that God created because God is good, and as good, God is generous. It is in this way that Augustine can argue that creation's "*quare fecerit?*" is a sanctified body of praise convoked for divine communion.

Augustine is willing to venture that the only answer to the question of why God created is found in God's own good will. In fact, since there is nothing greater than God's will, one necessarily errs in seeking its motivations. Augustine accordingly praises God for creating not out of exigency but out of the fullness of his goodness—*ex plenitudine bonitatis tuae*.[80] God creates purely out of his generosity and this divine *bonitas* is the key to Augustine's theology of creation because it is how he puts to rest the Manichaean claim that the material order is the result of an unwanted attack upon the *summum bonum* and thus the product of an unwanted mixture of good and evil: "And the statement, 'God saw that it was good' makes it quite plain that God did not create under stress of any compulsion, or because he lacked something for his own needs; his only motive was goodness."[81] God's goodness is neither under attack nor does it lack anything. The Trinity simply wants to share its divine goodness with existents of a different order of being. Without violating the ineffability of the divine will, Augustine nonetheless discerns a fittingness to God's bringing about a good creation and, as such, there can be no better reason [*nec causa melior*] given for creation than that the author of all goodness wanted to share that which is good.[82] Again,

80. *conf.* 13.2.2; CCL 27.242. Augustine asks about the goodness of all creation because God is supreme goodness, cf. *Trin.* 11.5.8: "deus fecit *omnia bona ualde* non ob aliud nisi quia ipse summe bonus est?"; CCL 50.344. A list of primary texts in which Augustine argues for creation's existence from divine goodness can be found at Fritz von Rintelen, "Bonitas Creationis—Bonitas Dei," *Giornale di metafisica* 9 (1954): 523–41.

81. *ciu. Dei* 11.24; Bettenson, *City of God,* 457; "*Vidit Deus, quia bonum est*, satis significatur Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est, quia bonum est"; CCL 47.343–44.

82. *ciu. Dei* 11.21: "Nec auctor est excellentior Deo, nec ars efficacior Dei uerbo, nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a Deo bono"; CCL 47.340.

divine goodness cannot be jealous, and it accordingly reveals a positive propensity to communicate itself. Most simply put, God creates because he wishes to.[83] Creation is God's purposeful sharing of his goodness with his creatures.

At least once Augustine combines the divine attributes we have hitherto mentioned: God's power, God's lack of jealousy, God's goodness, as well as God's enjoyment of that which he has brought about.[84] God brings other beings into existence and is in no way diminished by his creation: he is neither endangered by hostile forces nor threatened by sharing his life with other beings. Creation exists *for* God; God does not exist for it. As such, if there is no efficient cause to God's creating, we must answer "*quare fecerit?*" only in terms of the purpose for which the created world has been brought into being. In this fashion, Augustine provides us with a way to understand the ultimate purpose of God's good creation.

Augustinian creation is clearly framed between two ontological extremes: simple formability and pure perfection. Both states are motionless and invisible. Moreover, as we saw when we examined *formabilitas* above, the pure potentiality of God's first creative act cannot be a goal or a terminus, but rather the origin of all other goals and termini. Its converse, the higher "limit," is the *caelum caeli*, that created blessedness where eternity and immutability are enjoyed *sine ullo defectu contemplationis*.[85] It is this perfect creature which is the end proleptically contained in Genesis. In this way the church emerges as the answer to the question, "For what end does creation exist?" The denouement of God's good creation is the communal praise offered by his holy creatures.

Early in the Christian tradition, the church is represented

83. *en. Ps.* 134.10: "Non omnia quae fecit, coactus est facere, sed *omnia quaecumque uoluit, fecit*"; CCL 40.1945.

84. *Gn. litt.* 4.16: "sed bona facere si non, nulla est inuidentia. quia ergo est omnipotens et bonus, omnia ualde bona fecit"; CSEL 28.113.

85. *conf.* 12.12.15; CCL 27.223.

as the one for whom the world was made.[86] The conclusion to the *Confessions* also points us toward a similar ecclesial telos of creation. When Augustine peers into the mysteries of creation, he looks at all things in the Word and there sees a multiplicity of goods collected into the church, which God "predestined before time began, when there was neither morning nor evening."[87] All these living things thus point to one purpose: the eternal sabbath, namely, that perfect peace without end [*pacem quietis, pacem sabbati, pacem sine uespera*].[88] A foreigner in the distention of fallen creation, Augustine knows his true rest, his only true happiness, will come by clinging closely to God and he accordingly depicts this *caelum caeli* as a pure love clinging to the only true God [*casto amore cohaerentem deo uero*]. As he conveys, "This order of creation is God's house, neither terrestrial nor some massive celestial building, but a spiritual structure which shares [God's] eternity, and is unstained forever."[89] Only in this celestial *domus* can created persons be purged and made molten by the fire of God's love, and thus be able to flow into the divine.[90] Precisely how this communion of praise effects this sort of union will be the topic of chapter 5, where we shall return to the nature and the purpose of God's church as the ultimate purpose of created existence.

In positing such a communal adherence to God as the purpose of creation, Augustine must argue that creatures made in God's image cannot be perfected simply in the natural, visible order. Persons cannot find rest in anything derived and

86. Cf. *Shepherd of Hermas*, vision 2.8 (II.4) 1.

87. *conf.* 13.34.49; Boulding, *Confessions*, 378.

88. *conf.* 13.35.50; CCL 27.272.

89. *conf.* 12.15.19; Boulding, *Confessions*, 322: "Haec est domus dei non terrena neque ulla caelesti mole corporea, sed spiritalis et particeps aeternitas tuae, quia sine labe in aeternum"; CCL 27.225.

90. *conf.* 11.29.39: "donec in te confluam purgatus et liquidus igne amoris tui"; CCL 27.215.

mutable but only in the unchangeable and everlasting. The *cor inquietum* will settle for no effect of God and, as such, here the two senses of "*quare fecerit?*" conflate into God himself, signifying a key hermeneutic in understanding how creation acts as a prologue to Augustine's theology of divine union. For in the second sense of this question (that is, toward what end have creatures been brought about?), we now see how God again appears as the answer. Creatures exist both *from* and *for* God; they do so never in isolation, but rather as a collective unison of praise and thanksgiving. This is why God created the world: to offer communion with his divine life, to invite this ecclesial convocation of created persons to be united in constant praise and assimilation.

CONCLUSION

We began this chapter with Patric Ronson's accusation that Augustine's cosmos is not inherently in union with its creator. Using Augustine's suggestion at *De Ciuitate Dei* 11.21 that the three most important questions one could ask of a thing are, "Who made it?" "By what means was it made?" and "For what purpose was it made?" we came to see that creation is essentially a *conuersio ad Deum*, an intrinsic reception of God's incessant gift of being. In such a world, creator and creation are never rivals. Rather, creation is an invited participant in the God who freely desires to share his divine felicity in ways befitting various created natures.

In answering who created the world, we encountered a God who is defined by personal relationship. The Father's paternity and the Son's filiation are eternal acts of mutual gift. The complete handing over of the Father is realized by the Son's response and the Son's active gazing upon the Father, permitting the Father's paternity; the Holy Spirit accomplishes this exchange as an eternal act of love uniting Father and Son. As such, creation appears as the first externalization of

the triune life, standing as the preeminent indication that God wills to share his life with other beings.

Not brought out of some pre-existing substrate nor coerced out of anything other than God's generosity, creation for Augustine is far from the Manichaean attack on the good. Rather, creation for Augustine is understood by God's freely choosing to share the divine life with beings who find their meaning and purpose in reflecting their creator's majesty. To some extent, all creatures do this by their mere being.

This is how we begin to answer Augustine's second foundational question: "By what means was creation brought about?" By concentrating on *De Genesi ad Litteram* 1.4, we came to see how all existents must "turn" to the existence-imparting Word. In this way, all creatures show forth a doxological deiformity which bespeaks God's life and activity. Because such *conuersio* is simultaneous with *any* created being, there can be no "pure nature" for Augustine, no pure human virtue, no natural way of understanding anything without some implicit yet radical dependence upon God. But whereas all creatures are unshakably *like* God, those creatures who are created in God's image come to share in God's life in a transforming and unitive way. No creature is co-eternal with God.[91] Nevertheless, every created existent is somehow like its creator. All creatures acknowledge and, in a way suitable to their own natures, praise God. Because each and every existent must participate in God, each creature manifests varying degrees of the divine presence. This is how Augustine came to develop an unconquerable hope when he turned to the world around him.[92] In regarding the world around him, deep throughout God's handiwork Augustine saw a goodness which no sin or corruption could erase. As we shall see, all of creation's contingency

91. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 12.16.

92. Cf. Donald Burt, "Courageous Optimism: Augustine on the Good of Creation," *Augustinian Studies* 21 (1990), 55–66.

and consequent mutability is not due to an inherent evil but to the reality that creatures are not consubstantial with God.[93]

When Augustine sought an answer to creation's "*quare fecerit?*" the praise of creation came into clearer focus. Perfect and in no way lacking, the Trinity nevertheless chose to share its being and life and divinity with others. Gaining nothing by creating, God does so simply to allow others to know and enjoy his own trinitarian life. But now we must direct our attention to the human person in particular. For the ultimate purpose of God's establishing the world is ecclesial communion, the church of praise appearing as the telos of all creation. As much as Augustine sees all of creation as a divinely intended good, the human person is even more God's direct handiwork. Although all of creation is deiform, its fulfillment is realized in the glorification and divinization of the human person who alone is personally and freely capable of becoming one with God. However, because the human person has freely forfeited the divine life God intended, we shall also treat sin, cast by Augustine as the human person's misguided search for deification. The divine image has been distorted by the disobedience of humanity's protoparents: for what was once given to reflect God without weakness or diminishment has suffered a turning away from God. All creation has been affected by this Adamic aversion and, accordingly, all creation stands in need of the perfect image's advent. Genesis's divine drama already signals the Word's incarnation.

93. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 12.5; *Gn. lib. imp*. 16.60.

Two

MADE TO BE GODLY

The Divine Image Bestowed and Broken

quis ego et qualis ego?
—conf. 9.1.1

Understanding the *imago Dei* is crucial to unlocking Augustine's theology of deification. This chapter, accordingly, begins with an analysis of what Augustine means by *imago*. By focusing on a passage from *De Trinitate* 7.3.5, we come to see how Augustine locates the divine image in the one creature purposefully made "incomplete," the one creature brought into being for a relationship outside of him or herself. Unfortunately, the human person rejected this invitation to genuine deification, choosing instead the enemy's illusory invitation "to be like gods" (Gen. 3:5) and the divine image was de-imaged. The final section of this chapter is therefore a brief examination of human sin, understood as the futile attempt to seize divinity, a false act of deification.

This chapter parallels the last in two important ways. First, like Augustine's doctrine of creation, the human imaging of God is not yet directly a matter of the created person's godliness but is rather the precondition by which such communion

is able to occur. Although the human person is created for conformity with God, this cannot be perfected until the Son's descent into the flesh. This descent is however hinted at in the creation of the first Adam and we again see that *how* God shaped creation becomes the *way* in which he deifies. As an incarnate impression of God on earth, each created person has been endowed with the ability to participate in God insofar as a creature is capable, and this "so great a good" [*tam magnum bonum*] is made possible only by being made in God's image.[1]

Second, Augustine's understanding of *imago* parallels his doctrine of creation, because each plays a paradoxical role of simultaneously distinguishing and uniting. A created image is the reproduction of a temporally antecedent archetype: because it is an "image," it is always like and patterned upon this archetype, but because it is "derived," a created image is always incommensurate with and inferior to its original nonpareil. Something images another only if it is not that other; something can reflect another only if the two are related yet separate. Created *ad imaginem Dei*, human persons are simultaneously God's receptive icons as well as God's distinct others. As such, Augustine argues that an image possesses a natural propensity to become its truest self through union with its paradigmatic exemplar. The human person therefore becomes most real by becoming most fully God's. In this way we come to understand, first, how only the Son can be said to be the perfect image of God and, second, how the human person can never find any "rest" or lasting satisfaction in the creatures surrounding him but only in communion with God. This again is the paradox of the *imago Dei*. It simultaneously marks the ontological otherness between eternal and created persons while also highlighting the relationship between them.

1. *Trin.* 14.8.11: "Eo quippe ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest, quod tam magnum bonum nisi per hoc quod imago eius est non potest"; CCL 50A.436.

There is nothing more precious to God than his own image.[2] The human person is the chief work of God [*praecipuum Dei opus*].[3] All the beauty of the world yields to the glory of humanity which is alone made in God's image: "Observe the beauty of the world, and praise the plan of the creator. Observe what he has made, love the one who made it. Hold on to this maxim above all: love the one who made it, because he also made you, his lover, in his own image."[4] The most cherished part of God's good creation, this divine image receives its most straightforward treatment by Augustine at *qu.* 74 of his *De Diuersis Quaestionibus*.[5] Commenting on Paul's identifying the Son with the image of the invisible God (cf. Col. 1:15), Augustine gleans three metaphysical factors: *imago*, *æqualitas*, and *similitudo*. Each of these terms is relational in that they automatically point to some level of interconnectedness between two or more distinct existents. Tracing *qu.* 74 through, we learn how Augustine understood these concepts and the relationship between them:

Image and equality and likeness must be differentiated, because where there is an image there is necessarily a likeness but not necessarily equality; where there is equality there is necessarily a likeness but not necessarily an image; where there is a likeness there is not necessarily an image and not necessarily equality. Where there is an image there is necessarily a likeness but not necessarily equality, as in a person's image in a mirror: because it is a reflection of him it must also be a likeness, but there is no equality because many things are lacking to the image that are in the thing whose reflection it is. Where there is equality there is necessarily a likeness but not necessarily an

2. *s.* 20A.2: "Nihil est enim carius deo quam imago dei"; CCL 41.269 (dated 420).

3. *Gn. litt.* 6.12; CSEL 28.185.

4. *s.* 68.5; Hill, *Sermons* (III/3), 225; dated late, 425–30.

5. The ongoing composition of this set of inquiries is dated between 388 and 396. Mosher follows Bardy in dating *diu. qu.* 74 to the latest period (394–95) along with the other questions rooted in Pauline concerns. Cf. Edited by Gustave Bardy, BA 10, 30–31; David Mosher, trans., *Eighty-Three Different Questions* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 19.

image, as in the case of two of the same eggs: because there is equality there is also a likeness, for whatever properties one of them has the other has as well, but there is no image because neither of them is a reflection of the other.[6]

To unpack this text, let us begin by examining the three terms at play: image, likeness, and equality.

First, *imago* denotes a direct expression [*expressum*] of that which brought it into existence. An image is a relationship admitting diverse degrees of likeness with its source. The degree to which something is an image is the result of the type of its origin (either "begotten" or "made") which gives rise to the relationship between the image and its source. To explain this, Augustine provides the example of a man looking in a mirror: the reflected image is like the man but hardly his equal. There is an *imago* but no *æqualitas*. Therefore, although an image always and everywhere denotes some degree of likeness, equality may or may not be predicated between image and model. However, wherever there is *æqualitas* there is always a likeness but not always an image. Simply because two beings possess the same value and share a certain uniformity, they are not necessarily derived from the same specific source and cannot therefore be said to image one another. Likeness tells us nothing of derivation. Finally, *similitudo* guarantees neither image nor equality, for many things are alike in some way without sharing either a common origin or a degree of inherent equality.

As alluded to, Augustine gives us a man gazing into his reflection in a mirror in order to show that while the likeness may be obvious, the image staring back at him is clearly unequal in countless ways [*quia multa desunt imagini*]. There is an image relationship because the object in the mirror comes

6. *diu. qu*. 74, lines 1–16; Teske, *Miscellaneous Questions,* 137; CCL 44A.213. The same example can be found at *Gn. litt. imp*. 16.57; see also *diu. qu*. 51 where Augustine draws many of the same conclusions regarding the nature, diminishment, and restoration of humanity's divine image.

directly and immediately from its source; the reflection ensures the likeness, however unequal. Augustine then goes on to provide a second example in order to illustrate the relationship between equality and likeness, that of two identical eggs. There may be both equality and likeness, but since one egg did not come from the other [*quia neutrum de altero expressum est*], there is no image. Thirdly, although two specifically different eggs, say one from a chicken and another from a duck, may appear similar to the casual observer, void of any common origin, there can be neither image nor equality.

By insisting that every image demands some level of likeness, but that not every *similitudo* hearkens back to a relationship of image, Augustine ushered into Latin thought a new understanding of *imago*, *similitudo*, and their relationship. Every child will be like the parents she images, for example. However, two children of two different sets of parents do not share the same image, regardless of how alike these two children appear. While every image is naturally like that from which it is copied, not everything which is like something else can be said to be its copy.[7] This is how, unlike his predecessors, Augustine is able to attribute a divine "likeness" to all that exists and, so defined, *similitudo* becomes a much more inclusive term than *imago*.[8] This is key. Image has to do with a common source resulting in shared qualities, but likeness and equality are relational terms having nothing to do with origin or the relationship between existents. It follows that since "similitude is more [*amplius*] than image," there can be no image which is unlike the source from which it comes.[9]

7. Cf. *Gn. litt. imp.* 16.57.

8. R. A. Markus says he has "looked in vain for any precedent for [this widening of "likeness"] even in the works of [Augustine's] Latin predecessors. I can only conclude that his analysis of the meanings in question is a product of his own logical acumen, brought to bear on the language he spoke and wrote"; "<<Imago>> and <<similitudo>> in Augustine," *Revue des études augustiniennes* 10 (1964): 125–43; 126–27.

9. *qu.* 3.4, lines 49-50; CCL 33.277 (dated between 419 and 420).

It is not surprising that Augustine concludes *diu. qu.* 74 by stating that the relationship between the Father and the Son is so great that the Son is not only "from" the Father, is not simply "like" the Father, but *is* his very likeness and equality because not even temporal distance [*temporis interuallum*] stands between them.[10] Because of this absolute equality between Father and Son, the Son is the Father's perfect image. As his *unigenitus* the Son is the Father's begotten and thus perfect image. However, as God's created image, the human person is also a reflection of the divine. Augustine refuses to relegate the divine image only to the Son or only to the human person: the Son is the perfect image because he is the eternal equivalence of the Father, manifesting him in full filial expression, while human persons are also understood to be images, made to have a capacity for divine perfection by a source never identifiable with themselves.

If the defining characteristic of *imago* for Augustine has to do with derivation and origin, the next feature emerging from such a close affinity is the proximity and relationship of resemblance between image and model. Image is a relation of likeness between a copy and the exemplar upon which it is modeled. As John Sullivan wrote on this point in his seminal study of Augustine, image "means not only closeness in nature, but also an immediate relation to the exemplar as term of the innate and dynamic tendency in the image.... In the realization of this tendency toward the exemplar the likeness radically implicated in the nature of the image receives its full expression."[11] Three characteristics of the model-image rela-

10. *diu. qu.* 74, lines 38–42: "In deo autem quia condicio temporis uacat—non enim potest recte uideri deus in tempore generasse filium, per quem condidit tempora—consequens est ut non solum imago eius sit, quia de illo est, et similitudo, quia imago est, sed etiam aequlitas tanta, ut nec temporis interuallum impedimento sit"; CCL 44A.214.

11. John Sullivan, *The Image of God: The Doctrine of St. Augustine and Its Influence* (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1963), 21.

tionship here emerge: (1) an image not only comes from a paradigmatic model but (2) it also remains in some sort of union with that model as it shows forth participatory characteristics proper to its model and (3) will find completion only in perfect union with this model.

An image for Augustine therefore not only comes from and resembles its model, but possesses an innate tendency to "become" that other. This assimilative feature of an image came to Augustine very early on. In the *Soliloquia* (386–87), he uses this insight to show how created images must dwell between being and non-being [*omnino esse tendit, et non est*], but all the while possess an inherent longing to return to their more perfect paradigm. In the following section, Augustine [A] dialogues with Reason-personified [R] and we hear:

> R: Does it not seem to you that your image in a mirror [*imago tua in speculo*] wants, in a way, to be you and is false because it is not?
>
> A: That certainly seems so.
>
> R: Do not all pictures and replicas of that kind and all artists' works of that type strive to be that in whose likeness they are made?
>
> A: I am completely convinced that they do.[12]

It belongs to the nature of an image to strive to become the perfection upon which it is modeled. Furthermore, because a created image is not its own exemplar, it is always inferior. As it reaches likeness with its exemplar, the derived image is more complete, growing in equality with its model; as it fails to reach likeness with its exemplar it is "false." Its inherent longing to become that model is explained in terms of the image's desiring the perfection of the copy from whence it came. An image strives to become that from which it has been brought about.

This relationship is clearly unilateral: an image strives to become the model but in a way that does not directly affect

12. *sol.* 2.9.17; Paffenroth, *Soliloquies*, 72–73; cf. *c. Acad.* 3.17.39.

the model. Augustine could have very easily learned from Plotinus how this type of longing on the part of the image to become like its paradigmatic reality is a virtue only in lesser, derived existents and never in the archetype itself.[13] Only images, never the imaged, can strive for completion in an existent of a different ontological order. In the case of the human person, then, it follows that anyone who refuses to become like God remains false and becomes a riddle to himself. Movement must be made from remaining simply an *image of* and becoming an ever-increasing *likeness to* God. We can now begin to see how those who reject the model (whom they image) frustrate not their divine archetype but their own humanity by refusing their inherent tendency to become God.

When locating this image of God in the human person, Augustine uses three terms interchangeably with no rigid distinction between them. Careful not to find the divine image simply in the *anima* or *animus*—in that principle which vivifies all *animalia*—he instead relies on *ratio*, *mens*, or *intelligentia* interchangeably.[14] In locating this divine image, Augustine realizes that he must find a triad. For the image bestowed is of the triune God and not simply an image of the perfect image (that is, the Son); here Augustine broke with much of the Christian tradition.

For example, many Eastern Fathers held Gen. 1:26–27 and Col. 1:15 together by arguing analogously: as the Son images the Father, Adam images the Son. Irenaeus, for example, maintained that God "made man the image of God; and the image of God is the Son, after whose image man was made."[15] John Chrysostom wrote that the human person was made "in the

13. Cf. *Enneads* 1.2.2.

14. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 3.20.30: "id autem est ipsa ratio uel mens uel intellegentia uel si quo alio uocabulo commodius appellatur"; CSEL 28.86.

15. §22 *Demonstratio;* Ian MacKenzie, trans., *Irenaeus—Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching: A Theological Commentary and Translation* (London: Ashgate, 2002), *Demonstration*, 7.

image of Christ [κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Χριστοῦ], for this is in image of the Creator."[16] This Eastern patristic commonplace is still upheld by Panayiotis Nellas in his work on Christian deification: "Indeed, the Fathers carry further this line of thought found in Paul and the Old Testament writers by uniting the Pauline theme of *Christ—image of God* with the Genesis theme of *man—in the image of God*. Already in, among others, Irenaios [sic], Clement, Origen, Athanasios [sic], Gregory of Nyssa … the distinction is clear that Christ constitutes the image of God and man the image of Christ; that is to say, that man is the image of the Image."[17] For Augustine, however, humanity has been created not only in the Son's perfect image, but also in the image of all three divine persons. Augustine did not read the Genesis passage in light of Colossians, but held these two texts side by side to see two different types of image. In so doing, some scholars have feared that the "concept of Christ as the supreme archetypal image was somewhat sidelined" by the Bishop of Hippo.[18] Yet this is not so, as Augustine simply wants to establish an analogous relationship between Christ as the perfect image and human persons as participating images.

Such a position bolstered Augustine's argument that we are images not only of *the* Image, but are created in the triune God's image. Genesis's words, "*Let us* make the human person to *our* own image and likeness," teach us how the Father did not say to the Son, "Let us make the human person *to your image* or *to my image*, but he said in the plural, *to our image and likeness*—and who would dare to detach the Holy Spirit from this plurality?"[19] That is, Augustine continues, the hu-

16. *Commentary on the Letter to the Colossians*, ch. 3, homily 8.2 (my translation); PG 62.353B.

17. Panayiotis Nellas, *Deification in Christ: The Nature of the Human Person* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Press, 1997), 24.

18. John McGuckin, "Image of God," *The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology* (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 179.

19. *Gn. litt. imp.* 61; Hill, *Genesis*, 151 (adjusted); "non enim ait filio loquens: faciamus hominem ad imaginem tuam, aut: ad imaginem meam, sed pluraliter ait: ad

man person was made to the image, "not of the Father alone or of the Son alone or of the Holy Spirit alone, but of the Trinity itself."[20] The divine image found in the human person is a complex but equally unified reflection of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Its capacity is actualized and the image perfected not only in communion with the Son but only when union with each person of the Trinity is realized.

Augustine has one more argument from scripture that gives another hint of this trinitarian imaging in the hortatory *faciamus* of Gen. 1:26. Unlike the straightforward declaration, *fecit*, which brings about all other non-personal creatures, here Augustine sees the divine deliberation of humanity's creation implying a trinity: "[W]hile with the other works it says, *God said: Let it be made*, here on the other hand we have, *God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness*, to insinuate, that is, a plurality of persons, if I may so put it, on account of Father and Son and Holy Spirit."[21] The scale of ontological difference is set *in principio:* whereas the rest of creation was made through simple decree, the human person is introduced as one created through an internal consultation within the Trinity.

But in what does this triune image consist? This is the inquiry running throughout the second piece of Augustine's masterpiece, *De Trinitate*, and we shall come to see how the *imago Dei* is worthy of the name only when in union with God. Whereas the first part of the *De Trinitate* seeks to unfold the mystery of the Godhead, namely the relationship of the divine persons as well as their distinct roles in the economy, the latter books seek to name the image revealed at Gen. 1:26–27. Building on the scriptural claim that God is love (cf. 1 John 4:8), Augustine in *De Trinitate* 9 first entertains the triad found in the

imaginem et similitudinem nostram: a qua pluralitate spiritum sanctum separare quis audeat?"; CSEL 28.502.

20. *Gn. litt.* imp. 61; Hill, *Genesis*, 150; "quia non ad solius patris aut solius filii uel solius spiritus sancti, sed ad ipsius trinitatis imaginem factus est homo"; CSEL 28.502.

21. *Gn. litt.* 3.19; Hill, *Genesis*, 234; CSEL 28.85.

act of the mind when it knows and loves itself: *mens*, *notitia sui*, and *amor sui*.[22] This trinity, however, fails for two reasons. First, *mens* comes off not as an equal member of the triad, but as the substrate which makes the other two operations, knowledge and love, possible.[23] Second, in the act of human cognition, love unites the knower to the object known and, accordingly, love (*amor* or *appetitus* here) seems to precede knowledge—or, more significantly, the Holy Spirit would analogously seem to precede the Word.[24]

Augustine does not abandon his search but after examining other possible triads, he proffers the next candidate for the triune image within humanity: the mind's memory, knowledge, and love of itself.[25] While this triad is an apparent improvement, in that it is equal in three mental operations requiring no adventitious object, it also fails to fulfill what is required. Why so? While the mind indeed displays a permanent triad of memory, understanding, and love, in this schema the mind fails to be open to God, and this is what essentially constitutes the divine image: "This trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it is also able to remember and understand and love him by whom it was made."[26] That is, while the correct three faculties of memory, knowledge, and will are still directed toward a creature, they fail to meet what is required for a divine image. However, when they are opened to and in

22. *Trin.* 9.4.4: "Ipsa igitur mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt"; CCL 50.297.

23. *Trin.* 9.4.6; CCL 50.298.

24. *Trin.* 9.12.18: "Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam quo id nosse uolumus quaerendo et inueniendo nascitur proles ipsa notitia, ac per hoc appetitus ille quo concipitur pariturque notitia partus et proles recte dici non potest. Idemque appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae fit amor cognitae dum tenet atque amplectitur placitam prolem, id est notitiam gigentique coniungit"; CCL 50.310.

25. *Trin.* 14.8.11: "Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se"; CCL 50A.436.

26. *Trin.* 14.12.15; Hill, *Trinity*, 383; "Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est"; CCL 50A.442–43.

union with God, they describe, albeit imperfectly, the image Augustine sought. Thus the next line at *De Trinitate* 14.12.15: "And when [the human mind] does this (i.e., remembers, understands, and loves God) it becomes wise. If it does not do it, then even though it remembers and understands and loves itself, it is foolish. Let it then remember its God to whose image it was made, and understand and love him. To put it in a word, let it worship the uncreated God, by whom it was created with a capacity for him and able to share in him."[27]

After holding up and inspecting various mental triads, Augustine finally settles not simply on memory, intellect, and will, and not even on the mind's memory, knowledge, and love of itself, but on *memoria Dei*, *intelligentia Dei*, and *amor Dei*. The truest human honor, he writes, is found in the image and likeness of God, which is preserved only in relationship with the one by whom it has been impressed.[28] It is important to reiterate how Augustine does not settle on simply memory, intellect, and will, *but* on these three operations only insofar as they are in dynamic union with God. In other words, this triad is fully "activated" only when it reaches out, and is in communion not with any creature (including itself), but with the triune God in whose image it is fashioned. This reading is very much in line with what Walter Principe has argued: memory, intellect, and love for Augustine are not simple nouns but are dynamic verbs with a "vital drive" yearning outward for the only object which can eternally satisfy, namely the trinitarian life.[29] The *imago Dei* is the human person's remembering, knowing, and loving God and this operation is humanity's only way out of the skeins of self-centeredness.

27. *Trin.* 14.12.15; Hill, *Trinity*, 383; cf. *Trin.* 15.42.

28. *Trin.* 12.11.16: "Honor enim hominis uerus est *imago et similitudo dei* quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur"; CCL 50.370.

29. Walter Principe, "The Dynamism of Augustine's Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person," *Studia Patristica* 18.3 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 1291–99; 1291.

We began by analyzing what Augustine means by *imago* as well as its relationship to *similitudo* and *aequalitas*. We then located the divine image in the human person: in his *mens*, manifested as remembering, knowing, and loving the triune God. This movement out of creation toward the creator is what ultimately constitutes the *imago Dei* for Augustine. Let us now turn to this chapter's primary text which will prove beneficial to our understanding of the Augustinian notion of image and the human person's union with God.

Much of the discussion in *De Trinitate* 7 revolves around Augustine's teaching on 1 Cor. 1:24 and how Christ's being *the power of God and the wisdom of God* should be understood correctly. It should be taken neither as a way to subordinate Christ to the Father, nor should it be taken in a way that robs the Father of also being wise.[30] Yet, why does scripture almost always insist on predicating *sapientia* only of one begotten or created?[31]

Augustine's solution comes in terms of the economy of salvation. Since the Son is the one by whom humans come to God, he is revealed as God's very wisdom so as to show human persons that true human wisdom consists in imitating the Son. Those created in the divine image are illumined when they imitate the Father's *lumen*, the Word, who has now become flesh so as to reveal the Father to enfleshed images. Augustine therefore exhorts his readers in this way:

> Let us copy the example of this divine image, the Son, and not draw away from God. For we too are the image of God, though not the equal one like him; we are made by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father like that image; we are image because we are illuminated with light; that one is so because it is the light that illu-

30. For a look at how 1 Cor. 1:24 was used in the "Arian" controversies, see Richard Paul Vaggione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 83–86.

31. Trin. 7.3.4: "Cur ergo in scripturis nusquam fere de *sapientia* quidquam dicitur nisi ut ostendatur a deo *genita* uel *creata?*"; CCL 50.251.

minates, and therefore it provides a model for us without having a model itself. For it does not imitate another going before it to the Father, since it is never by the least hair's breadth separated from him, since it is the same thing as he is from whom it gets its being. But we by pressing on imitate him who abides motionless; we follow him who stands still, and by walking in him we move toward him, because for us he became a road or way in time by his humility, while being for us an eternal abode by his divinity.[32]

There are four points worth examining here. For in this wonderful passage, Augustine weaves together his theology of creation, his anthropology, his reliance upon a Platonic metaphysic, as well as his pastoral care as he urges his readers to imitate Christ. First, notice how all of creation imitates the Son's turn toward the Father but the human person must freely do so. When we move from creation to anthropology, then, we move out of an ontological and necessitated imitation of the Son's turn to a free and conscious reception of God. The second point to examine is the analogous use of *imago*. The Son is the perfect image of the Father while created persons are images striving for completion in the Son's perfection. The third point is the implied reliance upon a doctrine of participation: we become illumined by partaking of the light God is absolutely. The fourth point is the dynamic between humanity's striving and the Son's stability. Through his incarnation the divine Son has made himself our everlasting dwelling [*mansio aeterna*].

Let us first explore this new sense of conversion and imitation. We saw in the previous chapter that all creation must "turn" to the Father. This type of conversion (*epistrophe*) is an inescapable aspect of contingent being and is in no way a freely-chosen state. The human person, however, is now called to a new type of conversion (*metanoia*), first evidenced by Augustine's use of *discedere*, to separate or to depart from another. The negative imperative here (*non discedamus*) presumes that

32. *Trin.* 7.3.5; Hill, *Trinity*, 223; CCL 50.252-53.

such willful aversion is in the capacity of the created image. Augustine instead invites those made in the divine image to imitate the Father's equal image and thus freely turn to God, becoming fully who they have been created to be. As we shall see, such conversion is the only way to beatitude, as the only other option is to sink into one's own darkness and dissipation.

In this way, only Adam and Eve are created incompletely. They must freely take up a second, more personal conversion. Unless Adam freely converts to God, he could never achieve any good act in isolation from the one in whose image he has been made—only in God can Adam enjoy justice, knowledge, and beatitude.[33] While the human person is like the rest of creation, dwelling between the fullness of being and the nothingness from which it was created, Adam is also unlike the rest of creation because he can freely choose toward which end he desires to advance. Carol Harrison has keenly expressed this tension of the human person's finding himself: "[T]urning towards the eternal, immutable, truth, goodness and beauty on which he depends to exist and to draw him from his characteristic temporality and mutability, on the one hand; and on the other, his turning away from the source of his existence towards created, temporal, mutable reality and, consequently, towards nonbeing and nothingness; he either turns towards God or turns away from Him into nothingness."[34] Men and women are the only visible creatures so precariously yet gloriously poised: able to turn toward God so as to share somehow in the divine life, and similarly able to turn away from God and thus be faced with only nothingness. This latter option is a freely chosen aversion, a perversion which in Augustine's adroit hands serves as a wonderful word play [*auersi sumus*, *peruersi sumus*].[35] To turn

33. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 8.12; CSEL 28.249.

34. Carol Harrison, "Augustine and Religious Experience," *Louvain Studies* 27 (2002): 99–118; 105.

35. *conf.* 4.16.31: "Viuit apud te semper bonum nostrum, et quia inde auersi

back to God with a conscious and resolute trust is the only way to avoid such perverse ruin.

This brings us to the second aspect of this key text from Book 7 of *De Trinitate:* how *imago* is an analogous term for Augustine. To begin, despite the obvious disparity between the singular perfect and many imperfect images, Augustine pastorally counsels us not to dwell on such inequality but on the fact that both the Word and we created persons are divine images. As both "perfect God" and "perfect image" the Son is able to reveal to men and women what it means to approach and assimilate divinity. The created incompletion now comes to the fore. The human person is both an imperfect image and also made toward the perfect image. Augustine describes this disparity with the verbs of the movement that needs to be undertaken by rational creatures—*sequimur*, *ambulantes*, *tendimus*.[36]

In order to make sense of scripture's dual sense of *imago*—both (1) the human person as an image of the triune God and (2) the Son who is the perfect image of the Father (cf. Col. 1:15)—Augustine focuses on the very creatureliness of Adam which ensures that he is never perfect in and of himself but only insofar as he strives toward the Son, the only perfect image of God. As he will write a little later in *De Trinitate*, because the image of God in the human person "was made not entirely equal, as it was not born from him but created by him," that image is signified by being *ad imaginem*—"that is, it is not made equal by an equivalence but it approaches it by a certain likeness."[37] Since the human person is ever a crea-

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sumus, peruersi sumus. Reuertamur, iam, domine, ut non euertamur, quia uiuit apud te sine ullo defectu bonum nostrum, quod tu ipse es, et non timemus, ne non sit quo redeamus, quia nos inde ruimus; nobis autem absentibus non ruit domus nostra, aeternitas tua"; CCL 27.56.

36. For more on this imagery, see my "Traveling without Moving: Love as Ecstatic Union in Plotinus, Augustine, and Dante," *Mediterranean Studies* 18 (2009): 1–23.

37. *Trin.* 7.6.12; Hill, *Trinity*, 231 (adjusted); "Sed quia non omnimodo aequalis fiebat illa *imago dei* tamquam non ab illo nata sed ab eo creata, huius rei significandae causa ita *imago* est ut ad *imaginem* sit, id est non aequatur parilitate sed quadam

ture, he can never be equal to God [*non ab illo nata, sed ab illo creata . . . non aequatur parilitate*]. However, as image, he is no doubt *like* God and can indeed even become more similar to God the nearer he approaches [*similitudine accedit*].

So although the human person is not the ultimate archetype of what it means to image God (the unique and unrepeatable privilege of the Son), he too is nonetheless truly an *imago*. As mentioned, Augustine thinks of *imago* in two distinct ways: one absolute and whole, the other derivative and striving. On this point Andrew Louth's reflections prove surprisingly inadequate. In his otherwise very illuminating work on western mysticism, Louth argues that if enfleshed persons are created to be divine images, the Son therefore cannot be. He writes that (the later) Augustine understood that the Son as the Father's image would have rendered the Son's status as "subordinationist: the Son is God, co-equal with the Father, not the image of the Father. The image must be something other than God."[38] This is to misunderstand Augustine's main point when treating *imago*.

The Son is the perfect image because he is eternally begotten from the Father while created persons are simultaneously (imperfect) images *in se* and also seekers toward the fullness of that at same image. Furthermore, Augustine himself recognizes this linguistic and conceptual problem of equality, realizing that if the Father "made the human person to the image of the Son in a way that he is not the Father's image but only the Son's image, then the Son is dissimilar to the Father."[39] However, because the Father and the Son and Holy Spirit are substantially one, any image perfected in the Son's likeness

similitudine accedit."; CCL 50.266. This necessary movement toward the Word is well captured also at *Gn. litt.* 3.20; CSEL 28.87.

38. Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 146.

39. *Trin.* 12.6.7; Hill, *Trinity*, 325 (adjusted); "Si enim pater fecit ad imaginem filii ita ut non sit homo imago patris sed filii, dissimilis est patri filius"; CCL 50.361.

must also be fulfilled in the Father and in the Holy Spirit as well.

We next turn to how such communion requires a doctrine of participation. Following the Platonic tradition, participation plays an indispensable role throughout Augustine's theology. For Plato, μέθεξις or κοινωνία provided the bridge between the transient world of material existents and the ideal world of forms, thus giving the former a share in the latter.[40] Augustine picked up on this need to bridge absolute and contingent being. Characteristic of those working out of Platonism, Augustine often relies on such axioms as *omne uerum a ueritate* and other three-factored phrases.[41] Note the three components at work here: everything [*omne*] which is true [*uerum*] is such by means of truth itself [*a ueritate*]. Or, again, we learn that every creature is informed through participation in the perfect: chaste souls are such because they participate in chastity itself; wise souls are such because they participate in wisdom.[42] Such a doctrine of participation, as important as it was for Plato, becomes essential for any Christian theologian of deification. Why so? This language must be central when discussing unity between creator and creation, as participation always implies a simultaneous connectedness *and* disparity. The participant for Augustine may share in the attributes of the other, but the participant never becomes identical with or absorbed into the one in whom it participates.

Gerald Bonner has noticed how such a doctrine of partici-

40. Cf. M. Annice, "Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation," *New Scholasticism* 26 (1952): 49–79 remains an excellent survey; for the significance of various Platonic terms, cf. Cornelio Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione Secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1950), 47.

41. *diu. qu.* 1; CCL 44A.11.

42. *Gn. litt. imp.* 16: "castitas autem nullius participatione casta est, sed eius participatione sunt casta quaecumque casta sunt. quae utique in deo est, ubi est etiam illa sapientia, quae non participando sapiens est, sed cuius participatione sapiens est anima quaecumque sapiens est"; CSEL 28.498. For more on this, see my "Augustine's Early Theory of Participation," *Augustinian Studies* 27 (1996): 79–96.

pation and the restoration of the divine image in the human person are the two main components in Augustine's understanding of the Christian soul's progress. After stating how Augustine's theory of participation finds its roots in Plato, Bonner goes on to write that "the progress of the soul should be towards a closer and closer participation in God, which will be completed only in the next life, when it will be as close a union with God as possible for a created being with its Creator." Yet, how will this close union take place? Bonner answers by showing how the restoration of the created image in the human person, realized through participation in God, can reverse the effects of the Fall and bring the faithful to the restored likeness intended for them from all time.[43]

Bonner's comments bring us to our fourth and final aspect of this passage, the completion for which created images strive. Because we are not God yet are made for God, we must imitate the model who himself has no exemplar. The Son is our only access to the Father and for our sake the Son has become a way in time for those who follow him [*nobis uia temporalis*]. Furthermore, Augustine's wording here invites his readers to think of this *uia* also as the *mansio*. Perhaps with John 14:6 in mind, Augustine's *quae mansio nobis aeterna est per diuinitatem* (*Trin.* 7.3.5) suggests that the way of Christ in time is also humanity's dwelling in eternity. Whether the antecedent of *quae* is either the *uia* or the *humilitas* of Christ, humanity's striving to Christ is simultaneously humanity's being with Christ.

Closely connected to these four important aspects of Augustine's reading of Gen. 1:26 is also his ability to read in the *ad* of Gen. 1:26 [*ad imaginem et similitudinem*] how created images are packed with a propensity to seek out and to be-

43. Gerald Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine's Teaching on Divine Power and Human Freedom* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 31.

come similar to God. As mentioned earlier, Pierre Courcelle has convincingly demonstrated that the homilies Augustine would have heard Ambrose preach leading up to his Holy Saturday baptism in 386 were those making up a majority of the Bishop of Milan's *Hexaemeron*.[44] This is significant to our study because the Latin Neoplatonists were the first to show a decisive break from the way image and likeness had hitherto been understood by Christian thinkers.[45]

Prior to Augustine, image and likeness were often divided, with the fulfillment of one or the other reserved only for the beatific vision. For some (primarily) Eastern thinkers, *imago* was defined as an inseparable construct of the human soul while divine likeness was adventitiously obtained only in heaven. Representative of this approach was Irenaeus, the first Christian theologian to develop any sort of sustained reflection on Gen. 1:26–27. Adam is the special creature fashioned directly through the Son and the Holy Spirit (Irenaeus's much celebrated "two hands" of God) in whom God "made man the image of God; and the image of God is the Son, after whose image man was made; and for this cause he appeared at the end of times that he might show the image (to be) like unto himself."[46] A clear distinction exists between image, that in which the human person is made, and the likeness which will be revealed to men and women only in the eschaton. According to such a view, an image need not result in closeness or similarity with the original on which it is patterned. Image does not sufficiently liken one to the divine but must be perfected in obedience throughout a lifetime of ascesis, prayer, and charity. "For Irenaeus, image is both form and substance, and likeness is the saving action by

44. Cf. Pierre Courcelle, "Nouveaux aspects du platonisme chez saint Ambrose," *Revue des études latines* 34 (1956): 220–39.

45. Cf. Mark J. Edwards, *Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), *passim*.

46. *Demonstratio* §22; MacKenzie, *Demonstration*, 107.

which the spirit raises man to God."[47] All human souls image God but not all souls will be like God.

Other Greek writers, Clement of Alexandria for example, often argued the inverse: that while all may be like God, the divine image is not something constitutive of human nature.[48] Rather, one must become an image by cooperating with God and acting as he does, say, in the begetting of other persons: "The human person becomes an image of God [Εἰκὼν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται] in that he cooperates with him in the procreation of other human persons."[49] Such evidence suggests just how novel it was for Augustine to break with the standard interpretations of Genesis's language of *imago et similitudo*. In fact, Robert Markus attributes such a clear divide to the "more distinctively active, dynamic sense" of the Greek ὁμοίωσις, which the Latin *similitudo* does not convey.[50] In the Greek Fathers, "likeness" is an adventitious attribute propelling an image to become like its copy; divine likeness is not a predicate inherent in any created image. This is in obvious contrast to the Latin West where an image not somehow like its model would be unthinkable. It was Ambrose who helped Augustine to see this, not only introducing Augustine to a nonliteral reading of Genesis's *imago* passages, but also preaching how an image is always like its archetype.[51] Thus opening his Latin version of Genesis, Augustine picked up on (in a way unavailable to those reliant simply on the Septuagint) the two senses of meaning contained in the *ad* of Gen. 1:26: (1) a relation of

47. Eric Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 217. This also appears to be Origen's understanding, that the divine likeness comes when the human soul is resurrected and made righteous, cf. *Contra Celsum* 4.30.

48. Everett Ferguson places Clement wholly with those who argue that the divine likeness is attainable only in heaven, citing *Protreptikos* §12; s.v. "Image of God," *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity* (London: Garland Publishing, 1990), 452.

49. Clement, *Paidagogos* 2.10; PG 8.497B.

50. Markus, "<<Imago>> and <<similitudo>> in Augustine," 126.

51. Cf. *conf.* 3.7.12; 4.16.29; 5.14.24; Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, *sermo* 9, "The Sixth Day," ch. 7.

both inherent resemblance as well as (2) an active tendency to become the paradigm upon which something is derived.

Olivier du Roy argues that this understanding of *ad* allowed Augustine to hold two truths simultaneously: the human soul is both an image (however imperfect) of the divine and is at the same time naturally desirous of becoming *more* like God.[52] According to du Roy's study, *ad similitudinem* bespeaks both humanity's imaging of God as well as the perfect image yet to be revealed, that perfect image toward which and for whom we have been created. As we saw, for Augustine two existents who share mere *similitude* may be "alike," but they have no natural propensity to become more like the other. Where an existent reveals an image-model relationship, however, a longing for transformative communion is exhibited. This is how Augustine maintains that those creatures which are merely like God do not consciously or willingly long to become like him. The human person alone, as creature, is like God, while simultaneously being an *imago* that has been implanted with a nature longing to become God.

But how does this divine likeness appear? In what sense can we see how Adam imaged and was like God? In Eden, Adam and Eve enjoyed a true and uninterrupted joy. They lived without want, never knew hunger or thirst, knew only perfect health (that is, always free of bodily decay), and thus dwelled with nothing ever distressing their interaction with the sensible world.[53] In his reflections on the prelapsarian Adam, Augustine tends to highlight four perfections which

52. Du Roy argues that the "ad" signifies a particular relation of resemblance ("relation particulière de ressemblance") as well as an orientation and movement toward an existent's unifying principle; cf. *L'intelligence de la foi in la Trinité selon saint Augustin: Genèse de sa théologie jusqu'en 391* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966), 361. Vladimir Lossky, on the other hand, defends the Septuagint's κατά as "loaded with a promise of future theology, denoting a progress of tradition, a 'preparation for the Gospel' in light of revelation"; *In the Image and Likeness of God* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974), 137.

53. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 14.26.

manifest Adam's divine similitude: (1) immortality, (2) impeccability, (3) perfect tranquility, and (4) bodily integrity.

First is Adam's immortality. Adam was not created to die but was given the gift of everlasting life, provided he remained obedient unto God. Here Augustine makes his well-known distinction between the ability not to die [*posse non mori*] and the perfect state of not being able to die [*non posse mori*]. We read that in the beginning the human condition was one of both mortality, in that death was a possibility, and immortality, in that it was certainly God's intended state. Augustine explains:

> Before sin, in fact, the body could have been said to be both mortal for one reason and immortal for another; mortal, that is, because it was able to die, and immortal because it was not able not to die. It is one thing, after all, not to be able to die, like natures which God created immortal, while it is quite another to be able not to die; and this is the way the first man was created immortal, something to be granted him by means of the tree of life, not by his natural constitution. From this tree of life he was cut off when he had sinned, so that he could die, while if he had not sinned he would have been able not to die.[54]

Augustine first describes the human body as teetering between two extremes: it is created between God and nothing, as well as between immortality and nothingness. The destiny of the human body will be decided by which way its soul turns. He next distinguishes between two different states of immortality: that which some natures have *per se* and that which some enjoy through grace only (and therefore contingent upon something other than their own nature). The immortality for which Adam was created was not something absolute and necessary but something dependent upon his obedience to God. In his disobedience, Adam was severed [*separatus est*] from the source of immortality; death thus became the result of human rebellion.

54. *Gn. litt.* 6.25; Hill, *Genesis*, 321; CSEL 28.197.

This revolt, however, was not necessary. It flowed from humanity's ability not to sin, the second attribute which manifests Adam and Eve's being like God. This impeccability is represented by the same type of Latin parallel Augustine employs to distinguish between Adam's ability not to die [*posse non mori*] and his inability to die [*non posse mori*]: namely the difference between *posse non peccare* and *non posse peccare*. For without Adam's sin, his death would not have come about.[55] At this point Augustine must contend with what he portrays as a Manichaean dispute. The Manichees maintained that it would have been better to have made the human person "in such wise that he wouldn't sin." But that is precisely what God did do, answers Augustine: the human person was made so he would not sin if he had not wanted to.[56] The origin of sin is now squarely placed in human disobedience: made to long for and love God, Adam was nonetheless free to reject God and able to reorient his divine longing elsewhere.

Accompanying this blamelessness is a third characteristic: without the fear of death or the subsequent dissolution of body, Adam and Eve lived in perfect felicity. The Adamic perfection enjoyed in Eden was marked by a lack of blame, lack of fault, and a condition which was wholly good: "The first man was created with a blameless nature, in a nature without fault. He was created upright; he did not make himself so."[57] Without blame and its subsequent effect of death, Adam was originally able to live without any misery.[58] At *De Ciuitate Dei* 14.26, this lack of misery is explained as a true joy: Adam and Eve enjoyed perfect tranquility [*tota tranquilitas*] in their soul.

55. For more on this movement, cf. Gerhart Ladner, "Conception of the Reformation of Man," *Augustinus Magister* 2, 867–78; 869.

56. Cf. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.28.42: "Sic eum faceret, inquit, ut non peccaret.—Immo ipse hoc faceret; sic enim factus est ut, si noluisset, non peccaret"; CSEL 91.169.

57. *s.* 26.2; Hill, *Sermons* (III/2), 94; "Creatus est primus homo in natura sine culpa, in natura sine uitio: creatus est rectus, non se fecit rectum"; PL 38.172.

58. Cf. *correpт*. 10.28.

They knew neither sadness nor frivolity, but only *gaudium uerum*.[59] This unalloyed bliss which comes from human sinlessness, Augustine stresses, comes from God and could have accompanied the first humans throughout all of their days.

Adam and Eve's fourth prelapsarian perfection was their bodily integrity. Against what Augustine sees as a standard tenet of Platonism, lesser gods did not fashion the body and humanity's bodily dwelling is not a punishment for some pre-incarnational transgression.[60] But what about the infirmities and limitations now experienced in and by the body? The conditions that horrify us about the body after human sin were not there in the beginning: for then it caused no trouble, experienced no craving, no corruption. The body, instead, was destined to know neither decay nor fragility.[61] Finally, the body was perfectly pliable and governed by the rational soul. This condition was perhaps nowhere more obvious than in the reproductive organs, originally void of all lust and the lack of control which follows.[62]

As Augustine studies Genesis, he sees how these four manifestations of divine similitude would have continued, but even a sinless and obedient Adam and Eve would have had to await true and final perfection. That is, although receiving a perfectly blessed life, the first humans had received only the command of perfection while awaiting its consummation.[63] None of the

59. *ciu. Dei* 14.26: "Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquilitas.… Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. Gaudium uerum perpetuabatur ex Deo"; CCL 47.449.

60. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 12.27.

61. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.7.8: "ut nulla molestia, nulla indigentia cruciaret hominem ante peccatum et nulla corruptione tabesceret? Dicimus enim tabidum et fragile et morti destinatum corpus humanum post peccatum esse coepisse. Non enim in nostro corpore isti exhorrescunt nisi mortalitatem, quam damnatione meruimus"; CSEL 91.128.

62. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 14.16; *c. ep. Pel.* 1.17.34–35.

63. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.8.10: "Tunc enim spiritalis effectus est, cum in paradiso, hoc est in beata uita, constitutus praeceptum etiam perfectionis accepit, ut uerbo dei consummaretur"; CSEL 91.129.

four attributes examined above were granted without condition. Such a state was not one of absolute perfection, as the human person had only received the *praeceptum perfectionis* but had not yet fulfilled it. Elsewhere this distinction is between the *potestas perseuerantiae* which the first humans received, versus the *felicitas perseuerantiae* for which they were destined; in the first state they enjoyed the ability not to forsake goodness, but in the latter they would not have been able to forsake the good.[64] Adam's perfection was a contingent one, dependent upon his obedience to God. The first humans were thus created not absolutely or *per se* perfect but enjoyed paradisiacal bliss only conditionally, insofar as they were turned toward and subject to God.

This image and likeness of God found in the human person is his most eminent quality. If we were to look for anything higher above this image, we would meet no mere creature but its very creator.[65] Plotinus had argued something very similar: that between the utmost hypostases there was to be found nothing intervening between them apart from their being different, thus allowing for immediate knowledge of Nous by Psyche.[66] Perhaps such imagery aided Augustine's position that between God and Adam there is no other mediating nature [*nulla natura interposita*], describing what it means to be created in the divine image: "Hence, when someone can partake of wisdom according to the inner person, he is to such a degree in accordance with his image that no nature may be placed between them, and so there is nothing that is more united to God. For he knows and is alive and exists, and nothing is better

64. *correpт.* 12.33: "prima erat perseuerantiae potestas, bonum posse non deserere; nouissima erit felicitas perseuerantiae, bonum non posse deserere"; PL 44.936.

65. *Trin.* 15.1.1: "Supra hanc ergo naturam si quaerimus aliquid et uerum quaerimus, deus est, natura scilicet non creata, sed creatrix"; CCL 50A.460.

66. Cf. *Enneads* 5.1.3; Armstrong 5.20. Reaffirming the goodness of matter, roughly the same phrase is used at *Enneads* 5.8.7 (Armstrong 5.258) to describe the closeness between the intelligible and visible orders.

than this creature."[67] Sullivan argues that such a description, God's unmediated presence within the human mind, is "used by Augustine so often in association with the image of God in man that it is almost the equivalent expression."[68] The human person has received God's "direct imprint" [*exprimitur*] with the result that no nature can separate God and his human image: *inter quam et ipsum nulla interiecta natura est*.[69] At the top of the visible creation's hierarchy, the human person was made to enjoy the immediate presence of God.

In fact, Augustine finds himself so strongly arguing that the soul is "near" God, that he has to defend his position against being interpreted as a type of monism. He insists that production of the human soul is unique in that it originates from the creator's exhaling the divine breath, but this should not lead us to think that the soul's origin is from God's own self or from bodily elements.[70] This leads Augustine to state, even more clearly, that the soul comes directly from God, is spiritual like God, but in no way is of the substance of God: neither begotten of nor proceeding from the divine substance, but simply created by God.[71] The human person is clearly not constituted out of the divine substance, yet as the enfleshed unique image of the Trinity, the human person enjoys an inseparable likeness to God. To be similar does not mean to be the same.

Despite this closeness, there is still in Adam and Eve a certain prolepsis not found in other creatures. Augustine's typology allows him to detect the birth of the incarnate Logos in

67. *diu. qu.* 51.2; Teske, *Miscellaneous Questions,* 63.

68. Sullivan, *The Image of God*, 16.

69. *Trin.* 11.5.8; CCL 50.344.

70. *Gn. litt.* 7.4: "nec de se ipso nec de corporeis elementis creandus est"; CSEL 28.204.

71. *Gn. litt.* 7.28: "ex deo sic est, ut non sit substantia dei et sit incorporea, id est non sit corpus, sed spiritus, non de substantia dei genitus nec de substantia dei procedens, sed factus a deo"; CSEL 28.228. This argument is also found at *c. adu. leg.* 14.22 and is used as well against Vincentius Victor, whose disagreement with Augustine on the soul prompted the latter to compose the four books of the *an et or.* (419–21).

the sixth age as already anticipated in the "unfinished" sixth day's creation of humanity. The human person is gloriously presented as a foreshadowing of the Christ, and his dominion over lesser creatures foretells the Lord's power over all creation. If Adam is the prototype of humanity, the incarnate Logos becomes the archetype; and while the first Adam is temporally prior, the Second is ontologically prior, in that he is the source and the model of all humanity. The first son is created as the anticipation of the enfleshed Son: the former created on the sixth day, the latter coming in the sixth age.[72] Relying on the Pauline formula of Rom. 5:14, Augustine calls Adam the form of the one still to come [*formam futuri*].[73] The first created person points all to Christ. To justify this further, Augustine provides a fanciful numerological argument. When taken numerically ADAM adds up as A = 1, D = 4, A = 1, M = 40, totaling 46. Forty-six is the number of years it took for Herod to have his temple built in Jerusalem, a prefiguring of Christ's body, the new and everlasting temple. Finally, we are told, Christ has taken the body of the temple from Adam but not the sin which must be driven from it.[74]

Augustine wants to establish how Adam was not a wholly perfected creature but a precursor to the fullness of humanity. As the first five days were completed with God's expressed approval—*et uidit deus quia bonum est*—Augustine muses that perhaps there is the lack of such an approbation on the sixth day in Genesis's description of the creation of man and woman, not because they were not created "good," but because the human person was still not a completed creature.[75] The wholly perfected state of humanity is ascertained from sacred scripture's silence: "The man therefore before sin and in

72. Cf. *Gen. adu. Man.* 1.25.40; *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.25.43.

73. *Gn. litt.* 8.1; CSEL 28.229.

74. Cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 10.12.

75. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 3.24: "an quia perfectus nondum erat, quia nondum erat in paradiso constitutus?"; CSEL 28.91.

his own kind was of course good; but scripture forbore to say this, in order to say instead something that would foreshadow (*praenuntiaret*) something yet to come."[76] Eternal bliss is hinted at in the first story of humanity; Genesis acts as the presaging of a greater story still to follow. God comes to search for his image in the form of his own Son. Although the theme of the next chapter is to explore the deifying effects of the Incarnation, we can even now see how the life of the first Adam points to the coming of the second.

We have thus far established that the divine image always carries with it a likeness of the divine. It possesses an inherent longing for its perfect model. The human soul has been fashioned both triadically and divinely. It will therefore be satisfied only in perfect union with the Trinity. Before we conclude this section on the *imago Dei*, let us comment on how the human body gives men and women both a conjunction with as well as a distinction from the rest of the animals.[77]

Human persons are enfleshed minds occupying a middle position "between angels and beasts."[78] They are similar to other *animalia* in their necessitated corporeality, but as divine *imagines*, they are closer to heaven. Consequently, manifested in the very flesh of men and women is a primal correspondence with both creation and creator. What the Greeks referred to as a *mikros kosmos*, the human person is a unique creation precisely because he bridges the two worlds. He is a bridge creature who unites in himself the noetic and the material.[79] In the

76. *Gn. litt.* 3.24; Hill, *Genesis,* 240; "homo igitur ante peccatum et in suo genere utique bonus erat; sed scriptura praetermisit hoc dicere, ut illud potius diceret quod futurum aliquid praenuntiaret"; CSEL 28.92.

77. *Gn. litt. imp.*16: "et coniunctio et discretio animantium"; CSEL 28.497.

78. *ciu. Dei* 12.22; Bettenson, *City of God,* 502; "mediam inter angelos bestiasque"; CCL 47.380.

79. For excellent surveys of the human person as a microcosm, see Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 121–23; Norris Clarke, "Living on the Edge: The Human Person as Frontier Being and Microcosm," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 36 (1996): 183–200.

words of Gregory of Nazianzus, he is "a kind of second cosmos, magnificent in his littleness, a new angel on earth, a worshiper constituting both body and soul alike."[80] Augustine too sees the human person as a microcosm, having imaginatively reworked in him the days of creation. In the human person is found the light of faith from the *lux* of the first day; his ability to discern things of the flesh from the things of the spirit is reminiscent of the waters being separated on day two. On the third day men and women cleave their minds from the "stormy waves of fleshy temptations, like the dry land from … the sea;" on the fourth day they see unchangeable truth which "shines in the soul like the sun" and bestow order and beauty "upon the body, like the moon lighting up the night," and finally, on the fifth day their upright souls manifest embodied deeds on the earth—acts of bravery like the "great whales" as well as the proclamation of heavenly truths like the birds of the air.[81]

Even the name ADAM captures the whole of the created order. Besides the numerological evidence just replayed, Augustine also detects a clever acronym connoting the four ends of the earth: Anatolê the east wind, the west Dysis, Arctos which is the north, and Mesêmbria the south.[82] In ADAM creation is symbolized and unified: the human person is the summation of all of God's good creation. Only sin can frustrate such, and to this we shall now turn.

Sin and evil can only now be addressed in Augustine's thinking. Why so? In Augustine's view of things, sin is never the first word, nor will it be the last. Evil must always appear somewhere *contained by* the Christian narrative, never in the prologue (as the Manichees insisted) and certainly never in the epilogue where all will be Christ's. In the meantime, however, sin perverts creatures and makes them less than what

80. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes* 38.11 (my translation); PG 36.321D–24A.
81. *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.25.43; Hill, *Genesis,* 67–68.
82. Cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 10.12 and *en. Ps.* 95.15.

they were created to be. If created images are capable of advancing toward divinity, if human persons are made *to* the likeness (*ad similitudinem*) and are not the exact likeness itself, it follows that they can also retreat away from that divine union for which they have been made.

Having learned and rejected the tenets of Manichaeism, Augustine was aware that he had to hold the two attributes of God's goodness and omnipotence tightly together. Take one attribute away, the problem of evil was easily solved: God could be all good but weak in the face of a warring maliciousness, or indeed almighty yet just a little puckish and willingly complicit in bringing evil about. The Manichees's answer was of course the former: the good god was equally matched by the malevolent god and their eternal clashing gave way to this mixed world of good and evil in which we currently find ourselves. As he came to see that evil had no substantial nature and no efficient cause, Augustine came to see this position as untenable. Evil could only be explained as the absence of a good. By defining God as the *summum bonum*, he not only accounted for the world's beginnings, it also helped him understand the nature of evil—or, better, lack thereof.

In coming to stress God as absolute goodness, the former Manichee also came to see how evil could not be a warring equal.[83] Unlike the way the Manichaean principle of light was threatened by the equal principle of darkness, the Christian creator is all good and, as such, has no foe. In fact, evil has absolutely no intelligibility apart from the good. Augustine can therefore set the Manichaean theodicy aright:

> Through corruption, however, all things fall away from what they were, and that are forced not to remain; they are forced not to be. For to be means to remain. Therefore, that which is said to be in the highest and greatest way is said to be such by remaining in itself. For what is changed for the better is not changed because it remains but because

83. Cf. *conf.* 7.2.3.

it was perverted to what is worse, that is, because it fell away from its essence. But he who is the author of this essence is not the author of the falling away from this essence. Some things, then, are changed for the better and, for this reason, they tend toward being and are not said to be perverted by this change but to turn back and to be converted.[84]

We again see how conversion toward God results in the existence and completion of a creature, and how perversion away from God results in a falling away from what something should be. As such, we can see how there are really only two types of existents: goodness *per se* and participatory goods. All that is, is good, and much to the ruin of Manichaean cosmology, there is no third category of being. Evil is hence revealed as a parasitical corruption of the good. Consequently, there can be no thing which is essentially evil and nothing which is essentially corrupt. Evil is not the rival of the good but its reduction; it is able to be detected only within that which has been spotlessly created by the Good itself. Participation again plays a key role: all existents have goodness because all that exists participates in the Supreme Good so as not to fall back into the nothingness from which all came.

But malice and disorder are nonetheless discernible throughout the created order and Augustine was painfully aware of the havoc evil wreaks in our world. How then is it possible to account for evil and still see God as simultaneously omnipotent and all good? The answer would lie in the misuse of the (otherwise good) will of those made like God. While the Son draws all other creatures into his own adherence to the Father, enabling all of creation to speak of the beauty and goodness and truth of God, non-rational creatures can neither beguile nor disappoint. Only personal beings free to turn away from the Son can corrupt and disorder God's good creation.[85] This is the primary way Augustine's break from the

84. *mor*. 2.6.8; Teske, *Manichean Debate* (I/19), 82; CSEL 90.94.

85. *uera rel.* 36.67; Hill, *On True Religion* (I/8), 74: "Thus falsehood does not arise

Manichees affected his understanding of evil: unlike the Manichaean account, Christianity cannot admit that non-rational creatures either cause or bear sin. Rather, non-rational creatures can only be the object of an evil inflicted from the outside.

Augustine's understanding of evil is important because it allows us to understand humanity's primal sin in wanting to become "like gods." How is this condemnation of divinization reconciled with the thesis that divinization is at the heart of Augustinian anthropology? While we cannot treat all that could be said about evil and sin in Augustine's thought, by focusing on his exegesis of Gen. 3:5 we see how he situates sin in the innate human yearning to be like God. In explaining humanity's turn away from God, we shall fittingly begin by looking at Gen. 3:5 and Satan's tempting Adam and Eve to be gods as a paradigmatic story in which divine unity is misconstrued and falsely sought. From this fall comes the de-imaging of humanity and we shall next look at the effects of living in a new postlapsarian realm and way of life. Finally, just as we saw how the human body images God, we conclude this section by treating the little Augustine has to say about the corporeal symbols of humanity's newly-chosen mortality, the *tunicae pellicae* of Gen. 3:21.

As we argued earlier, all created persons were made with the ability not to sin and could have continued to enjoy such a state of bliss, contingent on the proper worship of God alone. Unwilling to receive humbly, however, Satan instead rebelled against God and chose his own self over the divine life God offered him. He sought to be like God not through reliant participation in God but through the autonomous assertion of self. It is in this way that Augustine gave the metanarra-

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from things themselves' being deceptive, since all they show the senses is their proper looks, which they have received according to their own grade of beauty"; cf. *lib. arb.* 2.16.4; *en. Ps.* 103, *exp*. 1.

tive of evil a deifying stamp. The devil is the *primus peccator, primus preuaricator.*[86] He first turned away because he could not be God. This is the same prospect the devil dangled before the first humans. He enticed them to become gods in their own nature as opposed to becoming "created gods" by participating in the one and only God.[87] This was the fallen angel's original act of rebellion and this is how he led the first humans astray. He falsely promised them by right what they could have had by grace: divinity.

This is why Augustine describes Satan as the first robber and Adam as the second. For both went after a state in life which was not theirs by right and such perverse deification is explained as a false *rapina* and is cleverly contrasted with the Son's kenosis. Placing Gen. 3:5 alongside Phil. 2:6–7, Augustine illustrates how both Satan and Adam attempted to seize something for themselves which belonged to another; the Son, on the other hand, let go of that which was rightfully his for the sake of others, "exchanging" his humanity for our divinity (a metaphor we treat in the next chapter).[88]

Another image employed by Augustine to describe this illicit seizing is the created person's innate desire for and imitation of God. Of course Adam and Eve's craving has been misdirected but we see how even pride reaches out toward union, showing that while the divine image on earth cannot help but seek out perfection and divinity, this can be done in one of two ways: it can be done according to a proper imitation of God or according to one's own self. The first way is the result of obedience and leads to fuller participation in divinity; the second way is the result of pride and leads to the consequent forfeiture of the beatitude willed in the beginning. This sec-

86. *s.* 153.14; PL 38.832.

87. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 14.13: "Dii enim creati non sua ueritate, sed Dei ueri participatione sunt dii"; CCL 47.435.

88. Cf. *en. Ps.* 68, exp. 1.9; s. 264.3.

ond way is never in accord with God's plan of participation but is according to one's own machinations. Thus, instead of imitating God aright, the fallen soul seeks perfection through its own self. This is an insight Augustine developed early on:

> In a perverse imitation of almighty God, what is the human person after if not to be the only one to whom all the rest [of creation] is subject? If he would have only unhesitatingly imitated God by living by his precepts, all created things would have been his and he would not have come to such a deformity so as to fear that fiend who wants to conquer men and women. This shows that pride also has a certain appetite for unity and omnipotence… [*Habet ergo et superbia quemdam appetitum unitatis et omnipotentiae*].[89]

By submitting to God, the human person would be placed above all creation. The human person's dominion over creation is clearly not an absolute right but was granted to him in light of his immediate conversion to and imitation of God. Having refused this *metanoia* and rightful participation in God (as opposed to the *perverse imitation* here), his earthly sovereignty was forfeited. Creation has thus been inverted: in demanding a godly life of unity and omnipotence (*unitas et omnipotentia*) on their own terms, the proud, originally created to serve God and rule over all other animals, have failed to give God due worship and thus find themselves living more akin to the beasts over which they were originally intended to rule.

We have seen how this attempt to seize divinity for themselves was a constant throughout Augustine's thought on the Fall. We see how the metaphysics we worked out earlier in exploring his theology of creation again comes into play. Those made in God's image can either turn toward God so as to be renewed and made like God, or they can turn away and in

89. *uera rel.* 45.84; Hill, *On True Religion*, 87; CCL 32.243. See also *en. Ps.* 103, *exp.* 2.11 as well as *ciu. Dei* 12.22 (CCL 47.380) where this desire for God is described in many of the same terms and strong images.

their perverse imitation and desire for self-rule, experience only autonomy and separation from God:

> Whoever wants to be like God so as to stand in his presence, and guard his strength in relation to him, as it is written (cf. Ps. 58:10), let him not recede from him, let him cling to him as wax is sealed by a signet-ring, let him have God's image affixed to him, realizing what is written, *Adhering to my God is my good*, truly guarding the likeness and image which God made. But if one will have perversely imitated God who is neither formed by nor ruled by anyone else, then this one desires to be like God, desiring to live as if formed by no one, ruled by no one. But what occurs, brothers and sisters, is that in withdrawing from God's warmth this one grows numb, receding from Truth this one vanishes, receding from God who supremely and unchangeably is, this one deteriorates, changed into something inferior.[90]

Communion with God is described in very strong terms here: *cohaerere*, *adhaerere*, *affixus*—a closeness illustrated by the impression a ring makes onto a wax seal. The opposite description is equally stark: *recedere*, *uanescere*, *deterius*—a loss illustrated by the "coolness" of the self turned away from light. What is striking about both of these movements and subsequent states is that they are both a matter of the imitation of God. But while the human person is called to be like God, the one attribute he cannot seek is God's own "autonomy." Humanity's divine likeness must always be a matter of participation. Only the perversion of sin seeks to be perfect in isolation from perfection's only origin.

90. *en. Ps.* 70, *exp*. 2.6: "Ergo quisquis ita uult esse similis Deo, ut ad illum stet, fortitudinemque suam, sicut scriptum est, ad illum custodiat, non ab illo recedat: ei cohaerendo signetur tamquam ex annulo cera, illi affixus habeat imaginem eius, faciens quod dictum est: *Mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est*, uere custodit similitudinem et imaginem ad quam factus est. Porro autem si peruerse uoluerit imitari Deum, ut quomodo Deus non habet a quo formetur, non habet a quo regatur, sic ipse uelit sua potestate uti, ut quomodo Deus, nullo formante, nullo regente uiuat; quid restat, fratres, nisi ut recedens ab eius calore torpescat, recedens a ueritate uanescat, recedens ab eo quod summe atque incommutabiliter est, in deterius mutatus deficiat"; CCL39.965. Notice how strongly, albeit over zealously, Boulding reads this passage in terms of divine union, translating *ut ad illum* as, "we can stand fast in close union with God"; *Expositions* (III/17), 444.

This desire to be whole and autonomous without God is paradigmatic of all sin. For Augustine, all sin somehow reenacts and thus echoes this solipsistic pursuit of equality with God and of divinity apart from God. Because the created image naturally longs to become its prototype, even sin is an attempt to become like God. That is, all long for divinity. In a passage where Augustine is searching to understand how the mind knows itself, we read in the *De Trinitate* how the mind

> sees certain inner beauties in that more excellent nature which is God; but instead of staying still and enjoying them as it ought to, it wants to claim them for itself, and rather than be like him by his gift it wants to be what he is by its own right. So it turns away from him and slithers and slides down into less and less which is imagined to be more and more; it can find satisfaction neither in itself nor in anything else as it gets further away from him who alone can satisfy it.[91]

The soul is naturally attracted to divinity and, either rightly or wrongly, desires such beauty for itself. Having turned away from God [*auertitur*], however, such aversion results in the soul's distorting creatures for the creator.[92]

Augustine understands why this is so. What other than divinity could those who have been made for divinity desire? What more is there to want for those who were made "naturally" perfect? What else could be so alluring to those made in God's image? He accordingly concludes that, "our first parents could not have been persuaded to sin unless they had been told, *You will be like gods*."[93] Humanity's Fall is depicted as the innate and good desire for deification. Nothing short of attaining God could have enticed those already made naturally perfect, so Augustine designates such a promise of godliness as the only gift great enough to have motivated Adam and Eve to sin. The

91. *Trin.* 10.5.7; Hill, *Trinity*, 292; CCL 50.320.

92. This is consistent with Augustine's long-standing definition of sin: "Sin in a human being is disorder or perversity, that is, an aversion to the more preferable creator, and a conversion to the inferior creatures" (*Simpl.* 1.2.18).

93. *Trin.* 11.5.8; Hill, *Trinity*, 310; CCL 50.344.

ultimately sad irony, of course, is that the divinity Adam and Eve sought could have been realized apart from Satan's prompting. That is, the promise held out to humanity to become "gods" was true but only by participating in God's truth. Satan proves to be the father of lies—not in what he told Adam and Eve, but in how he enticed them to obtain it.

The created will is a *media uis* for Augustine and was created with the inherent ability to have moved either toward God or toward itself.[94] Solipsistic movement of the will results in pride, manifested for Augustine by Eve's prototypical interaction with the evil one. Here she exhibits a love of her own self-will (*propriae potestatis*) and an inordinate pride in herself (*de se superbia praesumptio*) instead of that filial receptivity and humble willingness which alone can fill the creature with God's own life.[95] This again is the original evil: when a rational person thinks himself supreme and turns away from that very source which alone can make him so.[96] This godliness is what both angels and humans most truly desire, but apart from God such restlessness will only destroy: "An angel usurped equality with God, and fell, and became the devil; a man usurped equality with God, and fell, and became mortal."[97]

Because Adam and Eve attempted to possess divinity through their own souls and not through participating in God, they lost the majesty God intended for them: "Craving to be what they were not, they lost what they had received."[98] Augustine relies on Gen. 3:5 to show the paradigmatic nature of every rebellion against God. All created images long for divinity and all will search for it. Some will allow God to make them like

94. cf. *spir. et litt*. 33.58.

95. *Gn. litt.* 11.30; CSEL 28.363.

96. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 14.13; CCL 47.435. See also *lib. arb.* 24.72 where such intellectual distortion is a matter of pride and aversion: "Superbia enim auertit a sapientia, auersionem autem stultitia consequitur"; CCL 29.318.

97. *s.* 361. 16; Hill, *Sermons* (III/10), 235.

98. *en. Ps.* 103, exp. 2.11; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/19), 138; cf. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.25.38.

himself, while some will try to become like God without God. Let us now turn to the deleterious effects of such de-imaging.

With regard to the divine image, our misdirected grasp at self-divinity affected the human person in two primary ways: first, it deformed the brilliance of our godly reflection and, second, sin moved us further away from God, placing us in a land of dissimilitude—a *regio dissimilitudinis*.[99] The first effect of sin is primarily internal: distorting our inner lives, dimming our God-given reason and weakening our wills which were created to be intent on the good alone. The second effect has more to do with our relationship to the rest of creation. Augustine uses the metaphor of divine distance most effectively because by it, he captures our vocation to live *through* the world so as to see all creatures in the light of God: "Some persons are said to be far from him who became unlike him by sinning, and some persons are said to draw near to him who receive his likeness by living a pious life."[100] The renewal of the divine image distorted by Adam's disobedience leads to a life of integrity. Augustine tends to combine these two factors, internal rejuvenation and outer conduct, with great effectiveness.

But whereas the ages of the world continue to fall into decay, God's love ensures that this disintegration will not hold sway over his creatures: "In your soul is the image of God; the human spirit is capable of receiving it. It did receive it, but by stooping to sin it defaced [*decolorauit*] the image. He who had originally formed it came himself to reform it, for all things were created through the Word, and through the Word the image was stamped upon us."[101] Augustine often combines these

99. *conf.* 7.10.16; CCL 27.103. For more on this Platonic phrase (which, surprisingly, appears only here), see Eugene TeSelle, "*Regio Dissimilitudinis* in the Christian Tradition and its Context in Late Greek Philosophy," *Augustinian Studies* 6 (1975): 153–79.

100. *ep.* 187.5.17; Teske, *Letters* (II/3), 238.

101. *en. Ps.* 32, *exp.* 3.16; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/15), 416: "In animo tuo est imago Dei, mens hominis capit eam. Accepit eam, et inclinando se ad peccatum decolorauit eam. Ipse ad eam uenit reformator, qui erat eius ante formator; quia per uerbum facta sunt omnia, et per Verbum impressa est haec imago"; CCL 38.266.

three factors: (1) the divine image, (2) its becoming stained or discolored by sin, and (3) its renovation in Christ. For example, toward the end of *De Trinitate* we read: "But by sinning man lost justice and the holiness of truth, and thus the image became deformed and discolored [*deformis et decolor*]; he gets those qualities back again when he is reformed and renovated."[102] The *imago Dei* is the place of both deformation and reformation. In sinning Adam surrendered truth, although the deformity and tarnish he freely took on by sinning can be removed.

Sin may corrupt the created image but it never does so to the extent that human deiformity is completely eradicated. While it is true that evil and sin have affected all of God's good creation, Adam did not lose his divine image altogether. Augustine came to realize that the divine image is precisely what made the human soul what it was and, as such, it could not be lost without destroying the soul altogether as well.[103] The postlapsarian soul may be sinful but there is still within it the reflection of godliness, for that spark of reason [*scintilla rationis*] was not wholly extinguished.[104] Augustine is clear: sin does not erase the image of God in the human person but reorients it away from God.

The second image often used to describe this sad condition of the image's disintegration is its distance from God. Made for a transcendent pilgrimage, the fallen image becomes enamored and ensnared by goods in which only frustration

102. *Trin.* 14.16.22; Hill, *Trinity*, 388; "Sed peccando iustitiam et sanctitatem ueritas amisit, propter quod haec imago deformis et decolor facta est; hanc recipit cum reformatur atque renouatur"; CCL 50A.452.

103. Cf. *retr.* 1.25 on *diu. qu.* 67; *spir. et litt.* 28.49.

104. *ciu. Dei* 22.24: "non in eo tamen penitus extincta est quaedam uelut scintilla rationis, in qua factus est ad imaginem Dei"; CCL 47.847. In his sustained diatribe against the Western Fathers, Constantine Tsirpanlis misconstrues this point when he defines sin for Augustine as the realization of the "total destruction of God's image in man," *Introduction to Eastern Patristic Thought and Orthodox Theology*, Theology and Life 30 (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1991), 52.

can be found. If the Trinity alone can actualize the human person, no mere earthly communion could ever fulfill that divine image. In our fallen state we may think riches and success will satisfy, but we hear, "Gold, after all, is shining earth; you though were made to the image of God in order to be illuminated by God. Since gold is one of God's creatures, yet it wasn't gold that God made to his image, but you; it follows that he placed gold under you."[105] This effect of sin is the result of our turning away from God, the aversion toward non-being we examined earlier. Those made in God's image must never be content resting in a creature but must always be moving toward a greater divine likeness.

Communion with God, for Augustine, is the defining relationship in every human's life; all other relations must therefore be oriented, referred, back to God. In this way, God reserves humanity's ultimate love for himself. We must be content to make all other relationships derived and secondary, molded by and ordered toward life in God first. Consequently, the further we are from God the more we become unlike him: "You were made in the image of God, human creature, but by your perverted and evil life you have blurred or effaced the image of your creator in you. You have grown unlike him; but look hard at yourself until what you see displeases you, and from this moment you will have begun to recover the likeness, because what displeases God now displeases you as well."[106] Sinful aversion from God brings the fallen soul to a divine dissimilarity. Augustine invites his hearers to look inside and see where they are unlike God and there to grow dissatisfied and thus intent

105. *s.* 368.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/10), 301–2; "Aurum enim terra est fulgens; tu autem ut illuminareris a Domino, ad imaginem Dei factus es. Cum sit aurum creatura Dei, non tamen fecit Deus aurum ad imaginem suam, sed te. Ergo posuit sub te aurum"; PL 39.1654.

106. *en. Ps.* 75.3; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/18), 57; "Factus enim es, o homo, ad imaginem Dei; per uitam uero peruersam et malam perturbasti in te, et exterminasti in te imaginem Conditoris tui. Factus dissimilis, adtendis in te, et displices tibi; iam ex eo coepisti similis fieri, quia hoc tibi displicet quod displicet et Deo"; CCL 39.1039.

on reform. Although God is the only true goal of the image, the defaced image seeks communion with a myriad of other things. As we have seen, Adam and Eve's Fall is explained as the aversion away from God and the conversion toward oneself. For Augustine, this is the quintessential act of pride.[107] Yet, as Augustine matured, he also saw how it was not necessarily the ill-sought good that pleased the sinner but oftentimes it was the mere turning away from God that brought a fallen satisfaction.

This is the paradox of Adam after the Fall. One's divine image is so distorted that he mistakenly finds pleasure in that which is ontologically *prope nihil:* "we derived pleasure from the deed simply because it was forbidden … in which there was no motive for my malice except malice. The malice was loathsome, and I loved it. I was in love with my own ruin, in love with my decay: not with the thing for which I was falling into decay but with decay itself."[108] In consequence, sin deforms the created image in the human person by bringing more and more distance between him and his divine exemplar. For if God is being, sin is the lack thereof. It is the enacted moving away from the archetype of all free beings. We saw this above when we examined the requisite turn toward God. We can thus now better see how, in the words of Mary Clark, "There are decisions for non-being, made by persons created *ex nihilo* with openness to Absolute Being. Augustine confessed to making such decisions himself until through God's providence he found in Christ, the Word made flesh, the exemplar of all humanness and the Logos through whom all things are made and made valuable."[109] As we have stressed throughout this chapter, unlike lower levels of being, it is not enough for created persons simply to receive existence. While *in uia,* men and women find themselves between two contrary

107. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 12.6.
108. *conf.* 2.4.9; Boulding, *Confessions*, 68.
109. Mary Clark, *Augustine* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), 107.

states of being, God and nothing, they must freely choose to fulfill their self-giving natures by turning to God.

However, having turned away, sinful humanity has chosen mortality over God. Augustine sees this aversion represented in the "garments of skin" Adam and Eve used to obscure themselves before God and before one another as found at Genesis 3:21. Their transparent purity had been sullied by sin, their divine image distorted. In these symbols of mortality, Augustine sees a new and unintended posture of the human person which directly opposes what God originally willed for us, namely, directing our lives toward his perfect image.

After the Fall, Adam and Eve experienced a spiritual death and were condemned to live without the unsullied blessedness they forfeited. They still possessed the divine image but without the clarity that first shone forth, having exchanged immortality for corruption and a certain natural glory for a new depraved condition. In his commentaries on Genesis, Augustine employs the *tunicae pellicae* to signify the moribund effects of sin: God's condemnation and human mortality. They symbolize the new break in the relationship between the human and the divine as well as the new situation men and women would have to face in a fallen world.

These "coats of skin" represent God's punishment for Adam and Eve's attempt to deceive him. Upon sinning they attempt to cover their newly-recognized nakedness with aprons made out of fig leaves but it was God who made them tunics from the skin of dead animals. Whereas they thought they could live in such a condition of deceit, God acted so as to turn their hearts back to him: "They themselves, you see, had made aprons out of fig-leaves for themselves, and God made them tunics of skin; that is, they set their hearts on the pleasures of lying after turning their backs on the face of Truth, and God changed their bodies into this mortal flesh, in which lying hearts are concealed."[110]

110. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.21.32; Hill, *Genesis*, 93; CSEL 91.155.

Adam and Eve are here presented as unwilling to accept the gravity of their disobedience: content with the levity of leaves when the severity of dead skin is the only fitting response. God must therefore descend to show them the severity of their disobedience, exchanging their leaves for skins.

Augustine understands that there is no more effective symbol of mortality than slaughtered skins. Animal pelts naturally represent the slaying of that which was once alive. Furthermore, donning such pelts symbolizes the loss of human dignity: sinful men and women becoming more akin to the beasts.[111] The *tunicae pellicae* also represent not only the deception of Adam and Eve but their mortality as well. Their illegitimate imitation [*non imitatio legitima*] of God has resulted in their deaths and now all humanity will be cast down into the savage and thus moribund world of the animals.

It will become the mission of the Son to descend and to seek out what was lost by the first humans' abandonment of paradise and consequent descent into mortal flesh. Augustine writes, "Just as a coin, you see, if it's rubbed with earth, loses the emperor's image, so the human mind, if it is rubbed with earthly lusts, loses God's image. However, along comes Christ, the master of the mint, to strike the coins afresh … and he will show you that God is looking for his image."[112] So, although the divine image on earth sought deification apart from divinity itself, the Son comes to unite those made in the Trinity's image and to rejuvenate what the children of Adam have freely worn down.

CONCLUSION

Augustine understood *imago* to mean that the copy not only retained an inherent likeness to its model, but it also

111. ibid. "Quo enim maiore indicio potuit significari mors, quam sentimus in corpore, quam pellibus, quoniam mortuis pecoribus detrahi solent? Ita cum contra praeceptum non imitatione legitima, sed illicita superbia deus esse appetit homo, usque ad beluarum mortalitatem deiectus est"; CSEL 91.155-56.

112. *s.* 229w; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 342 (date unknown).

possessed a connatural desire to become one with its source. While all creation is like God, only the human person can be said to image God and thus to be able to become one with God. Our analysis has showed how Adam was made to find his only true communion in the one in whose image he was made. To achieve such a transformative union, those free creatures made in the divine image must willingly and consciously respond to God by "turning" to God so as to become more and more like God. We also examined how this imaging and likeness is faintly found in the human body.

Adam represents both the fullness of creation as well as the new Adam still to come. Adam is not only the microcosm of all creation, he is also the *forma futuri*, the living signifier of the essentially divine image yet to become incarnate on earth. The Son of God comes to restore the image which has freely turned away from God. Sin is depicted by Augustine as that understandable human longing for divinity, but a longing that is perversely and wrongly sought. Made for God, Adam and Eve fell when they sought God on their own terms and not through the participation and the praise that God designed for them. They sought to be gods without God. In order to restore this promise, God himself will become one of them.

Consequently, we are now in a position to examine where most studies on divine union begin: the deifying descent of the Son into the human condition. We are now ready to understand how men and women will "begin to be renewed in the interior human being according to the image of him who created them."[113] Having freely forfeited the fullness of that divine image, Adam and Eve were in no way able to renew it without God's own assistance. The Son therefore becomes human so as to restore and redeem humanity's divine likeness, transforming all his faithful into himself.

113. *pecc. mer.* 3.7.9; Teske, *Pelagians* (I/23), 86.

Three

THE SON'S DESCENT

faciens tibi nos de seruis filios de te
nascendo nobis seruiendo
—*conf.* 10.43.69

INTRODUCTION

Our study began with an examination of how Augustine understood the relationship between God and creation. We saw how all contingent being exists only insofar as it imitates the Logos in adhering to the Father. In so doing, creation displays a triadic ontology that is most often explained in terms of existence, essence, and a creature's proper place in the ordered cosmos. From creation in general we then focused more particularly on Augustine's understanding of how the human person images God. The sole creature which points to one beyond himself, Adam has been brought into being so as to find completion in God. Through disobedience, however, the first humans ruptured this relationship and now stand in need of reconciliation and renewal. For this, the Son of God enters the world.

We approach Augustine's presentation of the Son's incarnation by way of deification because it not only best captures what Christ has come into the world to achieve, but also because all of Augustine's eighteen uses of *deificare* appear when

describing the incarnate Son's activity in the world. If simply read in isolation, however, these eighteen instances of *deificare* fail to offer a fully-rounded account of salvation. But once we understand this metaphor to be used always alongside other central Christian images, we then begin to see how Augustine's account of salvation can be described as an account of deification. So, at times he will explain deification in terms of divine adoption, at other times as "becoming gods," while elsewhere in terms of the Son's exchanging his humanity for our divinity.

This chapter aims to extend earlier studies of deification in Augustine by considering all eighteen instances and, more importantly, by showing how this language must be understood as inseparable from his other central soteriological claims. Our method in this current chapter, therefore, will be to trace Augustine's use of *deificare* in order to understand what importance he gives to each usage and how he places the key uses of deification language within the context of other wider soteriological metaphors. In this way I intend to show how his use of deification language fits without difficulty into the wide range of concerns he employs to describe the new life in Christ.

Reading Augustine's Christology in such a way is admittedly rather novel. As we have seen, this is not a theme readily associated with the Bishop of Hippo and those opposed to including him among the patristic sources for a theology of deification seem endless. Take the scholar Myrrha Lot-Borodine, for example, who argued that *l'espirit augustinien* may be ordained to beatitude but never to deification. In Lot-Borodine's opinion, Augustine was unable to conceive of true communion between God and creatures because he failed to imagine any type of "co-penetration" between two ontologically distinct natures. The Bishop of Hippo's inability to work out some way to explain divine union, in Lot-Borodine's estimation, thus gave rise to the division between two distinct and separate ways of theologizing, between East and West, which

plagues us still today.[1] Following Lot-Borodine, Ben Drewery also argues that, "the revolution in European thought" consisted of its disassociation of humanity from God as well as the human soul from the body. Such an unfortunate division was, Drewery continues, "precisely the failure of Augustine (and later Aquinas) to follow patristic thought" on the matter of deification. He points more precisely to Augustine's psychology and how it "left no room for a 'deiform' faculty.... Hence in the West the supreme end for man becomes the beatific vision, or some form of beatitude, which is *not* deification, for beatitude is itself created and human. Augustine is indeed the consistent villain."[2] Finally, Michael Azkoul likewise contends that, "Augustine is uncomfortable with the Church's teaching on *deificatio*, θέωσις. He said very little about it and had difficulty verbalizing it."[3] While Azkoul is correct that Augustine directly explicates "very little" about Christian deification, this does not mean that he is necessarily "uncomfortable" with the teaching. In fact, as we shall see, he uses the Latin term more than any Western Father before him, and with various images of human divinization, he exhorted his Christian audiences to holiness, in ways that continue to inspire still.

Despite Augustine's many detractors, however, his use of *deificare* is always found in the midst of other standard biblical images, inviting his audience to embrace this stunning reality as one more way of understanding how God redeems in Christ. These scholars nevertheless articulate an important point: as significant as this individual term may be in a particular homily or treatise, Augustine never cares to handle the

1. Myrrha Lot-Borodine, *La Déification de l'homme selon la doctrine des Pères grecs* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1970), 39–40.

2. Ben Drewery, "Deification," *Christian Spirituality: Essays in Honour of Gordon Rupp*, edited by Peter Brooks (London: SCM Press, 1975), 37. As a corrective to Drewery's parenthetical remark against Aquinas, see A. N. Williams, *The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

3. Michael Azkoul, *The Influence of Augustine of Hippo on the Orthodox Church* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 176, n. 81.

concept of humanity's deification in an explicit or systematic manner. It is a word that turns up and, as soon as it appears, falls away. Nonetheless, some scholars, like Augustine Casiday, have observed that, "What is striking, and frankly frustrating, about these references to deification is how effortlessly Augustine makes them."[4] Now, a term surfacing eighteen times in a corpus numbering roughly 5.4 million words may not appear "effortlessly," but Casiday's remark nonetheless occasions an important clarification. It would be a disservice to limit our study into Augustine's understanding of the deified life to only the lines where *deificare* and its cognates appear explicitly. Therefore, while various uses of *deificare* may be incidental, they are not unimportant, as they prompt Augustine to develop related, further-ranging images for the Christian life.

In the course of this chapter a triptych of related incidences of *deificare* emerges: (1) the early philosophical usage, (2) the literary usage, and (3) the explicitly soteriological use. Augustine's first use comes in an early letter to Nebridius, dated sometime between 387 and 390. This is a letter full of the rich rhetoric one would expect from a young intellectual who has just discovered the splendors of philosophical contemplation.[5] As we shall see next, this use of deification is by far the most studied, perhaps because for some it also stands apart as the one most easily identifiable with pagan divinization.

DEIFICARI IN OTIO (387–90)

Unwell and with thoughts of his nearing death, Nebridius wishes to travel from Carthage to visit his friend in Numidia

4. Augustine Casiday, "St. Augustine on deification," *Sobernost* 23 (2001): 23–44; 24.

5. Between 387–90/91, Augustine and Nebridius (d. 390–91) exchanged a dozen letters: nine from Augustine (*ep.* 3, 4, 7, 9–14) and three from Nebridius (*ep.* 5–6, 8); for more, see Georges Folliet, "La correspondence entre Augustin et Nebridius," in *L'opera letteraria di Agostino tra Cassiciacum et Milano: Agostino nelle terre di Ambrogio*, edited by Giovanni Reale (Palermo: Edizioni Augustinus, 1987), 191–215.

one last time. Enjoying the new life and daily order of a *seruus dei*, however, Augustine admonishes one who had been a mentor to him against the errors of divination and of Manichaeism.[6] In Augustine's estimation, traveling to and fro on this earth is not "the mark of a man who ponders that one last journey, which is called death," the only trip truly worth anticipating. Instead, he bids Nebridius to enjoy the break from the busyness such a time in one's life brings and thereby to "become godlike in leisure" (*deificari in otio*).[7] He then concludes by admitting that he, at least, requires such freedom from "the tumult of perishing things" and insists that both men should seek instead "the journeys upward (*itinera in superna*) … the pleasure of the life of the mind when it dies to a love that is bodily."[8] In arguing that *deificari in otio* is derived from Porphyry's *Sententiae*, scholars have tended to read this phrase as smacking of pagan pride, seeking to attain divine union without any reliance upon God's humble elevation of humanity.[9]

According to Georges Folliet, Augustine found the source of the maxim *deificari in otium* in the thirty-second proposition of Porphyry's *Sententiae*.[10] Folliet goes on to argue that Augustine's initial use of the term "deification" sometime between 388 and 390 is to be taken in a strictly philosophical sense, similar to what the non-Christian sage sought in his desire to be godlike.[11] What is more, Folliet argues that far from connoting divine grace acting upon the passive creature, *deificari* cannot here mean the elevation towards the supernatural. Why not? He contends that the infinitive is used reflexively,

6. Cf. *conf.*, 4.3.6, 7.2.3.

7. *ep.* 10.2; Teske, *Letters* (II/1), 33–34.

8. *ep.* 10.3; Teske, *Letters* (II/1), 34.

9. Cf. Gerald Bonner, "Augustine's Conception of Deification," 371–72; Georges Folliet, "*Deificari in otio:* Augustin, *Epistula* 10, 2," *Recherches Augustiniennes* 2 [supplement: *Hommage au R. P. Fulbert Cayré*] (1962): 226.

10. Folliet, "*Deificari in otio,*" 230–31.

11. Ibid., 233–34.

and coupled with the pagan *otium*, it can only indicate a turning within so as to discover one's own divinity.[12]

In his doctoral thesis for the Netherlands' University of Groningen (Rijksuniversiteit), Jan Stoop also maintained that Augustine's first reliance upon deification was really no different from the blessed repose of any wise man in the Platonic tradition.[13] According to G. Bardy's seminal entry, the *deificari* in *Epistula* 10 also carries the same meaning as the pagan philosophers used.[14] Similarly, Frederick van der Meer saw this same hubris in Augustine's recommending to Nebridius that he seek his own divinization, "without ever guessing how selfish and presumptuous were those words."[15] These remarks not only help to reveal what Augustine could have meant by *deificari in otio* but also tell us something about deification in the culture of late antiquity in which he studied and wrote.

However, not all see Augustine's *deificari in otio* in this light. Most notably, Roland Teske and Serge Lancel stand against much of the twentieth century's scholarship on *Epistula* 10 and offer a particularly new insight. If *deificari in otio* is taken in isolation, perhaps the aforementioned scholars are justified in their critique of a strictly philosophical exhortation to divine assent. However, Teske shows how, if we place this letter to Nebridius in a larger context, we can read its insistence on *otium* alongside the *otium* called for in *De Vera Religione* written shortly thereafter, enabling us to take *deificari in otio* in a more Christian sense. Teske writes that when paralleled with *De Vera*

12. Cf. Ibid., 226.

13. Cf. J. A. A. A. Stoop, *Die Deificatio Hominis in die Sermones en Epistulae van Augustinus* (Leiden: Drukkerij Luctor et Emergo, 1952), 48.

14. Gustave Bardy, "Divinization: Chez les Pères Latins," in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité,* edited by M. Viller et al., and continued by C. Baumgartner, et al. Tome 3, section 3, (Paris: Beauchesne, 1957): "Le sens du mot *deificari* paraît encore très général, ou peut même dire philosophique; car il n'est pas mis en rapport avec les mystères chrétiens," 1391.

15. Frederick van der Meer, *Augustine the Bishop: The Life and Work of a Father of the Church*, translated by Brian Battershaw and G. R. Lamb (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), 209.

Religione (the last work written before Augustine's priestly ordination in January of 391), we receive a very Christian understanding of "leisure" which (citing George Lawless's work on Augustine's monasticism of this same period) has more to do with Christian *meditatio* than with pagan *theoria*.[16] Teske astutely points us to *De Vera Religione* 35.65, which is the claim that God has given humanity the power to become his children [*quoniam dedit eis potentiam filios Dei fieri*].[17] Serge Lancel likewise follows Teske's argument and refers to this first use of deification as an "initial Neoplatonic perspective." But Lancel also sees how this "perspective" can be baptized by *De Vera Religione* and its understanding of *otium* as well as Augustine's later, more Christianized, uses of the language of deification.[18]

This alternative reading of Teske and Lancel is raised because they help to shed light on Augustine's straining to establish a properly Christian sense of human divinization. While the Neoplatonic context of *deificari in otio* is beyond question, it can also be read as a term used by a Christian neophyte to describe what he and his new community in Numidia were attempting to achieve: divine communion through their leisurely pursuits of study, asceticism, and common worship.

LITERARY DEIFICATION (397–406)

During the years from his *Confessions* up to the time he begins his commentary on John (397 to 406), Augustine's reliance on some form of *deificare* reveals an intriguing pattern. Appearing only six times, it (1) is always used adjectivally, (2) refers each time to the authority of a canonical text, (3) is

16. Roland Teske, "Augustine's Epistula X: Another Look at Deificari in Otio," *Augustinianum* 32 (1992): 290; see also George Lawless, *Augustine of Hippo and His Monastic Rule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 51.

17. Cf. Teske, "Augustine's Epistula X: Another Look at Deificari in Otio," *Augustinianum* 32 (1992): 296–97.

18. Serge Lancel, *St. Augustine*, translated by Antonia Nevill (London: SCM Press, 2002), 132.

limited to an apologetic work, and (4) within these texts, it is never Augustine who uses some form of *deificus;* instead, each time he places it in the mouth of one of his interlocutors. As such, the appearances of *deificus* within these texts are:

397–98 *Contra Faustum*	32.7 *sermonem deificum*[19]
Contra Faustum 32.19	*sermonem deificum*
398 *Contra Felicem* 1.13	*per scripturas deificas*[20]
400–01 *De Baptismo* 6.15.24	*ex scripturis deificis*
405–06 *Contra Cresconium* 3.70.80	*ab exustione instrumentorum deificorum*[21]
Contra Cresconium 3.70.80	*scripturas deificas*

From each of these occurrences we can safely ascertain that a "deified word" is a formalized phrase used in late antiquity to prove the orthodoxy of anyone who would grant a canonical writing such godly status.

19. Cf. *retr*. 2.33. The *Contra Faustum* (397–99) is Augustine's most extensive work against the Manichees and his first work after the start of the *Confessions*. It details the proceedings between Augustine and Faustus mainly on the unity of scripture; cf., C. Basevi, *La interpretación del Nuovo Testamento: Criterios exegéticos propuestos por S. Agostino in el "De Doctrina Christiana" en el "Contra Faustum" y en el "De Consensu Evangelistarum"* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1977).

20. The *c. Fel*. appears immediately after the *c. Faust.* in the *Retractationes* (2.34). Controversies surrounding scholarly debate remain regarding the dating of this text. Scholars disagree whether the *c. Fel*. should be dated at December 398 (as in the standard biographies by Bonner, Bourke, and Brown) or 404 (as in J. Kevin Coyle, "Felicem Manicheum, Contra," *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 358; Decret, "Felicem, Manichaeum (Contra-)," *Augustinus Lexikon,* edited by Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1986–), 2.1256–63; 1257; Teske, *The Manichean Debate*, (I/19) 271); while Lancel (unknowingly?) lists both (Lancel, *Augustine*, "7 and 12 December 404" on 273 and "398" on 534). The discrepancy stems from dating the work's introductory line: "Honorio Augusto sexies consule, septimo idus decembris;" see also Goulvan Madec, *Introduction aux "Révisions" et à la lecture de saint Augustin* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 150–53 and François Decret, *Aspects du manichéisme dans l'Afrique romaine* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1970), 76–78.

21. In referring to both scripture and the writings of recognized churchmen as sacred "instruments," Augustine may here be following Tertullian's lead at *De Praescriptione Haereticorum* §38 (CCL 1.218) where Tertullian names the church's emerging canon an "instrument" against a diversity of heterodox opinion.

It does not seem that the term *deificus* itself is limited to any one philosophical or ecclesial perspective, as Augustine displays no problem putting it into the mouth of both Manichee and Donatist alike. While it most often refers to the canonicity of sacred scripture, it can also have a wider application. In a passage from the anti-Donatist *De Baptismo*, a certain Crescens calls a theological point that Cyprian makes about baptism to Bishop Iubaianus a "deifica scriptura" because Cyprian's teaching contains sacred teaching derived from and consonant with scripture.[22] This is the only occurrence within this literary use of deification where the text in question is not sacred scripture but one of the great North African Church Fathers, Cyprian of Carthage, whom both the Catholics and the Donatists claimed for their own purposes.

Since these six instances of "deification" do not convey much theological significance in and of themselves, let us bring this section to a rapid conclusion. But first allow me to make one more point regarding possible provenance. It seems very likely that Augustine received the term "deifying scriptures" from Marius Victorinus (d. after 362). Other than Victorinus, no form of *scriptura deifica* or *sermo deificus* appears in the West before these instances and it only appears again well after Augustine's death.[23] We know, however, that the literati at the end of the fourth century were no doubt familiar with the life and works of the great Latin rhetor and Catholic convert. In the writings of Marius Victorinus, Augustine and his circle would have encountered *lectio deifica* when, against

22. The *De Baptismo* is the fulfillment of a promise Augustine made earlier to explain the true nature of baptism (cf. *c. ep. Parm.* 2.14.23). The text in question here is from Cyprian's *ep.* 73, addressed to Iubaianus. For the identity of this otherwise unknown bishop, see G.W. Clarke, *The Letters of St. Cyprian* 4, Ancient Christian Writers 47 (New York: Newman Press, 1989), 221, n.2. The Stephen in question is certainly Pope Stephen (254–57).

23. Cf. *ep.* 11.1 of the *Epistulae Austrasicae*, 48 letters collected in Metz between 460 and 590 concerning mainly the relationship between Frankish bishops and rulers, employs *deificus sermo;* CCL 117.429.

the Arian heresy, Victorinus depicts himself speaking to the learned and holy bishops of Nicaea (*o docti episcopi, o sancti*). Victorinus turns to address these pro-Nicenes and, thanking them for keeping the integrity of the Catholic faith unsullied, informs them that it is "through your confession and through your *lectionem deificam* of *homoousion* this term has been approved."[24] Similar to how Augustine uses it against the Donatists, the "deifying word" of Victorinus has to do with the content of a sanctioned text transmitted through the church. For both, it points to an authoritative teaching expecting the assent of the Christian body.

It is only when Augustine turns to the work of Jesus Christ that his uses of *deificare* take on any real importance in his theology. A creature's becoming godly is obviously the work of the incarnate Lord. In tracing these next eleven instances chronologically, we begin to see how Augustine's choice to use deification language soteriologically is always contextualized by a wider metaphor: recapitulation, adoption, the "exchange" between God's humanity for our divinity, as well as the subsequent ability to now live as God lives, with hearts and minds (and eyes) renewed. As such, deification proves diversely delineated, with Augustine at times stressing the lowliness of Christ in achieving humanity's greatness, while at other times stressing the language of the participation of Christians in divinity, the role of grace, or of ecclesial incorporation.

The purpose of this next section is to show how Augustine uses *deificare* to explain the Christian life. Given the relative paucity of the term's appearance within his overall writings, it could surface as an incidental term. However, when examining each use of *deificare* we come to understand how Augustine relies on it and weaves it into other more standard soteriological images. That is, when following these later eleven

24. Marius Victorinus, *Aduersus Arium* 2.11; PL 8.1096–97.

Christian instances of deification, we see how they reveal four different paradigms pivotal to Augustine's theology.

The first paradigm is what I will refer to as a recapitulative model. Unlike the Gnostic separation between a deity who creates and another who liberates, the same God who creates for Augustine is clearly the same God who deifies. The second paradigm explains humanity's becoming gods by way of the Pauline concept of divine adoption. Through grace the Son extends his filiation to human persons, thereby giving them a share in the divine nature. The third paradigm is seen in the "great exchange" of natures. Here Augustine relies on and continues a standard patristic insight: God becomes human so humans can become divine. The fourth paradigm illustrates how deification effects ethical and physical changes in the human person. The deified are endowed with the mind and eyes of Christ himself, called to love and to see and to understand as he does.

AUGUSTINE'S SOTERIOLOGY OF RECAPITULATION

In a masterfully crafted homily treating Psalm 81 [82], Augustine takes up the easily misunderstood line, "God stands in the assembly of the gods" [*deus stetit in synagoga deorum*].[25] Delivered sometime in the year 404 to a congregation in Carthage struggling to understand how they differ from their non-Christian neighbors, many of whom were most likely even intimate friends or family members, sermon 23B provides an excellent example of Augustine's recapitulative deification by presenting God as the one who both gives life and deifies,

25. Possidius refers to this sermon in his *indiculus* 10[6]: "*De psalmo* LXXXI *non toto*" and a manuscript at the St. Nazarius Abbey of Lorsch, Germany (MS. Lorsch V) reports a heading, "*In psalmum* LXXXI *quod dicitur: Deus stetit in synagoga deorum*"; cf., François Dolbeau, ed., *Augustin d'Hippone: Vingt-six Sermons au Peuple d'Afrique* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 450. All Latin citations and line numbers are taken from this edition.

uiuificator et deificator.[26] In fact, in order to find a fitting description for the one who brings all human perfection about, Augustine was hard-pressed to find the proper term and eventually (line 35) coined *deus deificator.* God's deifying activity is grounded first in the undying hope borne through human suffering and the conditions of mortal life:

> To what hope the Lord has called us, what we now carry about with us, what we endure, what we look forward to, is well known .... We carry mortality about with us, we endure infirmity, we look forward to divinity. For God wishes not only to vivify, but also to deify us. When would human infirmity ever have dared to hope for this, unless divine truth had promised it?[27]

Despite the contingency and imperfections we discover within ourselves, every created person longs for a God-like immortality, something we saw in the last chapter when their deification was the only thing Adam and Eve lacked in prelapsarian Eden. Furthermore, God is here depicted as discontented with imparting mere biological life but longs [*uult*] to share his own life with those made in his image. Such a contrast between natural and supernatural life is found in Augustine's African predecessor, Cyprian. In a very similar fashion, the

26. *Sermo* 23B comes from François Dolbeau's recent discovery of Augustine's sermons in 1990. These twenty-six homilies were delivered either in the city of Carthage or in the villages of the dusty Medjerda valley between 397 and 404. They provide us with a picture of a passionate pastor exhorting recently converted Catholics to understand the uniqueness of their faith and not to fall into the pagan temptations surrounding them. The sermon to be analyzed here appears as number 13 in the Mainz collection. Dolbeau has named it number 56 within his collection of recently discovered sermons but we shall refer to this sermon by its numbering as found in the Maurist classification, 23B. For a brief history of these sermons, see John Rotelle's introduction to Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 13–17;19 (and chart on 21–22); see also Dolbeau's insightful "Le sermonnaire augustinien de Mayence (Mainz, Stadtbibliothek I.9): Analyse et histoire," *Revue Bénédictine* 106 (1996): 5–52.

27. *s.* 23B.1 (lines 1–6); Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 459.1–6: "Ad quam spem uocauerit nos Dominus Deus noster, quid modo geramus, quid toleremus et quid exspectemus, notum esse.... Gerimus mortalitatem, toleramus infirmitatem, exspectamus diuinitatem. Vult enim Deus non solum uiuificare, sed etiam deificare nos. Quando hoc sperare humana infirmitas auderet, nisi diuina promitteret ueritas?"; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 37.

Bishop of Carthage likewise juxtaposed the vivification God grants with the sanctification he bestows.[28]

Augustine bridges these two states with human hope: surrounded by mortality and infirmity, men and women look forward to a new type of life. We are quickly told that this expectation is not wishful thinking but an attainable reality. The divine perfection which humanity desires can in fact be accomplished, but only by God who alone has divinity to give. It is not a false promise, but one deliverable by God alone. For when we hear a promise made by God himself, we do well to expect it.[29] But how does God "make good" on such a promise?

In the lines which follow, Augustine instructs us that if God is going to fulfill the human longing for wholeness as well as God's own pledge to deify, God must become one of us. Such an incarnation is an act of supreme love and now God's perfect humanity becomes the instrument with which he heals all infirmed humans:

> Still, it was not enough for our God to promise us divinity in himself, unless he also took on our infirmity, as though to say, "Do you want to know how much I love you, how certain you ought to be that I am going to give you my divine reality? I took to myself your mortal reality." We mustn't find it incredible, brothers and sisters, that human beings become gods, that is, that those who were human beings become gods.[30]

It is by taking on our weakness [*infirmitatem*], that God promises us his own divinity [*diuinam meam*]. By assuming [*susciperet*] our mortality to himself, God divinizes creatures by assuming his own contingent creation and *not* from what he

28. Cf. *De Dominica Oratione* §12: "sanctificatio et uiuificatio, quae de Dei gratia sumitur"; CCL 3A.97.

29. *s.* 156.2: "quando audis promissorem, exspecta factorem"; PL 38.850.

30. *s.* 23B.1 (lines 10–14); Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 459; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 37; "Parum tamen fuit Deo nostro promittere nobis in se diuinitatem, nisi et nostram susciperet infirmitatem, tamquam dicens: <<Vis nosse quantum te diligam, quam certus esse debeas daturum me tibi diuinam meum? Accepi mortale tuum>>. Non nobis uideatur incredibile, fratres, deos fieri homines, id est <ut> qui homines erant dii fiant."

is by nature. Conversely, those who become gods are never so by what they are by nature but only through God's fulfilling his promise.

Given Augustine's phraseology here, a word of caution is in order. Notice how he does not fear being misunderstood in using various temporal tenses to highlight the contrast of this exchange. Without ever claiming that God forfeits divinity in the incarnation or that humans cease to be creatures in the act of deification, he nonetheless stresses how those who are deified "were" human persons [*homines erant*]. What can he mean by such a claim? Does he intend for his hearers to think that their humanity is something transient? If so, why would God take human mortality to himself?

I maintain that in Augustine's preaching such a phrase is not to be taken literally but is intended to have rhetorical effect: deification does not mean humanity's elimination but its perfection. This is why he utilizes a hyperbolic past tense, so as to highlight the new condition involved in humanity's new way of being in Christ. Such a move is not an isolated event. For example, years later (Christmas morning of 412), the Bishop will again utilize this hyperbolic past tense in one of his most felicitous turns of phrase: "in order to make gods of those who *were* merely human, one who was God made himself human" [*deos facturus qui homines erant*, *homo factus est, qui deus erat*].[31] With more maturity in guiding a congregation, Augustine may have noticed how such a contrast could be misleading and consequently follows this phrase up with the clarification that this was done "without forfeiting what he was, he wished to become what he himself had made. He himself made what he would become, because what he did was add man to God, not lose God in man."[32] Here Augustine is

31. *s.* 192.1; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 46; PL 38.1012.

32. *s.* 192.1; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 46; "nec amittens quod erat, fieri uoluit ipse quod fecerat. Ipse fecit quod esset, quia hominem Deo addidit, non Deum in homine perdidit"; PL 38.1012.

trying to make clear that Christ, who "was" [*erat*] God, did not cease being God [*non Deum in homine perdidit*], alongside the parallel implication that the ones who "were" human did not cease being human. In fact, toward the front end of *sermo* 23B we hear that those who worship false idols risk becoming like them, thus "ceasing" to be human and risking "becoming" the wood out of which such offensive idols are made [*non ut sis lignum et esse desinas homo*].[33] Of course Augustine cannot literally mean that deification negates humanity or that idolatry of wooden objects renders one ligneous.

Augustine employs the past tense only to stress the passage from a state before Christ to a moment after his incarnation. Looking back on the way humanity was before Christ is to look back on humanity as "merely" human, the first moment. The second moment, however, signifies no cessation of humanity, but it is nonetheless a new humanity because now the Son of God has "added" [*addidit*] humanity to his divinity. As Norman Russell has observed, this new life for Augustine could be brought about only through the sacrament of baptism and in those waters, "ceasing to be merely human" means being raised to a new human identity: "promoted, as it were to be gods, which in Christian tradition means they have been baptized."[34] In preaching this appeal to a new life, Augustine does not intend to destroy humanity but instead wants to spur his audience to embrace a radically new way of being human in Christ through the waters of Christ's church.

Returning to *sermo* 23B we further see how this new state of humanity is explained in terms of adoption. A commonplace among many patristic theologians by the time of Augustine, the Son of God has become human so humans could become sons and daughters of God. This assumed humanity

33. *s.* 23B.5; Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 461.

34. Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 330.

of the Son becomes both the means by which God infuses divinity into creation as well as the exemplar of what the faithful will become, namely that which God will take to himself and that by which we are remade:

> The Son of God became a son of man, in order to make sons of men into sons of God. Hold on to this absolutely… that neither is he mortal from what is his own, nor are we immortal from what is our own; not from what is his own, [not from himself and] not from the substance by which he is himself God; but in another way, yes from what is his own, because from his creation, from what he established, from what he created.[35]

Augustine repeats how God does not save simply by what he is [*non de substantia qua est ipse dues*], but manifests his power through his condescension, thus saving the world through that which is not his own. In this way, creation is again seen to be the instrument of God's deifying activity. The humanity of Christ establishes a new relationship between divine and created persons. The Son has become one with humanity so as to establish a new bond between the Father and created persons.

The next section of this homily begins at paragraph 2, lasting through paragraph 10 and taking up the theme of false divinities. Should it surprise us that after fifteen or so years of refraining from using the term *deificare*, Augustine should clarify his preceding comments with a relatively lengthy explanation of the different realities we call "gods"? This is precisely what prompts his use of deification language in *sermo* 23B. That is, *deificare* becomes explicit in order to contrast the

35. *s.* 23B.1 (lines 16-22); Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 459; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 37; "Filius Dei factus est filius hominis, ut filios hominum faceret filios Dei. Hoc plane tenete, quod iam locutos nosse esse caritati uestrae credo quod memineritis, quia ille nec de suo mortalis, nec nos de nostro immortales—non de suo, nec de natura sua, non de substantia qua est ipse Deus; alio autem modo de suo, quia de eo quod condidit, de eo quod creauit." Hill omits *nec de natura sua* as redundant, following directly upon *non de suo*—a phrase that seems to me, however, to be a typical Augustinian reinforcement of his point here, namely, that the humanity which God takes on is not from his own nature but from his creation.

true God who alone can deify [*deus deificator*] with the pagan idols who, according to Augustine, have only a nominal claim to divinity. Deification language is employed here to provide the congregation with the hope that they will be made like God and not like the false idols to which their non-Christian neighbors have fallen.

As we saw in chapter 2, humanity's primal sin had to do with pursuing deification apart from God. Given both this framework of sin as well as Augustine's audience in Carthage, *deificare* is presented here as the object of Christian *spes* while simultaneously allowing Augustine to lay down rules for distinguishing between the various types of *dii:* (1) the only true God who alone can deify, and (2) those who are called gods because they have been made so through grace and adoption. Given the perhaps misleading wording of Psalm 81 on which he is preaching, Augustine knows he must clarify among what kind of "gods" God stands: "Our God, the true God, the one God, has stood up in the synagogue of gods, many of them of course, and gods not by nature but by adoption, by grace. There is a great difference between God who exists, God who is always God, true God, not only God but also deifying God; that is, if I may so put it, god-making God, God not made making gods, and gods who are made, but not by a craftsman."[36] Here Augustine distinguishes between (1) the one true God who deifies [*deificatorem deum*] and (2) those gods who have been legitimately made so in grace [*non natura deorum, sed adoptione, sed gratia*]. As we have been mapping, Augustine often refers to the sanctified as "gods" and here he provides further characteristics of such a lofty title: they are not

36. *s.* 23B, section 2; Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 459; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 38; "Deus noster, Deus uerus, Deus unus *stetit in synagoga deorum*, utique multorum, non natura *deorum*, sed adoptione, sed gratia. Multum interest inter Deum exsistentem, Deum semper Deum, uerum Deum, non solum Deum, sed etiam deificatorem Deum, hoc est, ut ita dicam, deificum Deum, Deum non factum deos facientem, et deos qui fiunt, sed non a fabro."

divine by their very nature, but are made so through adoption and grace. Furthermore, the truly elect can be called "gods" not because they have been fabricated into deities by some pagan craftsman, but because they have been made so by the one who alone has such power [*et deos qui fiunt, sed non a fabro*]. Commenting on *deus deificator* at *sermo* 23B.2 (line 35), Dolbeau makes this same point; namely that Augustine relies on deification language to explain how a Christian monotheist is to understand scripture's use of "gods."[37]

Obviously Augustine had to develop some standard line of defense when explaining how to understand the plural *dii* or *deos*. He does so by next distinguishing between the one true God who can make "gods" and those self-seeking, counterfeit "gods" who attempt to appropriate divinity wrongly. Notice how the more Augustine uses the language of "becoming gods," the more we see how it becomes necessary for him to clarify his thought on the use of this potentially misleading term. He therefore sees it necessary to distinguish between the exclusively Christian *being-made-gods* [*dii fiant*] and the pagan *making-gods* [*faciant deos*]: "People who make [a] false god offend the true one, and by making what cannot be gods they fail to become themselves what they can.... For they, if they wish, can become gods, not of the sort which they worship, but of the sort which the one whom they worship makes.... So what do people want? ... To become gods or to make gods? ... They indeed consider it a greater show of power if they make gods than if they become gods."[38] Humanity's *being-made-gods* is realizable only when it comes from God's hand and not from human hubris. Fallen men and women

37. Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 458.

38. *s.* 23B, section 3; Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 460; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 38; slightly adjusted; "Deum qui facit falsum, offendit uerum, et faciendo quod non potest, non fit ipse quod potest. Ipse enim, si uelit, fit deus, non qualem ille colit, sed qualem facit ille quem colit. Quid ergo uolunt homines: dii fieri, an deos facere? Potentius quidem illis uidetur si faciant deos, quam si dii fiant."

must humbly put aside their fallen desire to manufacture their own "god" if the true God will ever be able to make them like himself. True power thus lies in receiving divinity, not manufacturing it.

The third section within *sermo* 23B stretches from paragraph 11 to 15 and deals with a more practically immediate concern, the tribulations of everyday Christian life. Augustine cleverly links daily trials with the divine perfection promised in Jesus Christ. Continuing the recapitulative pattern with which he opened, he now exhorts us to put up with our condition. The creator says, "I will recreate you; I created you mortal, I will recreate you immortal. Put up with your condition, so that you may receive your possession."[39] In illustrating this recreation unto divine perfection, two analogies are given. The first is the craftsman's furnace (paragraph 12): as straw burns so as to purify gold, the blasphemies of unbelievers may be flaming up all around the faithful but that is only for the sake of their refinement. The second analogy is similar. The oil press (paragraph 15) shows how only through adverse pressure is purification possible: Augustine's Christian hearers may at times tend toward desolation when they see how "the dregs are running through the streets," but they must never lose heart.[40] This contrast is further explained as those who appear to escape God's justice are in fact failing to be formed into his own children, while those who experience trials faithfully in Christ are being purified into God's own.

We began this section with *sermo* 23B because I wanted to show how it employs the term *deificare* and then opens up to the wider theme of recapitulation. The Son descends to accomplish the deification of humanity, but for this exaltation to take place the Son must encounter and thus convert all that is alien to the Father. Such Christian recapitulation enjoys a

39. *s.* 23B.11; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 43.
40. *s.* 23B.15; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 45.

significant pedigree. With seeds in St. Paul's understanding of *instaurare omnia in Christo* (Eph. 1:10), Irenaeus developed this idea as an essential part of his theology. That is, he situated the incarnation in terms of the restoration and elevation of humanity: the incarnate Son "recapitulated himself in the long line of humanity [*longam hominum expositionem in seipso recapitulauit*] and gave us salvation so as to regain in Jesus Christ what we had forfeited in Adam."[41] Eric Osborn summarizes such an approach to the work of Christ as every created being finding "meaning in the person and work of Jesus Christ, [whose] work involves joining the end to the beginning and changing reality in a radical way."[42]

Augustine's earliest use of recapitulative deification achieves precisely this, reuniting the end of humanity to its beginning and thereby radically changing what it means to be human. This is how a recapitulative deification is at work here, occurring whenever two contrary members of an antithesis—the former distorted and deficient, the latter perfect and operative—are joined together by the perfect member's penetrating that fallen reality and conforming it to itself. In a theory of recapitulation, the healing agent wholly enters into the ongoing destruction, reversing it by uniting it to its own perfection. The healthy doctor, for example, stoops to the level of the infirm and risks illness in order to cure; the learned simplify their thoughts and words so as to instruct the ignorant; and (once) the living underwent death in order to bring the dead to life. In this consummative process, the first antithesis is penetrated by the second and its deficiency is not only remedied, but is remade into an even more perfect state: once healed by the perfect medi-

41. Irenaeus, *Aduersus Haereses* 3.18. Irenaeus's "long line" of humanity is especially important given his understanding of Adam and Eve as younger children growing through the various stages of human development, the same development which Christ passes through for their sakes.

42. Eric Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21.

cine, the sickly are ill never again, and so on. By embracing the imperfect, perfection extends itself to all who succumbed to the former deficiency. This is how recapitulation rejuvenates and fulfills rather than discards a fallen reality. By seeking to clarify and comprehend, rather than to break with the past, recapitulation offers a continuity and totality not as evident in other soteriologies.

Such Augustinian recapitulation consists of four moments: (1) the initial enmity between the two antagonistic contraries; (2) the incarnate Son's identification with the perfect, operative reality within that antithesis; (3) the Son's uniting the deficient reality with his own divine humanity, and (4) the subsequent healing and final transformation of that former condition. A helpful example of this pattern is Augustine's discussion of the psalmist's enigmatic cry, *non derelinquas me, Domine Deus* at Ps 37:22. Here he argues for a typological casting of Christ speaking in place of the first Adam because in his descent, "Christ had taken the identity of the first human being to himself.... He came for no other purpose than that we should be renewed in him, for it is by longing for him and imitating his passion that we are made new."[43] The Son's incarnation incorporates the fallen Adam into himself and not only remakes him in Eden but now brings him into his very own being [*personam in se transfigurauerat*]. The new Adam reconciles himself with the first by putting on the first Adam's true flesh [*ueram carnem portare*] and thereby incorporates all of the enfleshed into himself. What was once opposed becomes unified into the perfect and is not only restored to its original condition [*primus Adam*] but is now elevated into the divine Son.[44]

Another way Augustine emphasizes God's unique ability to

43. *en. Ps.* 37.27; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/16), 166.

44. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 6.20 where Augustine again quotes 1 Cor. 15:53 to show that what faithful Christians receive is not only the primal innocence which Adam lost, but immortal perfection.

recapitulate what disobedient humanity has ruined is to rely on the various recapitulative couplets of *factor*/*refactor*, *formator*/*reformator*, and *creator*/*recreator*. We again see how Augustine's doctrine of creation informs all other aspects of his thought. Commenting on John 8:24, for example, *moriemini in peccatis uestris, si enim non credideritis quia ego sum*, Augustine has his listeners hear Christ, "If you do not believe that I am the Word of the Father [*uerbum Patris*], if you do not believe that I am the maker of the world [*conditor mundi*], if you do not believe that I am the fashioner and refashioner of humanity [*hominis formator et reformator*], the creator and recreator [*creator et recreator*], the maker and the remaker, you will certainly die in your sins."[45] As mentioned, recapitulation involves the Son's lordship, now evidenced by the fact that there is nothing which he cannot make his own. Oftentimes these Augustinian couplets are cast into the context of communal prayer. At one point he has his congregation meditate on the power of God: "Be still [*uacate*]. To what purpose? And see that I am God. See that you are not God, but I am. I created you, and I recreate you; I formed you, and I form you anew; I made you, and I remake you. If you had no power to make yourself, how do you propose to re-make yourself?"[46] At other times, such parallelisms simply become a prayer: "May the one who formed us, reform us, the one who created us recreate us, the one who installed us restore us to perfection."[47] The same God who creates humanity is the same God who redeems humanity: unlike the Manichaean separation between maker and redeemer, the Christian God enters his own creation to reverse the narrative of disobedience.

45. *Jo. eu. tr.* 38.8; Rettig, *Tractates*, 3.110; slightly adjusted; "*Nisi credideritis quia ego sum* Christus; *nisi credideritis quia ego sum* Dei Filius; *nisi credideritis quia ego sum* Verbum Patris; *nisi credideritis quia ego sum* conditor mundi; *nisi credideritis quia ego sum* hominis formator et reformator, creator et recreator, factor et refactor: *nisi* hoc *credideritis quia ego sum, moriemini in peccatis uestris*"; CCL 36.342; cf. *s.* 125.4 where this formula corresponds to the creation of earth and the recreation of humanity.

46. *en. Ps.* 45.14; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/16), 322.

47. *s.* 301A; Hill, *Sermons* (III/8), 291.

Another specific theme found within Augustinian recapitulation is the medicinal. Augustine was certainly not the first to transform basic Aesculapian imagery into Christ the divine physician, but he does make such a transformation an essential part of his soteriology: "indeed the humble doctor came, he found the patient lying sick, he shared his infirmity with him, summoning him to share his own divinity."[48] Rudolph Arbesmann's classic study, in fact, opens by stating that, "Augustine easily holds the first place among those patristic writers of the West who made use of the *Christus medicus* figure."[49] In Augustine's hands, this healer is known not so much by his strength but by his humility. God's ontological descent parallels humanity's moral humility and in such moral humility is found humanity's ontological exaltation:

> Do you wish to lay hold of the loftiness of God? First catch hold of God's lowliness. Deign to be lowly, to be humble, because God has deigned to be lowly and humble on the same account, yours, not his own. So catch hold of God's humility, learn to be humble, don't be proud. Confess your infirmity, lie there patiently in the presence of the doctor. When you have caught hold of his humility, you start rising up with him.[50]

But why is such medicinal imagery recapitulative? The image of Christ as the great physician recapitulates because his cure is applied not only through the reversal of the sickness brought

48. *s.* 341A; Hill, *Sermons* (III/10), 30.

49. Rudolph Arbesmann, "The Concept of *Christus Medicus* in St. Augustine," *Traditio* 10 (1954): 1–28; 2. For more on the medicinal soteriology, see Carol Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 221, n. 170. There is also a helpful section treating this imagery in Eoin Cassidy, "*Per Christum Hominem ad Christum Deum:* Augustine's Homilies on John's Gospel," *Studies in Patristic Christology*, edited by Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998), 122–43; 127–30.

50. *s.* 117.17; Hill, *Sermons* (III/4) 220; "Vis capere celsitudinem Dei? Cape prius humilitatem Dei. Dignare esse humilis propter te, quia Deus dignatus est humilis esse propter eumdem te; non enim propter se. Cape ergo humilitatem Christi, disce humilis esse, noli superbire. Confitere in firmitatem tuam, iace patienter ante medicum. Cum ceperis humilitatem eius, surgis cum illo"; PL 38.671.

about by human sin, but also through God's becoming "ill" by his taking on mortal flesh. This is how, in strong deifying and participatory language, Augustine can chide those who have deceived themselves about the source of their vitality: "O you strong ones, who need no physician! Strength like this is the mark of fatuity, not fitness.… But the teacher of humility became a sharer in our infirmity to enable us to share in his divinity."[51] The Son of God's incarnation is at once both the sign of God's strength and humanity's weakness: it is both the sign of his willingness to heal and our need for healing. Such medicinal imagery belongs under a recapitulative soteriology because it consists of the divine's becoming infirmed for our sake: he dies in order to kill our death and in so doing the Son reveals himself in humility.

By way of both conclusion and transition, I would like to turn quickly to Augustine's most comprehensive commentary on Psalm 81 [82]. In the beginning of this section on recapitulation we saw how Augustine chose to rely on explicit deification language throughout *sermo* 23B to explain the different senses of the plural "gods" he found within Psalm 81. Why, then, when we turn to his explication of this psalm in *Expositions of the Psalms*, is there no obvious deification language? Nowhere does *deificare* appear, nor does it even seem to motivate his explication of the passages where "gods" appear, and from such silence, some could perhaps argue that Augustine is in fact uncommitted to a doctrine of deification. Yet when we see how Augustine chooses to treat both instances where the line *Deus stetit in synagoga deorum* appears (Ps. 81:1 and Ps. 94:6), he explains the plural by encouraging his Christian hearers to become *filios Altissimi*, the sons and daughters of God. At *Expositions of the Psalms* 81 he goes on to illustrate

51. *en. Ps*. 58, *exp*. 1.7; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/17), 153; "O fortes quibus medicus opus non est! Fortitudo ista non sanitatis est, sed insaniae.… Doctor autem humilitatis, particeps nostrae infirmitatis, donans participationem suae diuinitatis"; CCL 39.734.

such a "synagogue" by way of Christ's gathered church.[52] Further, at *Expositions of the Psalms* 94 by way of those who become "gods" not by nature but through grace, he cites the Pauline sanction that such "gods" have been transformed into holy, living temples (cf. 1 Cor. 3:17).[53] We thereby see how Augustine can move fluidly between the metaphors of becoming "gods" and of becoming "children of God," stressing the commonality of a new divine life lived in a creaturely way in and through Christ, while also distinguishing between different scriptural images of this new life.

So, as one image of salvation among the many Augustine willingly uses to explain the Christian life, deification language appears interchangeably with biblically-sanctioned images, with no need to highlight or defend the term. That is, at times life in Christ may be expressed explicitly as a deified life, but at other times as becoming "gods," while in other instances a more biblically palpable image of divine adoption is given. This is why it would now be fitting to turn to the next place deification appears. In so doing, we deepen our understanding of this metaphor in the Augustinian taxonomy of salvation as we explore how human persons become children of God.

AUGUSTINE'S SOTERIOLOGY OF DIVINE ADOPTION

Augustine's next two uses of *deificare* both involve his discussion of becoming children of God, thus affording us the opportunity to deepen our understanding of his use of scripture's language of adoption [*huiothesia*]. We see him, first, linking it explicitly to a process of deification and, second, explaining the result of such adoption as humanity's becoming "gods."

52. *en. Ps.* 81.1: "ergo synagoga filiorum Altissimi"; CCL 39.1135–36.

53. *en. Ps.* 94:6: "deos dixit participatione, non natura; gratia, qua uoluit facere deos"; CCL 39.1335.

We saw above how deification language for Augustine at times involves a hyperbolic past: those who "were" human are now called to be something more. We encounter this again when we examine Augustine's next use of *deificare*. In a sermon dated to 409, delivered at the Shrine of the Twenty Martyrs in Hippo Regius on the first Sunday after Easter, Augustine wishes to take up the topic of becoming a new sort of human.[54] To do this he juxtaposes Eph. 4:25, *putting aside lying, speak the truth*, with Ps. 116:11, *every man is a liar*. These two verses are contrasted not because he wishes to spend this homily critiquing human mendacity but, rather, he wants to show that no one should be content being merely "human" but should strive rather to be "God;" men and women are now to become something more than their current state allows.

Augustine begins this sermon by stating that God commands us to be human no longer [*hoc iubet Deus, ut non simus homines*].[55] While realizing the boldness of such a claim [*audeo dicere*], he presses on because he desires to show his congregation how each human person belongs to two Adams, one who was simply man and another who is the Son of Man. If in the first Adam the human person is given to the vice of lying, in the new Adam all have the power to be made one with incarnate truth. Augustine thus exhorts his flock to see salvation as being "merely human" no longer but in becoming human anew. He uses the first Adam to represent those content being "merely" human [*tantum homines*], but the second Adam to describe what those *noui homines* in Christ can become: "Because the apostle for his part is advising us to take off the old man and put on the new, when he says *Putting aside lying, speak the truth;* and the psalm in turn, was

54. The Church of the Twenty Martyrs was a local shrine dedicated to those martyred under Diocletian and appears often in Augustine's homilies: *s.* 148, 257, 325, as well as the miracle of Florentius, recorded at *ciu. Dei* 22.8, the poor tailor whose sartorial needs were provided for through the intercession of the relics of these martyrs.

55. *s.* 166.1; PL 38.908.

warning them and lamenting them, because they didn't want to take off Adam and put on Christ, and were eager to be, not new men, but just mere men, of the sort to whom it is said, Are you not men? And on whom the statement falls, *Every man is a liar*."[56] Such an exhortation raises a point from earlier: deification for Augustine does not mean the cessation of humanity but its radical renovation or its "promotion" as Russell explained. Such rhetoric is neither useless exaggeration nor is it a cry to reject one's humanity, but is a call to a new type of living as a human person in Christ.

Augustine realizes that how he chooses to represent such a conversion out of "mere humanity" may be either misunderstood or even found offensive. He therefore presses on in order to provide a fuller explanation of what he means by this invitation to bring one's humanity to an end: "Don't be offended. You are not being told not to be human, in the sense that you are to be a beast, but you are among those to whom he has given the power to become sons and daughters of God."[57] New life in Christ does not mean *not* being human but becoming a new sort of human: human children of God. It is, say, the opposite of how sin "dehumanizes" the human person.[58]

Deifying grace, on the other hand, makes those in Christ "more" than human, not by destroying one's humanity of course, but by enabling that humanity to experience new virtue, new freedom, and new life. It is for men and women to

56. *s.* 166.2; Hill, Sermons (III/5), 209: "Quia et apostolus exuendum hominem ueterem et induendum nouum monens, dicit: *Deponentes mendacium*, *loquimini ueritatem:* et psalmus illos admonebat et plangebat, qui nolentes exuere Adam et induere Christum, non noui homines, sed tantum homines esse cupiebant; qualibus dicitur: *Nonne homines estis?* et in quos cadit quod dictum est: *Omnis homo mendax*"; PL 38.908.

57. *s.* 166.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/5), 209; PL 38.909.

58. In fact, "dehumanizes" is how an (anonymous) translator takes Athanasius' ἀλογωθέντων τῶν ἀνθρώων at *De Incarnatione* §13 (PG 25.117) in that sin diminishes in the human person precisely that which makes him human; *On the Incarnation*, translated by A Religious of C. S. M. V. (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989), 40.

become, to use Capánaga's provocative term, *superhombres*.[59] Augustine next explains this new state of humanity by way of adoption: sharing in Christ, humans have been made children of God. It should not surprise us to see this contrast between a mortal *mendax* and becoming an adopted child of God in the commentary on Psalm 116, the psalm upon which this sermon is partially based. In this commentary Augustine teaches that, "Every human being is a liar, but in the measure that men and women are not merely human but divine, being children of the Most High, they will be liars no more."[60] He goes on to link this adoption model with the notion of the human person's godliness. Returning to the next line of *sermo* 166, this divine adoption metaphor is extended to the image of becoming a god: "God wants to make you a god; not by nature, of course, like the one whom he begot, but by his gift and by his adoption. For just as he was made a participant in your mortality through humanity, so through his exalting you he makes you a sharer in his immortality."[61] An essential distinction is again made. As we saw in *sermo* 23B, God's gift [*donum suum*] of this new life in Christ cannot be brought about by creatures but only by God's humbly taking on human mortality. Considered in itself, humanity cannot achieve what God deigns to do; yet humanity is the means by which God enters the human condition to exalt [*per exaltationem*] it to himself.

The transformation of human flesh thus becomes Augustine's final point in this homily. Here he is explicit that this adoption is simultaneously a deification: "So, *putting aside lying*, *speak the truth* (Eph. 4:25), in order that this mortal flesh

59. Victorino Capánaga, "La deificación en la soteriología agustiniana," *Augustinus Magister* 2 (1954): 750.

60. *en. Ps.* 115.3; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/19), 328–29.

61. *s.* 166.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/5), 209; slightly adjusted; "Deus enim deum te uult facere; sed non natura, sicut est ille quem genuit; sed dono suo et adoptione. Sicut enim ille per humanitatem factus est particeps mortalitatis tuae; sic te per exaltationem facit participem immortalitatis suae"; PL 38.909.

too, which you still have from Adam, may itself earn renewal and transformation at the time of its resurrection, having been preceded by newness of spirit; and thus the whole man being deified and made divine may cleave forever to the everlasting and unchangeable truth."[62] At sermon 166 Augustine introduces a new image into Christian literature: the human person wholly deified: *totus homo deificatus*, one who is completely and wholly godly, an awesome phrase appearing nowhere else in the Latin fathers.[63] Creation is again presented for the sake of divine union. Adam was created to become one with God and in typical Augustinian fashion, such deification is explicated in terms of God's gift and adoption [*dono suo et adoptione*]. Grace removes each of us from the influence of the fallen Adam and brings us more and more into Christ: while the fullness of this Christ-life may not be realized until the resurrection, even now it is preceded by the newness of the Spirit [*praecedente nouitate spiritus*] in the lives of Christians. This new state of divinity is made possible only through the Son's breaking into and assuming of the contingent and fallen.

Turning next to the two instances within Augustine's commentary on Psalm 49 where he joins deification and adoption, we see many of these same themes continued. What prompts this first use of *deificare* in *Expositions of the Psalms* 49 is again to distinguish between those who have *been* deified and him alone who *can* deify. This is very reminiscent of the pattern in *sermo* 23B. Now, however, we hear, "It is clear that [God] calls

62. *s.* 166.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/5), 209–10; "*Deponentes* ergo *mendacium, loquimini ueritatem*, ut et caro ista mortalis quam adhuc habetis de Adam, praecedente novitate spiritus, mereatur et ipsa innouationem et commutationem tempore resurrectionis suae; *ac sic totus homo deificatus inhaeret perpetuae atque incommutabili ueritati*"; PL 38.909.

63. This image echoes Plotinus's admonition at *Enneads* 1.6.9 that we must become "wholly godlike" [θεοειδὴς πᾶς] if we are ever going to encounter God and true beauty.

human beings gods, deified from his grace and not born of his own substance. For the one who justifies is just in and of himself and not by another; the one who deifies is God in and of himself and not by participation in another."[64] God alone can save and such salvation is represented here as either a justification or a deification, without Augustine's sensing a need to differentiate between them. What is made clear is that only God can justify and deify. How does he achieve this? Out of God's grace human persons are deified [*ex gratia sua deificatos*]. He alone could effect such a change because he alone is God: all other "gods" are made so only through God's grace that allows them to participate in divinity.

The second use of deification in *Expositions of the Psalms* 49.2 is employed to explain further Augustine's understanding of divine adoption. As the passage unfolds, his unwillingness to set justification and deification in opposition is again encountered, and is now linked with John 1:12 and humanity's becoming children of God. Augustine writes:

> [H]e who justifies is the same who deifies because by justifying he made [human persons] into children of God: *he gave them power to become children of God* (Jn 1:12). If we are made God's children, we are made gods: but this is through the grace of the one who adopts and not through the nature of the one who begets. For there is only one Son of God: our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ.… The rest who have been made into gods are thus made by his grace and not born from his own substance, so as to be what he is, but they come to him through [his] generosity and are thus Christ's coheirs.[65]

64. *en. Ps.* 49.2; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/16), 381; adjusted; "Manifestum est ergo, quia homines dixit deos, ex gratia sua deificatos, non de substantia sua natos. Ille enim iustificat, qui per semetipsum non ex alio iustus est; et ille deificat, qui per seipsum non alterius participatione Deus est"; CCL 38.575.

65. *en. Ps.* 49.2; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/16), 381; adjusted; "iustificat, ipse deificat, quia iustificando, filios Dei facit. *Dedit enim eis potestatem filios Dei fieri.* Si filii Dei facti sumus, et dii facti sumus: sed hoc gratiae est adoptantis, non naturae generantis. Unicus enim Dei Filius.… Caeteri qui fiunt dii, gratia ipsius fiunt, non de substantia eius nascuntur ut hoc sint quod ille, sed ut per beneficium perueniant ad eum, et sint cohaeredes Christi"; CCL 38.575–76.

Again, not through generation but through grace, human persons are made God's children and Augustine strives to explain how the two ways of being "G/god" differ. On the one hand the only begotten son [*unicus filius Dei*] is God in an essentially different way from those who have been made gods; yet, on the other hand, the begotten Son and those made sons and daughters share a corresponding relationship with the Father in both being his children [*filii*]. As such, the latter have been brought into the beneficence of the Son's graces, now rendered coheirs [*cohaeredes*] along with him. With the Father's extending his loving paternity beyond his *unigenitus*, an analogical relationship is established between the Christ who is God by nature and created persons who become gods through grace.

Furthermore, this adoption is explained as an act of great love. The Son descends out of the Father's desire to add to his children, namely to extend his paternity to creatures. Such is the love the Father has for the Son [*tanta caritas*] that he wants to extend it even to beings of a distinct, lesser order of being, but who are now heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ.[66] The Father's charity is now cast widely in terms of co-heredity and the rights accompanying such status, but Augustine presents this act as different from the procedure of human inheritance for two reasons.

As we saw when we examined the generosity of God in the act of creation, since there is no greed in God he longs to distribute all he has to as many as he can, and secondly, because he is the universal good, he is in no way diminished through such generosity. Augustine developed this notion of God as the sole, undiminishable (and therefore equally accessible) Good as early as *De Libero Arbitrio*.[67] In this passage, though,

66. Cf. *en. Ps.* 49.2: "Tanta enim caritas est in illo haerede, ut uoluerit habere cohaeredes. Quis hoc auarus homo uelit, habere cohaeredes?"; CCL 38.576.

67. Cf. *lib. arb.* 2.15.39–17.46 where the divisibility of sensible goods and the universal accessibility of God are contrasted.

such universal beneficence is presented as God's love for his own, rendering them his children:

> Even if one such were found who was willing to have coheirs, and he divided the inheritance with them, he would have less himself than if he had kept the whole. But the inheritance we look to, as coheirs with Christ, is not diminished by the crowd of people who are to inherit, nor does it dwindle because they have become so numerous; but there is as much when the heirs are many as when they are few, and as much for each individually as for all. See what love the Father has bestowed on us, says the apostle, that we should be called God's children, and so we are.[68]

The gifts of God are not lessened when distributed. Christians do not need therefore to compete against one another to guarantee their inheritance. The Fatherhood of God is for all. Christians can claim the title of God's sons and daughters even now because that is what indeed they have been made. Having said this, however, Augustine then concludes by quoting 1 John 3:1-2, that the fullness of our divine likeness will come only when we see God face to face. So, we hear Augustine stressing how God can rightly be called "Father," while also maintaining that the fullness of this adoption and the completeness of deification will take place only in heaven.

At John 20:17, Augustine easily finds warrant to account for this dual-paternity. Christ tells Mary Magdalene that he has not ascended *ad Patrem meum et Patrem uestrum* and it becomes obvious why, "He does not say 'our Father.' Therefore, in one way, 'my,' in a different way, 'your.' By nature, 'my,' by grace, 'your.'"[69] In this way Augustine grounds human deification in the natural filiation of the Son without ever wrong-

68. *en. Ps.* 49.2; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/16), 381; adjusted; "Sed et qui in uenitur uelle, diuidet cum eis haereditatem, minus habens ipse diuidens quam si solus possideret: haereditas autem in qua cohaeredes Christi sumus, non minuitur copia possessorum, nec fit angustior numerositate cohaeredum; sed tanta est multis quanta paucis, tanta singulis quanta omnibus. *Videte*, inquit apostolus, *qualem dilectionem nobis dedit Deus, ut filii Dei vocemur et simus*"; CCL 38.576.

69. *Jo. eu. tr.* 121.3; Rettig, *Tractates*, 5.59.

ly subsuming the creature into the creator. Only the Son can call God "Father" immediately and unconditionally; if any of creation is able to understand God as the generative Father, it does so only through the grace which comes through the enfleshed divinity of the natural Son. Created persons thus remain created, but in Christ are now able to know and love God truly as Father.

We again see how guarded Augustine's reliance on the word *deificare* is. Where he might seize the opportunity to explain the Christian's adoption into the divine family as a matter of human divinization, he connects these two ideas only twice. As mentioned, *sermo* 166 coins a beautiful phrase to describe the Christian elect, the *totus homo deificatus*, but during this homily Augustine chose not to explain what this might mean practically. Deification's use at *Expositions of the Psalms* 49 emerges to explain scripture's use of the plural "gods," a move we have seen Augustine make before. *Sermon* 166 and *Expositions of the Psalms* 49 are good examples of how explicit deification language arises indiscriminately to explain that apart from God there can be only those divinely adopted "gods" in Christ and that such sons and daughters are called to a new way of life. Exactly how this happens or what it entails, Augustine seems content to leave unexplained.

To conclude this section, let us highlight the words of some contemporary scholars who have commented on Augustine's connection between deification and divine adoption. In his sweeping survey of Christian justification, Alister McGrath has noticed that, "By this participation in the life of the Trinity, the justified sinner may be said to be deified. Augustine's understanding of adoptive filiation is such that the believer does not merely receive the *status* of sonhood, but *becomes* a son of God. A real change in man's *being*, and not merely his *status*, is envisaged in his justification, so that he *becomes* righteous and a son of God, and is not merely *treated as if he were* righ-

teous and a son of God."[70] This internal transformation is likewise stressed by the University of Navarre's López de Meneses who likewise judges Augustinian adoption to be one of actual transformation and not merely a nominal change. He writes that justification is "perfectly equivalent" [*perfectamente equivalente*] to deification for Augustine because it entails a change in the human person's very being [*un cambio en el ser del hombre*], making those called into adopted children and gods-through-grace [*dioses por gracia*].[71] To be adopted is thus to be brought into God's own life, to enjoy a new relationship as a co-heir alongside the Son, and to become one now enabled to join Christ in calling God "Father."

This new way of life for the creature, Augustine knew, was a *magna beneuolentia*, a *magna misericordia:* "He was born the only one and he did not want to remain the only one."[72] The Father is revealed as willing to share his perfect and eternal love for the Son with humanity. The Son's uniqueness [*unicus*] does not demand his solitude [*unus*]. Rather, the Father's paternity is now manifested in one of two ways: eternally and naturally by the Son and by means of divine grace and adoption for created persons. As we have just seen, the Father's willingness to be "Father" to many is considered by Augustine to be "a great mercy." Let us now see how this new life with the Father through Christ is also considered to be "a great exchange" as well; God's humanity for humanity's divinity.

THE "GREAT EXCHANGE"

The next appearance of explicit deification language comes in the context of the patristic commonplace of the "great ex-

70. Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1986] 2002), 32.

71. Pedro Urbano López de Meneses, *Theosis: La doctrina de la divinización en las tradiciones cristianas: Fundamentos para una teología ecuménica de la gracia* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A., 2001), 120–21.

72. *Jo. eu. tr.* 2.13; Rettig, *Tractates*, 1.70; "Magna beneuolentia! Magna misericordia! Unicus natus est, et noluit manere unus"; CCL 36.17.

change." What is more readily identified as a Greek formula, Augustine's equivalent became a constant sometime after 410.[73] On Easter morning of 412, for example, we hear him tell the Catholic faithful of Hippo that a "marvelous exchange" [*magna mutatio*] has occurred: "For your sakes the one who was the Son of God became the Son of man, in order that you who were the sons of men might be turned into [*efficeremini*] sons [and daughters] of God.... You were sons of men and you have become [*estis facti*] sons [and daughters] of God. He has shared with us our ills, and he is going to give us his goods."[74] God's power for our weakness is at the heart of the Augustinian exchange: "There you have something in view of your weakness; there you have something else in view of your perfection. Let Christ raise you up through the fact that he is man, let him lead you through the fact that he is God [and] man; let him bring you to that which is God."[75] On the surface this language of exchange may simply appear to be another recapitulative couplet, so how is this a different soteriological metaphor?

This chapter's earlier focus of Augustinian recapitulation was on the new power of Christ as *recreator*, *reformator*, and so on. As we saw, it emphasized the restoration of humanity as renewed into a perfectly pristine condition: what was crippled was not only mended but strengthened, what was in regress was not only halted but rejuvenated. On the other hand, the great exchange highlights a goal that far surpasses the original. It involves a "double metathesis"[76] of Christ's taking on hu-

73. Cf. Irenaeus, *Aduersus Haereses* 3.19.1, Athanasius, *De Incarnatione* §54. For this date of 410, see William Mallard, "Jesus Christ," *Augustine Through the Ages*, 463–70; 469.

74. *s.* 121.5; Hill, *Sermons* (III/4), 236; PL 38.680.

75. *Jo. eu. tr.* 23.6; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.218; slightly adjusted. Cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 108.5, where Augustine uses the human nature of Christ to illustrate how we too will be sanctified, a point Daniel Keating compares with Cyril's more overt reliance on the Spirit as sanctifier; see his *The Appropriation of Divine Life in Cyril of Alexandria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 238.

76. H. E. W. Turner, *The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption: A Study of the Development of Doctrine during the First Five Centuries* (London: A. R. Mowbray & Co., 1952), 89.

manity so as to impart divinity to human persons. Attributes which were once predicated solely of God are now attributed to humanity and, conversely, those qualities which were once reserved for humanity become God's own in Jesus Christ. In this way, exchange language is much more unificatory and much further reaching in what it accomplishes. The attributes to be exchanged are primarily those qualities which have become characteristics of what was lost in the fall of Adam.

Most often the qualities in question are simply gathered together under very generic terms, such as that which is weak [*infirmitas*] or moribund [*mortalitas*] about postlapsarian humanity. For example: "we should not find it surprising that to meet our weakness he descended to the discrete sounds we use, for he also descended to take to himself the weakness of our human body."[77] While we later hear: "we cannot take his divinity, if he himself did not take our mortality and come to us to speak the gospel to us; if what is ignoble and least in us he had not wished to share with us, we would think that he did not wish to give us his greatness, who took on our smallness."[78] We thus see how fallen human qualities, such as bodily frailty [*infirmitas corporis*] or human mortality, are taken up by the Son's incarnation [*ad suscipiendam*] and in return, replaced with Christ's own integrity and immortality. From these representative examples, we can see three paradoxical factors used by Augustine: (1) the Son's descent for human persons' ascent, (2) God's smallness for human greatness, (3) and the remunerative tone which lends itself naturally to the language

77. *en. Ps.* 103, *exp.* 4.1; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/19), 167; "nec mirandum nobis sit, quia propter infirmitatem nostram descendit ad particulas sonorum nostrorum, cum descenderit ad suscipiendam infirmitatem corporis nostri"; CCL 40.1521; cf. *en. Ps.* 102.22; *en. Ps.* 33, *exp.* 1.6.

78. *Jo. eu. tr.* 22.1; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.197; slightly adjusted; "quia capere non possumus diuinitatem ipsius, si non caperet ipse mortalitatem nostram, et perueniret ad nos ut loqueretur nobis Euangelium; si quod in nobis abiectum et minimum est, noluisset communicare nobiscum; putaremus eum noluisse nobis dare magnum suum, qui suscepit paruum nostrum."

of any deal or transaction. After examining each of these three aspects of Augustine's "great exchange," we shall take up the one passage where he uses deification explicitly to express how such a commutation of properties occurs.

First, the "great exchange" begins with God's descent into humanity. Accordingly, humanity is raised to the divine by what can be described as a unique instance of downward participation, given as the only antidote to the hubris of humanity. Augustine worked out this new form of participation as early as the *Confessions*, as he sought to distinguish the truths of Christianity from the books of the Platonists. Here we encounter a radically new form of participation which a pure Platonist would not easily grasp. Augustinian deification begins with a "downward" participation involving not the creature's clinging to immutable being but the absolute's descending into that which is in need of restoration. Augustine is seen here reaching deep into his philosophical purse and drawing out a term that has been used hitherto only for creatures' reliance on the absolute.[79] By reversing this order, the Son's participation in our mortality redeems humanity from the "inside" by assuming the worst of its conditions: "He heals their swollen pride and nourishes their love, that they may not wander even further away through self-confidence, but rather weaken as they see before their feet the Godhead grown weak [*infirmam diuinitatem*] by sharing our garments of skin, and wearily flinging themselves down upon him, so that he may arise and lift them up."[80] This passage captures the essence of Augustine's notion of the divine exchange. Never foregoing his own divinity, the Son's unmatched humility allows him to enter into the "swollen pride" of fallen humanity. But in becoming weak,

79. For more on the significance of "downward participation," see my "The Incarnation and the Role of Participation in St. Augustine's *Confessions*," *Augustinian Studies* 29:2 (1998): 61-75.

80. *conf.* 7.18.24; Boulding, *Confessions* (I/1), 178. For more on pride as a swollen tumor, see *en. Ps.* 118.9.2.

Christ allows us to see God, to fall on God, and thus be raised back from whence he himself came. The lowly flesh of the one mediator Jesus Christ proved to be the missing factor in those books of the Platonists. God's downward participation enables humanity to experience a new level of upward participation: "He descended for us; let us ascend to him."[81] The entire purpose of this exchange is to elevate the whole of the human person to God: "God is with us in order that we may be with him; he who came down to us in order to be with us is at work now to draw us up to himself."[82]

The second factor in Augustine's "great exchange" doctrine is God's assuming "smallness" for humanity's greatness. That is, the worth of men and women and the lowliness of God are joined in this great exchange. Accordingly, the Son of God:

> was made so small that he could be born of a woman; but he [was not separated from] the Father.... O man, on whose account God became man, you ought to consider yourself to be something great; but first come down low in order to go up high; because God too came down low when he became man. Stick close to your cure, imitate your master, acknowledge your Lord, embrace your brother, understand your God. That's what he is, this one so great and so small....[83]

The *paruitas* of God brings about the *magnitudo* of men and women. While divine in himself, the Son has become small in order to redeem humanity and is thus wonderfully portrayed as both *tantus* and *tantillus*, so great and yet so small.

81. *Jo. eu. tr.* 12.8; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.36. This is a popular contrast within Augustine's preaching: e.g., "Nos cecidimus, ille descendit," *en. Ps.* 26, *exp.* 2.8; CCL 38.158; see also *en. Ps.* 125.15.

82. en. Ps. 145.1; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/20), 400.

83. *s.* 380.2; Hill, *Sermons* (III/10), 361–62; slightly adjusted; "factus est tam paruus, ut de femina nasceretur; sed mansit tam magnus, ut a Patre non separaretur.... O homo, propter quem Deus factus est homo, aliquid magnum te credere debes: sed descende, ut ascendas; quia et Deus descendendo factus est homo. Adhaeresce medicamento tuo, imitare magistrum tuum, agnosce Dominum tuum, amplectere fratrem tuum, intellege Deum tuum. Hoc ille tantus et tantillus"; *s.* 371 follows the same line of thought here with very much the same rhetoric but the Maurists have been hesitant to ascribe this piece to Augustine, preferring Caesarius of Arles; cf., Hill, *Sermons* (III/10), 315, n. 1.

The third aspect stressed by Augustine is the remuneration, characterizing this "exchange" in terms of a great "payoff" received by humanity. Christ "sells" his divinity in order to purchase the human race (described as a *qualia commercial*).[84] This is "the wonderful exchange [*mira commutatio*], the divine business deal [*diuina commercia*], the transaction effected in this world by the heavenly dealer .... Without him, we are nothing, but *in him we too are Christ*."[85] Every transaction has a price and Augustine points to the cross to show us what this *grande commercium* costs.[86] This also shows us our own worth: "Consider the price he is paying, and then you will see what he is buying."[87] God's chosen people are shown their worth when purchased by God and are thus made into Christ. The dignity of humanity is paradoxically demonstrated through Christ's cross.

The "great exchange" imagery as a divine business deal reaches fever pitch in a late (though undated) sermon in which Augustine depicts Judas and the Jews as seller and buyers involved in a bitter deal over the fair price of humanity, the commodity of Jesus himself:

> Let Christ the redeemer sing, let Judas the seller groan, let the Jews, the buyers blush for shame. Look, there you are; Judas sold him, the Jews bought him, they made a bad bargain, both lost out on it, both seller and buyers ruined themselves by it. You wanted to be buyers; how much better to have been bought and redeemed!... Rejoice, Christian, at the deal struck by your enemies; you are the one who gained by it. What that man sold and they bought, you, yes, have acquired.[88]

By going to the cross, Christ assumes human brokenness in all its dimensions. He takes to himself all that the wayward chil-

84. *s.* 80.5; PL 38.496.

85. *en. Ps.* 30, *exp.* 2.3; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/15), 323; my emphasis. At *ep.* 148.17, the same *mira commutatio* is used to describe the transformation of the carnal into the spiritual body: it will acquire new powers without loss of its former identity.

86. *s.* 329.1; PL 38.1454.

87. *en. Ps.* 147.16; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/20), 458.

88. *s.* 336.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/9), 268–69; slightly adjusted.

dren of Adam have procured: corrupted human nature, sinful habits, and death.

This passage points to how the assumption of humanity is a necessary condition for the great exchange. God relies on our mortality because he, of course, by nature does not posses it. Christ establishes a unity between the immortal and the mortal in his very self, "later making us sharers in himself, but first becoming a participant in us. We had nothing of our own by which we could live, nor did he have anything from himself by which he could die. Therefore he struck a wonderful exchange with us by means of a mutual participation: ours was what allowed him to die, his is what allowed us to live."[89] Augustine is careful not to verge on pantheism or to violate the divine nature in any way, as one of his most consistent pleas is to insist how divine interaction with creation changes only the created while divinity goes unaltered: "Because the Word was made flesh it was the very Word himself who was crucified, but the Word was not changed into humanity; rather, humanity was changed by its union with him. Human nature was changed in him to become nobler [*melior*] than it had been before, but it was not changed into the substance of the Word."[90]

The exchange is effected first by the Son's sharing in mortality and humanity's ascent is achieved not by anything of its own merit or power but through the graciousness manifest in this divine descent: "before we could become participants in his immortality, he had to become a participant in our mortality. But as he became mortal not because of anything in his own nature but by sharing in ours, so do we become immortal

89. *s.* 218C.1; Hill, *Sermons* (III/16), 194; adjusted; "participes sui postea facturus, quorum esset prior particeps factus. Nam nec unde uiueremus nos habebamus de nostro, nec unde moreretur ille de suo. Mirum proinde nobiscum egit mutua participatione commercium; nostrum erat, unde mortuus est; illius erit, unde uiuamus"; PLS 2.545–46.

90. *en. Ps.* 130.10; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/20), 148.

not in the power of our own nature but through his."[91] This wonderful exchange also receives a priestly and sacrificial tone on the Feast of the Ascension in the year 417. We hear that the Son took for us what he would offer the Father on our behalf [*assumpsit pro te*, *quod offeret pro te*]: "You didn't have anything to live by, and he didn't have anything to die with. What a marvelous exchange [*o magna mutatio*]! Live by what is his, because he died with what is yours."[92]

Finally, let us now examine the single instance where this *mutatio* is explained explicitly in terms of *deificare*. When the psalmist praises the Lord for the final victory he will bring about against the wicked, he uses Ps. 117:15–16 to proclaim "the joyful shout of deliverance," acknowledging how the Lord's "right hand strikes with power." Augustine translates this victory not as a mere military scuffle but as the greatest of all feats, making a god out of a human: "Great might is needed to raise up the lowly, to deify a mere mortal, to make the weak perfect, to grant glory through abasement and victory through suffering.... No human being has ever raised up himself, no human has made himself perfect, no human has conferred glory on himself, no man or woman has proved victorious, no human being has saved himself."[93] The terms of the exchange are clearly God's subjection and suffering for humanity's deification. This passage is particularly helpful because Augustine lists five concrete ways the "great exchange" allows the divinized human to appropriate the divine

91. *en. Ps.* 146.11; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/20), 430–31.

92. *s.* 265D; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 259. Referring to the flesh as that which both allowed Christ to die as well as that which he came to save is a standard trope among the Fathers: cf. Tertullian, *De Carne Christi* §6 (PL 2.764A), Athanasius, *De Incarnatione* §20 (PG 25.152B) and *Epistula ad Epictetum* §6-7 (PG 26.1061A).

93. *en. Ps.* 117.11; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/19), 337; "Magna uirtus exaltare humilem, deificare mortalem, praebere de infirmitate perfectionem, de subiectione gloriam, de passione victoriam, dare auxilium de tribulatione.... Non homo se exaltauit, non homo se perfecit, non sibi homo gloriam dedit, non homo uicit, non homo sibi saluti fuit."

life. Through God's subjection and suffering comes humanity's (1) elevation, (2) perfection, (3) glorification, (4) victory over death, and (5) ultimate salvation. Such transformation manifests the might of God, for there is no greater power than God's making humans like himself—exalting the humble and deifying the mortal [*magna uirtus exaltare humilem, deificare mortalem*]. No human person can cause his or her own existence, no sinner can bring about his own salvation, and no mere human can prove strong enough to raise himself.

We are able to be raised only because he first has become one of us, has entered the condition from which we need saving. Whereas our eyes were kept on Christ above by focusing on the promissory nature of deification (cf. *sermo* 23B), here Augustine emphasizes the tremendous power it would take to transform sinful humanity.[94] Such a transformation should clearly have practical consequences, and so it comes as no surprise that the final occurrences of Augustinian deification appear precisely here.

ACTING AS GOD ACTS

Augustine's final uses of deification all point to its ethical implications and the new gifts the divinized are granted in Christ. This is a fitting conclusion. For if we take the language of divine union seriously, would we not expect some practical or moral changes in the lives of the deified? The *De Patientia* is a lesser-known work of Augustine's, composed sometime

94. Here soteriological and epistemological concerns are intertwined. The pagans cannot truly know God because they have misunderstood both the source and the nature of divinity. Only God's humility and not humanity's haughtiness can elevate the fallen soul. John Rist therefore argues that against non-Christian philosophers more reliant on their own intellectual prowess than on the humility of the crucified one Augustine levels "the criticism that [pagan philosophy] involved the arrogant notion of self-sufficiency [and] Augustine maintains that the belief that the soul is by nature, rather than by creation, divine is itself the cause of the pagan philosopher's failure to know God"; *Eros and Psyche* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 220.

between 415 and 417.[95] The overall subject matter of this work is, first, to distinguish the attributes of divine from human longsuffering (chs. 1–14) and then to account for the origin of all patience (chs. 15–26), which is duly located in divine wisdom. Patience unites human persons with divine persons because true patience is always motivated by charity, which God is by nature and which creatures can become only through his grace. Where does Augustine see this best played out?

Martyrs appear as the best examples of patience. Their integrity and trust show the world what God can do in those who allow him. Unlike the lustful and the wicked who only mimic patience in their tenacity fostered by a self-originating concupiscence, the Christian's patience comes from God and allows him or her to endure all sorts of trials unequivocally and magnanimously. It is here *deificare* enters. Contrasting the superficial similarities between a concupiscence which keeps a seeker indefatigably after that which he seeks, and the true patience which fuels Christian integrity, Augustine maintains:

> There exists a concupiscence, which is not from the Father but from the world, and the more vehement and ardent it has been in a human person, the more is each person (on account of what he desires) able to endure all troubles and pains. But, as we said above, this is not the type of patience descending from above; for true patience comes to us from the Father of lights above. That first type is earthly, the second heavenly; that animal, this spiritual; that devilish, this deified [*illa diabolica, ista deifica*]. Concupiscence, by which sinners endure trials tenaciously, is from this world, but charity, by which those who live right endure all things patiently, is from God.[96]

95. Cf. *ep*. 231.7. Its omission from the *Retractationes* should not cast its authenticity into question, as an aged Augustine writes to Count Darius telling him that he will soon send him a copy of a treatise bearing the same title.

96. *pat*. 14 (my translation): "igitur concupiscentia quae non est ex Patre, sed ex mundo, quanto fuerit in homine uehementior et ardentior, tanto fit quisque pro eo quod concupiscit, omnium molestiarum dolorumque patientior. Idcirco, sicut supra diximus, non est ista patientia desursum descendens: patientia uero piorum

Living rightly means living for the glory of God and accordingly ordering all one's pursuits toward him. True to its etymology, the diabolical scatters while the deified life integrates and unifies all under the Father. These two ways of life could not be clearer for Augustine. Whereas the life of concupiscence is still sadly attached to the ever changing and fanciful, the life of the Christian is insistent on the matters of heaven. The former still acts similarly to a brute [*animalis*] while the Christian is now living in accord with the spirit of God [*spiritalis*]. The contrast gets even stronger when he names the former state of life devilish and the latter deified. Here we receive the first instance of the practical implications of a deified life.

The deified life is led by the Spirit, ordered toward God, cognizant that all is a gift from above. It is a result of the humility examined earlier. True patience admits that one is not the author of reality but is dependent upon the one who in fact is. For true patience can be informed only by charity: it is neither a matter of endurance or longsuffering, nor is it simply acting proper in external matters, but it is a matter of loving from and unto God.

The next instance of ethical deification likewise stresses the charity which patience brings, changing both how we see this world and how, therefore, we choose to act in it. In a homily dated 417 A.D., the Bishop of Hippo selected John 5:19 to show how the Son can do only that which he sees the Father doing. Augustine crafts his thoughts into a treatise on the importance of faith and takes for his starting point "God's everyday miracles" [*quotidiana miracula Dei*]. He finds it sad that we are so astonished by the miracle of Cana, but remain thoroughly unimpressed when God turns water into wine every day through

desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum. Itaque illa terrena est, ista coelestis; illa animalis, ista spiritalis; illa diabolica, ista deifica. Quoniam concupiscentia, qua fit ut peccantes omnia pertinaciter patiantur, ex mundo est; caritas autem, qua fit ut recte uiuentes omnia fortiter patiantur, ex Deo est"; CSEL 41.679.

the rain's entering the soil and rising to nourish the grapes' roots and vines. We are amazed by the multiplication of loaves but daily grain in abundance fails to elicit gratitude. With common eyes, the regular and mundane prove soporific. This was the case with Christ's advent as well: appearing like an everyday man, many turned away without beholding the glory united to his common features. The eyes of the head must however give way to the reason of the heart [*oculos in corpore*, *rationem in corde*] and only then will the eyes begin to see the invisible workings of God in and through the everyday creation.[97] Creation is yet again approached as the iconic means through which God intends to reveal himself.

The second half of this homily applies this rule to the unity of humanity and divinity in the incarnate Son, utilizing the *forma serui*, *forma Dei* distinction so important to Augustinian Christology. Christ's perfect humanity not only reveals to believers the fullness of human life, but the Son also reveals the life of the Father. Augustine therefore asks why most of those around the Christ fail to recognize him as the Messiah. Surely people saw him and we know that he promised to show himself to those who asked:

> And there he stood, in front of the eyes of a servant, in the form of a servant, saving the form of God for deified eyes [*seruans oculis deificatis formam dei*], and he said to him, *Am I with you all this time, and you do not know me? Whoever sees me also sees the Father* (Jn 14:8–9). You want to see the Father, see me. You see me, and you don't see me. You see what I have donned for your sake, you do not see what I have been keeping for you. Listen to the commandments, purify your eyes.[98]

97. Cf. *s.* 126.3; Augustine also uses this contrast between Cana and common vintners at *Gn. ad litt*. 6.13.23-24.

98. *s.* 126.14; Hill, *Sermons* (III/4), 278: "Et ille stans ante oculos serui, in forma serui, servans oculis deificatis formam Dei, ait illi: *Tanto tempore uobiscum sum, et non cognouistis me? Qui me uidet, uidet et Patrem*. Patrem quaeris uidere, me uide. Vides me, et non uides me. Vides quod pro te assumpsi, non uides quod pro te seruaui. Audi mandata, purga oculos"; PL 38.704.

With deified eyes, a phrase again unmatched in Latin patristic expression, like all who gaze upon him we see not only the humanity of Christ, but now see more deeply, more accurately: the divine in the human.

Here Augustine may be drawing from the Neoplatonic insistence that only like could encounter like. In Plotinus, for example, assimilation and cognition were necessary correlatives because one must "become" the object of knowledge. Only that which was similar and like [συγγενὲς καὶ ὅμοιον] could ever come into contact with each other. This is why Plotinus would hold that one must first become "sun-like" in order to see the sun, or in some way "god-like" [θεοειδὴς] in order to gaze upon God.[99] Would such an insight help fuel Augustine's imagery of "deified eyes" to some extent? To gaze upon the *forma Dei* one must become somehow like God, for only like can know like. This is precisely what Augustine was exhorting us to become when he opened *De Trinitate* by warning his readers that the power of sight which would be able to "see" such mysteries as the incarnation or the Trinity, is not unaided sight but a power which can be described only as something more than human [*ultra homines*].[100]

Augustine's final use of deification is similarly an instance of ethical deification, appearing toward the end of *The City of God*. In that work's lengthy chapter 19.23, Augustine returns to a topic first encountered in Book 10, pagan magic and Porphyry's reliance on Hecate's "praise" of Christ. This "praise" is nothing more than an attempt by the pagans to appropriate Christ for their own ends. By acting admirably in regarding Christ a deity, the pagans then hope to bolster the authenticity of their vituperation of Christ's followers. Since this move of Hecate comes through the pen of Porphyry, Augustine returns there and to his endorsement of establishing various

99. *Enneads* 1.6.9.
100. *Trin.* 1.2.11; CCL 50.40.

forms of union with the demons who dwell in the heavens' lower regions.

Here is one of the few places Augustine quotes Porphyry favorably, drawing from his *Philosophy from Oracles*, where the Christian bishop finds non-Christian corroboration that monotheism is the true cult and there is one God who is the father of all, who "has indeed no lack of justice, chastity, and other virtues, making our life itself a prayer to him by imitating him and seeking to know him. For seeking to know him purifies us, while imitation of him deifies us by bringing our disposition in line with his."[101] Many of the key elements of Augustinian deification again appear: the search for God as purificatory, the imitation of God, and consequently, becoming divine understood as aligning one's actions with God's own self [*ad ipsum operando*]. It is easy to see why Augustine would agree with Porphyry here. The Father lacks nothing [*nullius indiget*], and while he gains nothing from creaturely praise, it is essential for us [*nobis est bene*] that we adore him through lives of virtue. In this way, our very selves become a prayer consisting of two phases.

The initial phase is in the seeking to know God, leading to human purification, while next comes the imitation of God, leading to deification. This two-fold process thus configures all human operations to God himself [*ad ipsum operando*]. As Augustine closes the quote and moves on to comment, however, he unfortunately leaves the meaning of this divine disposition untouched. He instead concentrates on Porphyry's rightly calling God the only Father and on how such a posi-

101. *ciu. Dei* 19.23; Bettenson, *City of God*, 888: "Nam Deus quidem, utpote omnium Pater, nullius indiget; sed nobis est bene, cum eum per iustitiam et castitatem aliasque uirtutes adoramus, ipsam uitam precem ad ipsum facientes per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purgat, inquit; imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando"; CCL 47.693. This passage is (all too briefly) discussed by John J. O'Meara, *Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1959), 57–59.

tion should terminate all supposed sacrifice to any other deity, what he calls "those whom he considers to be gods" [*quos opinatur deos*]. Augustine uses this extract from Porphyry because it provides him with the perfect opportunity to expound on what it means to imitate God and consequently, to be deified by him. Given Porphyry's understanding of demons and sacrifice, Augustine is also afforded an opportunity to redefine pagan deification language in order to discuss the differences in "gods" as understood in the Christian tradition.

ANALYSIS OF AUGUSTINE'S USE OF *DEIFICARE*

We have thus far followed the uses of *deificare* and its cognates in the writings of Augustine chronologically. His meaning of deification must be elicited from how it is woven into more amplified soteriological metaphors. In contrast to much secondary literature on Augustine and deification, we have seen how he employs the term in many helpful and illuminating ways. Let us now follow two related lines of inquiry. First, what provokes Augustine to employ deification language at all? What does it solve for him and what cachet does it have in his thought? Second, are we able to discern what limits his use of deification language? That is, simply, why does he not rely on it more often?

To begin, it is not unimportant to point out that Augustine uses explicit *deificare* language more than any Latin theologian before him. Although eighteen occurrences may seem far from notable given Augustine's massive output, there are only sixteen instances of *deificare* that appear in the Christian West before him.[102] As such, it is Augustine who is here setting prec-

102. Searching *Corpus Christianorum* (CCL) reveals 16 various uses of *deificare* before Augustine: (1) Tertullian, *Apologeticum* §11; (2) Cyprian, *De Zelo et Liuore* §15 and Cyprian's (3) *Epistula* 52.2 and again at (4) *Epistula* 67.9; (5) *Epistulae ad Cyprianum et alios* 22.1 and (6) again at 75.7; (7) *Sententiae Episcoporum Numero*

edent, unable to draw from any of his usual sources like Hilary or Ambrose. Within the eleven explicitly soteriological uses of deification, two main reasons prompt Augustine's selection of this term: (1) to explain both pagan and sacred scripture's (seemingly) polytheistic use of "gods" and (2) to explain and even bolster other Christian metaphors for salvation.

Augustine's explanation of the plural "gods" found in both pagan and Christian cult is accomplished by way of distinguishing between three types of *dii* found in the religious world around him. For in both his own scriptures as well as the pagan milieu of late antiquity, "gods" presents a challenge to any strict monotheist and thus *deificare* allows Augustine to show the essential difference between (1) the one alone who can deify [*deus deificator*], (2) those whom this God has deified [*deificatos*], and (3) those outside this process who may use the term "gods," but do so falsely. For Augustine, then, the name *deus* can be applied (1) truly and properly, (2) adjectivally and participatorily, and (3) wickedly and deceptively.

From this demarcation we can also conclude that deification for Augustine is a strictly Christian term. It is a process that does not exist outside the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ, and is therefore not a term applicable to those outside Christ's church. As we have seen repeatedly throughout this chapter, Augustine's explicitly soteriological uses of *deificare* are all inextricably bound with the incarnation of the Son (this is obviously to prescind from the initial use at *Epistula* 10.2 as well as the literary uses of *deificare* at the turn of the fifth century). It is a rejuventated state of life not open to anyone outside the

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LXXXVII De Haereticis Baptizandis (*Concilium Carthaginiense sub Cypriano anno 256 habitum*) §8; (8) Marcus Victorinus, *Aduersus Arium* 2.3.11 and again (9) *in ep. ad Ephesios* 1.4.8; (10) Pope Liberius, *Epistula* 2 (to Eusebius of Vercelli) line 5; (11) Ambrosiaster, *In Paulii Epistulam ad Romanos* 1.24, (12), in his *Quaestiones Ueteris et Noui Testamenti* 114.17, (13) and again in the same work at 114.26; (14) Arnobius Junior, *Conflictus cum Serapione* 2.14; and finally, (15 and 16) Optatus of Milevis, twice at *Contra Parmenianum Donatistam* 1.27 (lines 18 and 24).

body of Christ: only in the Son's descent and enfleshment are we able to become deified. In this way Augustine continues a commonplace among the Fathers, that God has become human so that men and women could become divine.

The second purpose *deificare* serves in Augustine's thought is to intensify other related images for the Christian life. Dissatisfied with relying on *deificare* in isolation, he chooses rather to intertwine it with other terms for the new life Christians enjoy in God. In this chapter we saw how the deified life is explained in terms (1) of God's recapitulating all of creation in Christ, bestowing not only life but also a participated-in-divinity, (2) of divine adoption, a "Christification" of the human creature's sharing the Son's same filiality, (3) of Christ's exchanging his humanity for humanity's divinity, and (4) of a "new" humanity's exalted powers in Christ, human persons enjoying a new type of self in God (for example, deified eyes), a new way of interacting with others (for example, a new patience), and a new identification with God (for example, human dispositions in line with his own).

Given these goals, the explanation of *dii* and the exhortation to a new life in Christ, we can agree with Professor Chadwick (*beatae memoriae*) that participation in God is at the heart of Christian redemption for Augustine.[103] It is just as true, however, that Augustine does at times seem hesitant to push this language of deification or participation in God's nature. For, as Chadwick also points out, the Bishop of Hippo knew that among his hearers and readers, many could be found who had strong reservations about any Christian use of the language of deification.[104] While it may be impossible to provide any definitive reasons why Augustine limits his use of

103. Henry Chadwick, "Note sur la Divinisation chez saint Augustin," *Revue des sciences religieuses* 76.2 (2002): 247.

104. Chadwick argues that despite such known reservations, Augustine nonetheless allowed the scriptures—Psalm 81 in particular—to legitimize such rhetoric; cf. "Note sur la Divinisation," 248.

deification language, I would like to venture the three following observations.

The first answer actually strengthens my overall thesis. Augustine limits his use of *deificare* because he finds the same reality in other soteriological models. Simply put, he does not use explicit deification language more than he does because he does not need to. At his disposal are more scriptural terms of salvation: becoming children of God, becoming members of the body of Christ, imitating Jesus in his humility and charity, and so on. In Augustine's mind, these more commonplace Christian images are instances of the deified life.

The second reason Augustine may limit his use of explicit deification language is that the main Latin predecessors from whom he draws (for example, Hilary, Ambrose, Victorinus), likewise veered away from any use of the term *deificare*. Given the preference of such theologians in this regard, Augustine too may have hesitated to use a term which those in his tradition found avoidable or even misleading.

Third, we find that it is a term already promoted by Augustine's opponents. Augustine is very suspicious of those who think that they can become equal to God without qualification, either in this life or in the next. Stressing the language of "becoming gods," therefore, may have led the faithful astray and promised them something which most are not able to understand rightly. Above we saw how two of his most renowned opponents, the Manichees and Donatists, were not at all shy in granting approval to some piece of theology by their use of *deificus*. If Augustine hesitates in using *deificare* because of how the connotations of such a term were being used by his rivals, we can also argue here that this is precisely why he never relies on 2 Pet. 1:4 and humanity's participation in the divine nature.

This *locus classicus* in the history of Christian deification would have provided Augustine with biblical sanction for his

claim that in Christ men and women can participate in God. He can admit on a couple of occasions that the human person participates in the divine nature.[105] Neverthless, such claims are admittedly limited in Augustine's works as a whole. In fact, as it stands, the only instances of his citing 2 Pet. 1:4 appear when he reports how it has been co-opted by the Pelagians.

As Augustine understood Pelagius and his followers, everything the human person required for perfection was already found within. Such anthropological assurance helps to indicate why neither 2 Pet. 1:4 nor perhaps a more sustained discussion on "partaking of the divine nature" finds an explicit place in Augustine's grammar of divine union. It also helps to explain why he never uses 2 Pet. 1:4 as a way of describing deification. We shall pass over the accuracy of Augustine's understanding of the Pelagian system, but what is clear is that he associates the formula "partakers of the divine nature" with their perceived project of casting the human person as a part of the divine [*pars Dei*] without sin or fault. Augustine reports that Caelestius "cited the testimony from the apostle Peter that *we are sharers in the divine nature* (2 Pet. 1:4), and he is said to have formulated the syllogism that 'if the soul is not able to be without sin, then God too is subject to sin, since a part of him, namely, our soul, is subject to sin.'"[106] If we participate in a sinless God, we too remain sinless (so went Augustine's understanding of how Caelestius used 2 Pet. 1:4).

105. Cf., *en. Ps.* 52.6: "Videte quae sit illa participatio: promissa est nobis participatio diuinitatis; mentitur qui promisit, si non est prior factus particeps mortalitatis"; CCL 39.642; *c. s. Ar.* 27.23: "Si autem non erunt, quomodo accipienda est illius plenitudo atque perfectio, nisi ut sit prorsus gignenti aequalis, et in nullo omnino dissimilis; atque ut id breuius planiusque dicamus, sint isti filii gratia, ille natura: quia in istis est participatio diuinitatis, in illo plenitudo?"; PL 42.702.

106. *gest. Pel.* 18.42: "et de apostolo Petro posuit testimonium, '*Diuinae* nos esse *consortes naturae*' et syllogismum facere dicitur: 'quoniam si anima non potest esse sine peccato, ergo et deus subiacet peccato, cuius pars, hoc est anima, peccato obnoxia est'"; CSEL 42.98; Roland Teske, *Pelagians* (I/23), 364; cf. *gest. Pel.* 35.65 where Augustine's concern is again the use of 2 Pet. 1:4 to show how the soul can be "as sinless as God."

As such, Caelestius's reliance on 2 Pet. 1:4 is depicted as equating God's sinlessness with the human soul's impeccability [*sine peccato quemadmodum Deus*].[107] Norman Russell qualifies Caelestius's thought here, stating that he "was probably only stating an extremely optimistic view of human nature."[108] Therefore, prescinding from the question of whether Augustine understood Caelestius accurately or not, he was nonetheless rightly repulsed by any hint of the soul's innate divinity and thus distanced himself from any anthropology or soteriology that depicted the human person as a divine being or as a part of the Godhead.

While Augustine does not name those who think they can be equal to God in this life or in the next, he does admit:

> For my part, I hold that, even when we shall have such great righteousness that absolutely no addition could be made to it, the creature will not be equal to the creator. But if some suppose that our progress will be so great that we will be changed into the divine substance and become exactly what he is, let them see how they may support their view. I confess that I myself am not convinced of it.[109]

Equality to the divine substance is clearly unattainable, perhaps in a way that the term "deification" does not readily make clear. Neither human sinlessness nor the "perfection" the elect will experience in the life to come can render a creature "divine" without making essential theological distinctions and qualifications. This limitation is something we shall return to in chapter 6, when we explore the supposed unity between divinity and humanity in Augustine's understanding of the *totus Christus*.

To Augustine the theologian, the Pelagian misconstruction of 2 Pet. 1:4 fostered a perfectionism which no human being

107. *gest. Pel.* 35.65; CSEL 42.121.

108. Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 332.

109. *nat. et gr.* 33.37; Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* (I/23), *Nature and Grace,* 244.

could ever attain without constant petitioning for God's grace; to Augustine the pastor, it fostered a perfectionism which would generate a church of deluded rigorists. Augustine therefore (invidiously perhaps) accused his Pelagian neighbors of claiming that they were the only ones who need not pray, *dimitte nobis*, "Forgive us our sins," because their own wills have never been in need of liberation.[110] Accordingly, he feared that such a naiveté only encouraged an impossible yearning for innocence and, with the Pelagian denial of the necessity of God's grace intervening and assisting all human efforts, ended up stressing the human person's innate, solitary, and unaided efforts. Against what was seen as a wrongly placed optimism, Augustine tended not to emphasize the potential of men and women to be deified but their utter ineptitude apart from God. As we have seen, however, this does not mean that deification language was absent from his explanation of the Christian life. As Bonner has rightly noticed: "Nevertheless Augustine continues to speak of deification, even when the stream of anti-Pelagian writings between 411–12 and his death was absorbing much of his energy and causing him to emphasize predestination rather than participation."[111] We can only wonder how Augustine's soteriology may have progressed differently if the Pelagian controversy had not forced him to mute the glory of God's life in his creatures.

CONCLUSION

Concentrating on those passages where *deificare* appears within the Augustinian corpus has revealed some significant divisions and patterns. We have seen how there are three clearly distinct uses of deification: (1) the initial use tied up

110. Cf. *ep.* 176.2; *ep.* 177.18; *pecc. mer.* 3.13.23.

111. Gerald Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine's Teaching on Divine Power and Human Freedom* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 114.

with, but certainly not limited to, Augustine's newly found Neoplatonism; (2) the next six which are only reported instances, never explained nor developed; and (3) the final eleven Christian instances which range from 404–27.

Within this third division, deification language is initially presented as a promise by God to his creatures. It is something that creatures could never merit or manufacture on their own. Furthermore, Augustine's later uses of the term *deificare* bring us into contact with the major soteriological metaphors of his theology. For every time deification is used, divine adoption, becoming (participatory) gods, the imitation of God, the simultaneous participation in divinity, as well as the perfecting of the fallen person, arise as well.

This chapter has also shown that every time *deificare* is used in the 400s, it is used in close connection to and emphasis with the flesh of Christ. It is in this way that we can readily conclude with Norman Russell that Augustinian divinization is "firmly incarnational and sacramental."[112] It is the Son's descent into the depths of humanity that enables humans to become gods, a descent which divinely adopts men and women and makes them into children of God. For Augustine, the possibly beguiling term, *deificare*, is never uniquely linked with God the Father nor is it ever the expressed work of the Spirit. Without fail it is used alongside the Son's incarnation. Could not both *pater* and *spiritus* have been found in the soteriological expressions of Manichees as well as the Platonists? The scandal of Christ's enfleshment becomes the sole context in which the Bishop of Hippo is comfortable enough to rely on encouraging his congregation to become deified.

Our initial inquiry into how creator and creature are related for Augustine is thus enriched when we see how he employs language of deification. He is unambiguous that a life with God

112. Russell, *Deification*, 331.

deifies the creature. That said, however, he is both reluctant to multiply such claims and unwilling to elucidate exactly what a deified life might mean. It is a term which may lead his hearers to understand the different ways a Christian can use the term "gods." In Augustine's mind, such an appeal could elicit a Pelagian autonomy and a misplaced perfectionism.

Deification language therefore emerges as a term used profitably and deliberately, a term showing the power of God in remaking creatures into gods. More precisely, it is a soteriological metaphor showing how Christ acts so as to make the elect like himself: he exchanges his divinity for their humanity, he adopts them and makes his Father their Father, and so on. However, while every instance of *deificare* may point Augustine's flock to the work of the Son, his soteriology demands the cooperating work of the Holy Spirit. It is there we now turn.

Four

THE HOLY SPIRIT'S INDWELLING

quia non Deus amaretur, nisi per Spiritum quem dedit
—conf. 13.31.46

INTRODUCTION

The indwelling of the Holy Spirit within the human soul is an indispensable component of Augustinian deification. Reserving the term *deificare* for the overt work of the incarnate Son, Augustine nevertheless depicts how the Spirit's presence renders men and women gods: "not by nature, but are graced to be made and fashioned into gods by the Father through the Son by the gift of the Holy Spirit."[1] Once again we encounter the doctrine that God transforms the elect into "gods" through the Son and by the gift of the Spirit. But precisely how does the Holy Spirit achieve this and how does Augustine explain the Spirit's work in the process of deification?

We saw in chapter 1 how the Spirit of God has been at work since the creation of the world. A new outpouring of the Spirit awaits creation at Pentecost, however, and Augustine must accordingly make a distinction between the Spirit's weak and re-

1. *f. et symb*. 9.16 (my translation): "Non enim sunt naturaliter dii, quicumque sunt facti atque conditi ex Patre per Filium dono Spiritus Sancti"; PL 40.189.

stricted (*infirmus et angustus*) presence available to all in the age before Christ, and the fullness of the Spirit which converts individual Christians into God's holy temples and, collectively, into his living body of praise.[2] Augustine reconciles any tension between the Spirit's older mode of presence and the post-Pentecostal indwelling by confessing that the glorification of Christ leads to a giving of the Spirit to men and women, "as there had never been before" [*qualis numquam antea fuerat*]. That is, this new outpouring of the Spirit is seen not as something completely novel in history but as the consummation of divine union between God and creatures initiated at creation: "It is not that there had been none before, but none of this kind. If the Holy Spirit had not been given at all before, what were the prophets filled with when they spoke?"[3] The Holy Spirit at Pentecost is, quite fittingly, linked to the ascended Lord's new way of being present to his body on earth and Augustine thus uncovers an important pedagogical image.

In transcending space and time, Christ continues to teach his disciples that not everything which pertains to their salvation can be seen with the eyes or touched with the hands. This is why Jesus refuses Mary Magdalene's longing embrace: she must not think that he was only that which could be seen or touched.[4] Furthermore, with an overly carnal mind [*carnali cogitatione*] one refuses to believe in the coming of another Paraclete and thus needs to understand that the Spirit is consubstantial with both the Father and the Son, with the Spirit being the lover [*dilector*] whose descent is brought about by the Son's ascent.[5] Jesus ascended in order to remove such *desideria carnalia* from his followers, so "the Holy Spirit might

2. *Jo. eu. tr.* 92.2; CCL 36.557.

3. *Trin.* 4.20.29; Hill, *Trinity*, 174; CCL 50.200.

4. Cf. *Trin.* 1.9.18: "Ideoque nolebat in eo esse finem intenti cordis in se ut hoc quod uidebatur tantummodo putaretur"; CCL 50.54; cf. *s.* 143.4.

5. *Trin.* 1.9.19; Hill, *Trinity*, 79; CCL 50.55. While no "carnally minded" heretics are here named, Augustine could very well have had in mind those who were still

fill them with a spiritual love, removing their fleshy yearnings."[6] Since a *uisus interior* is always to be preferred [*melior*] over a human body which is limited to a particular place and time, the Son ascended so the Holy Spirit could comfort them "by infusing [*infusurus*] himself into the hearts of those who were believing" and thereby manifest his divine presence.[7] Even in this introductory sketch we begin to see how the Holy Spirit unites God and his followers. This unity between persons is why the Holy Spirit has come into the world: to descend softly from on high and unite all peoples to the incarnate Word.

In order to discuss the Spirit's role in unifying the elect with God, a passage from *De Trinitate* 6 serves as a point of departure. Within Augustine's refutation of Arian logic against the consubstantiality of the Son appears a rich discussion on the nature of unity within the Godhead. In this one passage we encounter the three functions of the Holy Spirit on which I shall concentrate throughout this chapter. We shall see how the proper role of the Holy Spirit is to effect his own divine attributes of (1) unity, (2) holiness, and (3) charity. Before we turn to this text, however, let us treat two preliminary factors that are important in how we approach Augustine's pneumatology.

The first relates to how he exegetes the biblical images used to describe the Spirit, discovering a significant theology of symbols surrounding those illustrations used in scripture to describe the Spirit's presence. While active since the beginning of time, the Spirit is now "demonstrated by perceptible signs (e.g., the dove, parted tongues of flame) to show that the whole world and all nations with their variety of languages

holding on to a form of Ulfilan Arianism which relegated the Holy Spirit to a tertiary ranking merely awaiting the Son's dictates. Cf. William A. Sumruld, *Augustine and the Arians: The Bishop of Hippo's Encounters with Ulfilan Arianism* (London: Associated University Presses, 1994), 55–56.

6. *s.* 264.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 229.

7. *Jo. eu. tr.* 94.4; Rettig, *Tractates*, 4.183.

were going to believe in Christ by the gift of the Holy Spirit."[8] In these sensible signs [*signis sensibilibus*], Augustine develops an important theologoumenon: given the Spirit's particular task within the economy, the various scriptural signifiers for the Spirit stress his subtle and silent ubiquity. The objects he chose by which to make himself known only hint at but never reveal his substance. The Spirit never sanctified the dove, wind, or fire because he never united them to himself, nor his person [*neque … sibique et personae suae in unitatem habitumque coniunxit*] to any such transitory creature.[9] Although he remains immutable and invisible like the Father and the Son, he uses very plain and visible theophanies in order to convert the human mind from these visible manifestations of his own coming to the hidden eternity of his constant presence.[10] Unlike the dignity of the flesh the Son assumed from Mary's humanity, the Spirit was never joined to any created nature. Augustine's exegesis clarifies that these ephemeral images "imposed themselves on the human senses and passed away [and] were divinely effected at a particular time from subservient creation, not from the Sovereign Nature itself, which remaining intact in itself, moves what it wishes, and, unchangeable, changes what it wishes."[11] That is, the Holy Spirit never assumed created being, was never joined to any part of the visible world and can therefore never be circumscribed by it.

The Spirit's various theophanies are not, however, without significance. In his commentary on John 1:32–33, where John the Baptist witnesses the Spirit's descent from heaven "like a

8. *Trin.* 4.20.29; Hill, *Trinity*, 175: "cum oportet eius aduentum signis sensibilis demonstrari ut ostenderetur totum orbem terrarum atque omnes gentes in linguis uariis constitutas credituras in Christum per donum spiritus sancti"; CCL 50.201.

9. *Trin.* 2.6.11; CCL 50.94.

10. Cf. *Trin.* 2.5.10: "ut exterioribus uisis hominum corda commota a temporali manifestatione uenientis ad occultam aeternitatem semper praesentis conuerterentur"; CCL 50.93; cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 6.3.

11. *Jo. eu. tr.* 99.2; Rettig, *Tractates*, 4.220; slightly adjusted.

dove" upon Jesus, Augustine uses this as an opportunity to note that upon the Apostles the Spirit descended as flame (cf. Acts 2:1–4).[12] This distinction within the economy manifests the various attributes of the Spirit: to the Son he reveals simplicity, to the Son's followers he grants apostolic zeal and evangelical fervor.[13] The Spirit has correspondingly chosen creatures which represent both the gentleness and the power, as well as the union of love which he has been given by the Son to accomplish. Even the breath of Christ (cf. John 20:22) aptly displays the intangibility of the Spirit as well as dual procession from the Father and the Son.[14]

The second preliminary consideration is methodological in nature: we shall examine the Augustinian principle that the way the divine persons exist in the economy reveals something about their eternal relationships within the Trinity. The Trinity, inseparably at work in history, reveals God's eternal persons and processions. In other words, everything God does in time is arranged so as to elicit proper faith by giving testimony to the eternal missions of the Trinity: "Everything that has taken place in time in 'originated' matters which have been produced from the eternal and reduced back to the eternal, and has been designed to elicit the faith we must be purified by in order to contemplate the truth, has either been testimony to this mission or has been the actual mission of the Son of God."[15] All God accomplishes in history is carried out

12. For Augustine, the dove is a most guileless bird, yet it possesses a beak and wings and is willing to fight for its own. Even though such an arsenal leaves much to be desired, he sees how it most fittingly "expresses anger without bitterness" [*sine amaritudine saeuit*]. Unlike the raven which knows how to injure only with acrimony, the dove chastises with love [*amor saeuit, caritas saeuit*]; cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 6.3. For more on the dove in Augustine's thought, see Adam Ployd, "The Unity of the Dove: The Sixth Homily on the Gospel of John and Augustine's Trinitarian Solution to the Donatist Schism," *Augustinian Studies* 42 (2011): 57–77.

13. *ep. Jo.* 7.11; Rettig, *Tractates*, 5.226–27.

14. Cf. *Trin.* 4.20.29.

15. *Trin.* 4.19.25; Hill, *Trinity*, 171: "Quaecumque propter faciendam fidem qua

based on the pattern of the Trinity's interpersonal relations. The work the divine persons perform economically provides a faint hint of their eternity. We saw this at play when we examined the role of each divine person in the act of creation back in chapter 2. Now this principle again becomes essential because we can expect to see that what the Holy Spirit accomplishes in human persons indicates how the Spirit lives in the Trinity.

Given this intricate and complementary blending of images and roles, there has been surprisingly little appreciation of how Augustine understands the Holy Spirit in the work of salvation. Most scholars have chosen instead to concentrate on his groundbreaking insight into the Holy Spirit as the personal love between Father and Son, hence failing to account thoroughly for what the Holy Spirit achieves in history. Two recent comments indicate how scholars view the way in which the Holy Spirit plays some role in Augustine's understanding of humanity's participation in God, but see it as a mitigated and less-studied role when juxtaposed with the East. For example, Patricia Wilson-Kastner concluded that, "The Greek Fathers also formulated a crucial aspect of human participation in the divine life which is present in a lesser way in Augustine—the role of the Holy Spirit."[16] Likewise, in his fine comparison between Augustine and Cyril of Alexandria, Daniel Keating concludes that when attention is turned "to Augustine's depiction of the Spirit's role in our appropriation of divine life, it appears—on a first reading—that Augustine's account is somewhat underdeveloped in comparison to Cyril's."[17] Let us,

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mundaremur ad contemplandam ueritatem in rebus ortis ab aeternitate prolatis et ad aeternitatem relatis temporaliter gesta sunt aut testimonia missionis huius fuerunt aut ipsa missio filii dei"; CCL 50.193.

16. Patricia Wilson-Kastner, "Grace as Participation in the Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo," *Augustinian Studies* 7 (1976): 140.

17. Daniel Keating, *The Appropriation of Divine Life in Cyril of Alexandria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 244.

then, go beyond such a "first reading" to show how the Spirit consummates what we can call the divinizing work of the Son. To achieve this closer reading and thereby understand how the Holy Spirit is active in the lives of the deified, let us now consider what the Spirit *does* in those elect whom Christ calls.

EXPOSITION OF *DE TRINITATE* 6.5.7

The overall purpose of Book 6 of the *De Trinitate* is to refute what Augustine sees as a fault in Arian logic, a project that also forces him to question some of the linguistic precision he worked out earlier. The Bishop of Hippo suggests that from 1 Cor. 1:24—Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God—the Arians strengthen their position of subordinating the Son to the Father. That is, by arguing that the Son is both the *uirtus* and *sapientia* of the Father, the Arians supposedly conclude that the Father must therefore not be *uirtus* and *sapientia* but only the begetter of such virtues. To understand why this is such a troublesome contention for Augustine, we must examine the core argument running through Books 5 to 7.

In Book 5 Augustine agreed with the Arians that one can never predicate an accidental quality of the Godhead but he is quick to point out that this does not mean that all predicates are substantial. Augustine therefore enlists another way of talking about God, providing his readers with two ways of attributing divine predicates: (1) by way of God's substance [*secundum substantiam*] and (2) by way of the relationships [*secundum relatiuum*] within the Godhead.[18] We can therefore now talk about God by way of *what* God is substantially, as well as by way of *who* the divine persons are in relationship to one another. So, for example, "begetter" and "begotten" should be understood not as substance terms (as the Arians were wont to do) but as relationship terms, thus showing how

18. *Trin.* 5.5.6; CCL 50.211.

the Father and the Son are related while in no way connoting a dissimilarity in essence.

1 Cor. 1:24 seems to upset this rather helpful linguistic maneuvering. How can a substance term, like power or wisdom, be ascribed particularly to a relationship (that is, to the Son), without casting the Father's claim to be also and equally "power" or "wisdom" into question? Moreover, if the Son is the power and wisdom of the Father, perhaps all divine predicates are ultimately relationship terms. If so, are we forbidden to attribute any "substance" terms to any one of the three divine persons without including all? While this is the line of questioning Augustine treats throughout Book 6, no final answer comes until Book 7.

There he realizes that if attributes such as *uirtus* and *sapientia* are relationship terms, why would not other names be similarly relegated? If so, "substance" and even "God" could be predicated only by way of relation and that would mean that not even being itself is being but only relationship: *ipsa essentia non sit essentia*.[19] Knowing this to be wholly illogical, Augustine concludes that scripture often predicates attributes of God without explicitly clarifying how such a name or agency is applicable to each person of the Trinity. So echoing the creedal tradition of the church, Augustine concludes that while "the Father is himself wisdom, and the Son is called the wisdom of the Father in the same way as he is called the light of the Father, that is, as we talk of light from light, and both are one light, so we must understand wisdom from wisdom, and both one wisdom."[20] As substance terms, "power" and "wisdom" can be equally predicated of each divine person and as "begotten" the Son can be called the Father's *uirtus* and *sapientia* without any threat to their substantial equality.

We have traced the core argument of *De Trinitate* 5–7 be-

19. *Trin.* 7.1.2; CCL 50.247.
20. *Trin.* 7.12; Hill, *Trinity*, 221.

cause standing in the middle of this illuminating section on how to speak of the Trinity properly is a very succinct and helpful passage relating to how Augustine understands the Holy Spirit. As we just saw, Book 6 opened with the Arian claim that 1 Cor. 1:24 essentially bifurcates the Father and the Son. The Father is powerful or wise, not in himself, but only in the Son, leading to the conclusion that the Father "will be great with the greatness he has begotten, and good with the goodness, eternal with the eternity, omnipotent with the omnipotence which is born from him," and so forth.[21] Ultimately this discussion centers on the way to understand unity rightly. This is why Augustine next turns to a discussion of various types of union, citing John 17:22 on the unity between Christ and his followers, and 1 Cor. 3:8 on the equality of the one who waters and the one who plants. He then lists three more types of unity: the hylomorphic unity between body and soul, the nuptial unity between man and woman, and the divine unity between Christians and the Holy Spirit.

Augustine next shows how the Holy Spirit is likewise to be given the same unity and equality of substance [*in eadem unitate substantiae et aequalitate*] within the divine Trinity as the Father and the Son:

> For whether he is the unity of both the others or their holiness or their charity, whether he is their unity because their charity, and their charity because their holiness, it is clear that he is not one of the two, since he is that by which [Father and Son] are joined to the other, by which the begotten is loved by the one who begets him and in turn loves the begetter. Thus *They keep unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace* (Eph. 4:30), not in virtue of participation but of their own very being, not by gift of some superior but by their own gift. We are bidden to imitate this mutuality by grace, both with reference to God and to each other … because it is by his gift that we are one with each other; with him we are one spirit (1 Cor. 6:17), *because our*

21. *Trin*. 6.1.2; Hill, *Trinity*, 206.

soul is glued on behind him (Ps. 63:8). And *for us it is good to cling to God* (Ps. 73:27)....[22]

Unity, holiness, and charity are clearly seen as the essential predicates of the Spirit's nature and his relationship to both the Father and to the Son. We must not think that these attributes are not able to be predicated also of the Father and of the Son; they nonetheless belong particularly to the Holy Spirit because he is their communion, their love, and their sanctity. Perhaps sensing this danger, Augustine is careful to clarify that the Father and Son are also one, love, and holy not by participation but in their very own being. As soon as this consubstantiality is established, the Holy Spirit is again brought in as gift so as to show *how* the Father and the Son are one, love, and holiness. This is not to violate the principle laid down earlier (that all substance terms can be predicated equally of each of the divine persons), but to show that the nature of the gift is also the nature of the Father and the Son. Each person is divine and each is thus unity, holiness, and love not by participation [*non participatione*] but each in his very own being [*sed essentia*].

As soon as this piece of trinitarian theology is settled, Augustine turns to his audience and bids them to imitate God in such "mutuality" (Hill takes the opening *Quod* here as referring back to the unity and the bond of peace at Eph. 4:30). Such an imitation is not the necessary imitation of the Logos necessarily performed by all of creation which we examined back in chapter 1, but is now a free imitation of God which

22. *Trin*. 6.5.7; Hill, *Trinity*, 209: "Siue enim sit unitas amborum siue sanctitas siue caritas, siue ideo unitas quia caritas et ideo caritas, quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque coniungitur, quo genitus a gigente diligatur generatoremque summ diligat, sintque non participatione sed essentia sua neque dono superioris alicuius sed suo proprio *seruantes unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis*. Quod imitari per gratiam et ad deum et ad nos ipsos iubemur … quia ipsius munere inter nos unum; cum illo autem *unus spiritus* quia agglutinatur anima nostra post eum. Et nobis *haerere deo bonum est*"; CCL 50.235.

can be approached and executed only through grace [*per gratiam*]. This grace, furthermore, proves to be the Holy Spirit himself, named here as the gift of God [*munus*] now given to Christ's body. The Spirit is thus presented as the one sent to unify and to gather created persons on a two-fold level. The Spirit unites men and women to God [*ad deum*] and to one another [*ad nos ipsos*] and in this, the two great commandments are fulfilled. Unity is clearly the prerogative of the Holy Spirit: the Spirit comes to unite created persons to divine persons and in so doing, unites all created persons into a bond of peace.

Such movement out of mutability and dissipation into permanence and divinity must be a component within any theology of Christian deification. The Holy Spirit not only gathers in the soul fragmented by sin, he also frees our human nature from its self-imposed restrictions by uniting it to God, that is, by "gluing" us to the Son at the Father's right hand. Joseph T. Lienhard draws our attention to Augustine's use of *gluten* in this passage by convincingly arguing that what he has in mind here is the Old Latin version of Psalm 62:9, *agglutinata est anima mea post te*, and not the Vulgate's *adhesit anima mea post te*.[23] Turning to Augustine's commentary on Psalm 62 thus better enables us to understand how *gluten* is identified with the Holy Spirit, namely the love of God: "Where are we to find the strong glue? The glue is charity. Have charity in you and it will glue your soul into place, following God. Not with God, but behind God, so that he goes ahead and you follow."[24] Love is a glue in that it binds the lover to the beloved and the beloved back to the lover. This occurrence is easily used to show how we become what we love: for Augustine, any sort of unity

23. "The Glue Itself Is the Charity: Ps. 62:9 in Augustine's Thought," in *Collectanea Augustiniana: Presbyter Factus Sum*, edited by J. Lienhard, E. Mueller, and R. Teske (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 375–84.

24. *en. Ps.* 62.17; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/17), 243.

always results in some measure of identity.[25] Finally, this type of "clinging" to God is depicted as humanity's only good [*Et nobis haerere deo bonum est*]. Such divine "adhesion" is what consummates those made in God's image and what satisfies all human longing.

I have chosen this passage from *De Trinitate* 6 because it is a helpful illustration of how Augustine understood the Holy Spirit's eternal role in uniting Father and Son. It also provides us with the basis from which to see what the Holy Spirit accomplishes in the economy of salvation. As stated from the outset of this chapter, the immanent life and the historical agency of each divine person are related and, as such, the unity, sanctity, and love of the eternal Spirit will also be realized in the lives of those in whom the Spirit dwells. Each of these three predicates will therefore be examined in the order in which Augustine presents them in our primary text.

The first section will consider the life of the Father and the Son as a life of co-inherence and unity. This act of union is most often and most clearly attributed to the Holy Spirit by Augustine. Within the economy, union between persons, human and divine, is primarily the gift of the Holy Spirit. The second section will take up the Spirit's ability to elevate the creature's being into a living holiness. The Spirit recreates the human person into a *homo spiritualis*, achieving godly attributes not attainable by unaided human nature alone. We should note here that this aspect of the economy differs subtly from the other two. Whereas union and love are attributes more unequivocally attributed to the Spirit as he dwells between the Father and the Son and in the life of God's faithful, his sanctification of creatures is only analogous to his life as "holy" and

25. Cf. *s.* 349.2; *c. Faust.* 12.14; *cath.* 5.9; *c. Jul.* 6.14.2. The only place where *gluten* is not identified with a unifying and identifying love is at *ciu. Dei* 15.27 when it is simply the glue Noah uses to hold together the ark. For more on becoming what one loves, see my "Becoming Gods by Becoming God's: Augustine's Mystagogy of Identification," *Augustinian Studies* 39 (2008): 61–74.

"Spirit" within the Trinity. Why so? Sanctification involves the removal of sin, elevation of the intellect, and a stabilization of the soul which God, of course, does not need. The third theme, the Spirit as not only the communion but also the charity of God eternally effecting the love between Father and Son, reflects the fact that Augustinian deification is always related to love.[26]

We see these same three effects in other writings roughly of this same period. For example, the Bishop of Hippo (sometime between 408 and 413) responded to a letter from Bishop Boniface of Catqua in Numidia regarding the effects of infant baptism. Boniface wonders how the efficacy of a sacrament can change and benefit someone who is not yet able to understand what Christ is doing through his appointed minister. Augustine answers that the infants who are baptized "are correctly understood to be presented by all who are pleased that they are presented and by whose *holy* and undivided *love* they are helped to come into the *communion* of the Holy Spirit."[27] The baptized are sanctified and infused with charity by receiving the Spirit of Christ and, consequently, they experience a new degree of union with God. Since sanctity, charity, and unity tell us what happens through the sacramental waters and in the lives of the baptized, do they first tell us something of the Spirit himself?

THE HOLY SPIRIT AS UNION

By identifying the Spirit's nature as union, Augustine becomes the first to see him as the curvature or bend [*s'infléchir*] between the Father and the Son.[28] Olivier du Roy's imagery here, the Spirit as the eternal incurvation uniting Father and

26. Cf. *Trin.* 15.21.41.

27. *ep.* 98.5; Teske, *Letters* (II/1), 429; my emphasis.

28. Olivier Du Roy, *L'Intelligence de la Foi in la Trinité selon saint Augustin: Genèse de sa théologie jusqu'en 391* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966), 416–19.

Son, is a provocative way to display Augustine's contribution to trinitarian thought. The early church was, to a large extent, bedeviled by two tendencies inimical to the creedal formulation of the consubstantiality of the three divine persons.

The first was the early focus on the equality of the Father and the Son to the apparent exclusion (or at least minimal treatment) of the Holy Spirit. Prior to the Cappadocians, many treatises on the Trinity failed to develop a clear trihypostatic theology, tending to focus on the perfect identity involved in the eternal begetting of the Son and the Son's consequent equality with the Father, thus inclined not to grant so much detailed attention to the Holy Spirit.[29] Augustine was aware of this problem and attempted to save the churchmen he had read by offering a helpful hermeneutic. In a sermon delivered in 418 A.D., he admits that just because the Holy Spirit is not mentioned in theological treatises regarding the equality of the Father and the Son does not necessarily mean that he has been overlooked. Why not? The Bishop preaches that the silence surrounding the Spirit in much of theological speculation actually shows how he is named in the dual signification of the Father and of the Son because only he is uniquely understood as being equally both of theirs: "He is not the Spirit only of the Father, or only of the Son, but he is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. So when he's not mentioned, and they are both named, he is understood in them, because he is both of theirs."[30]

29. This is not to cast doctrinal suspicion on these earlier trinitarian treatises, but simply to point out that the attention given over to the *homoousios* of the Spirit pales in comparison to the Son's equality to the Father. Take Novatian, for example, who does not even "expressly give the Holy Spirit the name of God" (Russell DeSimone, trans., *Novatian: The Writings* [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974], 17); moreover, Novatian's *De Trinitate* dedicates merely one chapter (§29) explicitly to the Spirit (see also J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Writings* [London: Adam & Charles Black, 1965 [3rd ed], 126, where he calls Novatian's doctrine of the Spirit "rudimentary," pointing out that "he makes no mention of His subsistence as a Person.").

30. s. 217.2; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 178: "Non, quia tacitus est, praetermissus est spiritus sanctus"; PLS 2.663; see also note 57 below.

If the first problem had been the plain omission of the Spirit's presence and role from the work of earlier theologians, the second danger was the earlier analogies used to describe the Trinity. Many bordered on a subordinated, tertiary position for the Spirit. The Spirit could be depicted as that which came after the sun and its ray or after a body of water's source and its river.[31] While such images rely on the obvious consubstantiality of the sun or the water, as it descends from its source neither the light nor the water can help but diminish in power and effect. With Augustine's insight into the Holy Spirit as the indispensable bond (or, in Du Roy's terminology, the "curvature") between Father and Son, however, there could be no more room for the subtle subordinationism of these earlier thinkers. The Spirit's person and mission as consubstantial union were now indispensable to the Trinity's very existence.

In this way the Spirit as divine communion became an indispensable part of Augustine's soteriology. The verbs he chooses to describe the work of the Holy Spirit are strong and telling: *collocare, coniungere*, *inhaerere*, (*per-*)*manere*, *uinculare*, and *adglutinare*. Such taxonomy clearly emphasizes the Spirit as the living union between persons. As early as 396–97 and the first book of the *De Doctrina Christiana*, the central soteriological working of the Holy Spirit is seen as binding created persons to the trinitarian life. As in his gloss on Psalm 62:9, the Holy Spirit is depicted as the glue that unites us with divinity: "For when you reach [Christ], you also reach the Father, because it is through his equality that the one to whom he is equal can be recognized, with the Holy Spirit binding and so to say gluing us in there, so that we may abide for ever in that supreme and unchangeable good."[32] This phrase, *uinciente et tamquam agglu-*

31. Cf. Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* §8; the same images are used at Hippolytus, *Contra Noetum* §11.

32. *doc. Chr.* 1.34.38; Hill, *Teaching Christianity*, 123: "Cum enim ad ipsum peruenitur, etiam ad Patrem peruenitur, quia per aequalem ille cui est aequalis agnos-

tinante nos Spiritu Sancto, imagines the Holy Spirit as the glue who unites us to the unchangeable good. Christ both exemplifies and offers the invitation to divine unity, while the Holy Spirit effects it. The Spirit is the only alternative to our feeble attempts to "cling feebly to any temporal things." The Spirit is the divine person who is particularly able to free our human nature from all such temporal conditions and limitations [*qui nostram naturam a temporalibus liberauit*], collecting us and bringing us to the Father's own right hand [*collocauit ad dexteram patris*].[33]

Given the sense of unity suggested by Augustine here, it is telling that in the next line of the primary text for this chapter the Holy Spirit is called the "friendship of God." Returning to that passage at *De Trinitate* 6.5.7 for a moment, we read: "So the Holy Spirit is something common to the Father and Son, whatever [he] is, or is their very commonness or communion, consubstantial and coeternal. Call this friendship if it helps, but a better word for [him] is charity."[34] While *caritas* may still be a more appropriate term, Augustine will allow us to see the Spirit as the eternal friendship which unites Father and Son. For, glued together by likeness and love, friends become like one another and slowly take on the attributes of the other. But why is Augustine here slow to insist on the Holy Spirit as divine *amicitia?* Perhaps this is because friendship implies two pre-existing persons who only come to a new mutuality and shared closeness in time enriching both parties. However, by at least allowing us to call the Spirit "friendship," even if some-

citur; uinciente et tamquam agglutinante nos Spiritu Sancto, quo in summo atque incommutabili bono permanere possimus"; CCL 32.28.

33. *doc. Chr.* 1.34.38: "Ex quo intellegitur quam nulla res in uia tenere nos debeat, quando nec ipse dominus, in quantum uia nostra esse dignatus est, tenere nos uoluerit, sed transire, ne rebus temporalibus, quamuis ab illo pro salute nostra susceptis et gestis, haereamus infirmiter, sed per eas potius curramus alacriter, ut ad eum ipsum, qui nostram naturam a temporalibus liberauit et collocauit ad dexteram patris, prouehi atque peruehi mereamur"; CCL 32.28.

34. *Trin.* 6.5.7; Hill, *Trinity*, 209: "*Spiritus* ergo sanctus commune aliquid est *patris et filii*, quidquid illud est, aut ipsa communio consubstantialis et coaeterna; quae si amicitia conuenienter dici potest, dicatur, sed aptius dicitur caritas"; CCL 50.235.

what conditionally, a bevy of other images stressing unity arise from Augustine's own narrative.

Augustine has elsewhere characterized friendship by the classical definition of the sharing of selves and the becoming the other as friends come to share the good, cemented together through sharing similar loves and actions.[35] Friendship meant finding a soul's other half [*dimidium animae suae*].[36] This friendship was based on a mutuality in sharing the true and the good.[37] Friendship also included the love of the divine.[38] If the Holy Spirit is therefore the friendship of God, we can deduce how the Son's particular role is to make us like God by allowing us to share the same love, thereby uniting us to the one for whom each human person has been made.

In examining these texts which discuss the particular work of the Holy Spirit, are we to assume that it is the Holy Spirit himself who is alive and active in the divinely-united soul? Is it the Holy Spirit who unites Christians to the Godhead or is it rather some effect of the Spirit's activity? This question is essential because any doctrine of deification demands an internal and intimate presence of the Trinity within the human soul. It is not enough for God to touch and tug from afar; God must transform from within. God, and not an effect of God, regardless how exalted, must be active within the soul.

In Augustine's Pneumatology we realize a new presence of the divine life in creatures. The binding of the believer to Christ is simultaneously a new ontological presence of the Trinity within the human soul; it is a presence reserved exclusively for the deified which is much more than an ethical empowerment

35. Cf. *Gn. litt. imp.* 16.59.

36. *conf.* 4.6.11; CCL 27.45 (paraphrasing Horace, *Carmina* 1.3.8).

37. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 19.8. For more on the Augustinian notion of friendship, see Joseph T. Lienhard, "Friendship with God, Friendship in God: Traces in St. Augustine," in *Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue*, edited by F. van Fleteren, et al. (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 207–29.

38. Cf. *ep.* 258.1-2.

or an intellectual improvement. This however does not mean that the Holy Spirit alone lives in the created soul. Augustine maintains: "After all, the Holy Spirit doesn't dwell [*habitat*] in anybody without the Father and the Son, just as the Son doesn't without the Father and the Holy Spirit, nor does the Father without them." Despite always stressing the inseparable workings of the persons of the Trinity, Augustine goes on here to insist on seeing the divine indwelling "as the proper work of the Holy Spirit" because the Spirit is himself "the companionship of the Father and the Son."[39] As the bond between the Father and the Son, the Spirit makes the entire Trinity our divine guest: we dwell in God and God dwells in us.[40]

At times Augustine may refer to grace as a medicine.[41] However, this should not necessitate the conclusion that "God's grace for [Augustine] was primarily an unmerited supernatural help to convert from sin or resist temptation."[42] Grace does enable the rational creature to avoid sin but that is only propaedeutical and not the ultimate purpose of the divine's indwelling. Instead, this new presence of the Spirit effects created godliness; it is the divine presence in the human soul making the Christian into a participant in the triune life. This notion of indwelling is fitting to the Spirit's ubiquity and role in uniting us to God the Son, conforming creatures to him and thereby forming in the faithful those filial attributes of the Son. The Spirit's penetration and consequent abiding in the human soul is explained as a sheltering and subsequent remaining: "Let God be your house, and be the house of God.

39. *s.* 71.33; Hill, *Sermons* (III/3), 267: "Neque enim habitat in quoquam Spiritus sanctus sine Patre et Filio: sicut nec Filius sine Patre et Spiritu sancto, nec sine illis Pater … ideo societas unitatis Ecclesiae Dei, extra quam non fit ipsa remissio peccatorum, tamquam proprium opus est Spiritus Sancti, Patre sane et Filio cooperantibus, quia societas est quodam modo Patris et Filii ipse Spiritus Sanctus"; PL 38.463.

40. *Trin.* 15.17.31: "Sanctus itaque spiritus de quo dedit nobis facit nos in deo manere et ipsum in nobis"; CCL 50A.506.

41. Cf. *s.* 156.5.

42. Ronald Modras, *Ignatian Humanism* (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2004), 42.

Abide in God and let God abide in you. God abides in you that he may hold you; you abide in God that you may not fall."[43] Moreover, Augustine would come to find the Pauline description of the sanctified creature as a divine temple (cf. 1 Cor. 3:16, 1 Cor. 6:19, 2 Cor. 6:16, Eph. 2:21) very attractive. To capture the Spirit's indwelling, the human person as the temple of God accordingly becomes a prominent image in Augustine's writings.

THE HUMAN PERSON AS DIVINE TEMPLE

Despite the frequent occurrence of the sanctified individual as an undifferentiated *templum Dei* (188 times), we never find Augustine describing the soul as a *templum Patris* or a *templum Filii*. The sanctifying indwelling of God is a role particularly reserved for the Holy Spirit. By reserving such inhabitation for the Spirit, Augustine clearly follows the Pauline metaphor. It is only through the Spirit that the Father and Son come to abide in their created temples. Furthermore, such temples are differentiated from all other creatures because this triune indwelling is no longer simply the presence granted to all creatures by the fact of their very existence. In the sanctified, the Trinity now dwells (*habitat*) in his temples in a transformative and appropriative manner: "Hence God, who is present everywhere and whole everywhere, does not dwell in all but only in those whom he makes his most blessed temple or most blessed temples, *rescuing them from the power of darkness* and transferring them *into the kingdom of his beloved Son* (Col. 1:13), which begins with their rebirth."[44] One is not simply rescued from sinfulness, but is also brought into incorruptibility and therefore made a child of God. The Christian

43. *ep. Jo.* 9.1; Rettig, *Tractates*, 5.247: "Sit tibi domus Deus, et esto domus Dei; mane in Deo, et maneat in te Deus. Manet in te Deus, ut te contineat: manes in Deo, ne cadas"; PL 35.2045.

44. *ep.* 187.12.35; Teske, *Letters* (II/3), 247.

is thus made, by first being lifted out of sin, freed from the enemy of our human nature, and then made fit for the eternal kingdom which the Son has inaugurated.

When discussing the divine presence within the soul, Augustine speaks of God's very presence. Yet are we able to think of Augustinian grace as something from God or as the actual indwelling of God himself? Augustine's argument originates in the *cor inquietum* which can be satisfied with nothing other than the divine. Our only satiety can be God, which is to be filled with God through grace: *Hoc est enim Deum gratis amare … de Deo properare impleri de ipso satiari.*[45] Attempting to find contentment in anything other than God dissatisfies and ultimately perverts the human soul. Comparing the flickering lamp of John the Baptist and the refulgent sun of Christ, for example, Augustine preaches that Christ's testimony to himself throughout John 5:31–40 is meant to exhort his hearers to go beyond any created good. Instead, Christ wants us to understand how the "human soul and rational mind which is in the human being and is not in the brute animal, are not enlivened, are not made happy, are not enlightened except by the very substance of God."[46] Is it possible to defend Augustine's words (*nisi ab ipsa substantia Dei*) here? Is the grace of union really a participation in the very substance of God? Just a few lines later, Augustine repeats this claim: the soul's only happiness can come about only "by participation in that life of an always living, unchangeable, and eternal substance which is God."[47] Does Augustine ever bother to explain this grace of divine indwelling? Does he explain how the created

45. *s.* 334.3; PL 38.1469.

46. *Jo. eu. tr.* 23.5; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.216: "insinuauit nobis animam humanam et mentem rationalem, quae inest homini, non inest pecori, non uegetari, non beatificari, non illuminari, nisi ab ipsa substantia Dei"; CCL 36.235.

47. *Jo. eu. tr.* 23.5; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.216: "beatitudinem tamen eius qua fit beata ipsa anima, non fieri nisi participatione illius uitae semper uiuae, incommutabilis, aeternaeque substantiae, quae Deus est"; CCL 36.235.

soul can participate in the very substance of God? Similar to his use of *deificare*, this is unfortunately an area where he is not concerned to provide a clear resolution or to offer some philosophical solution. Once again, he is much more content to exhort than to explain.

However, while Augustine may not care to venture into the dynamics of how humanity and divinity can meet, we accept that it is an act of grace which is the only action that will bring the human person to completion. This is Augustine's central concern. For his main goal in developing the Pauline language of the human soul as God's dwelling place or in arguing that true human happiness comes only through participation in the very substance of God is to show that Christianity never forces the sanctified creature to rest in some created gift. The life of the holy ones consists in living contact with the divine nature. He thus appears to be taking a middle path between violating or modifying the divine nature and understanding the divine presence simply in terms of an operation extrinsic to the created person. Perhaps this point will be made clearer by turning to what proves to be more of a theological treatise on the presence of God than a simple letter, Augustine's *Epistula* 187 to Dardanus.[48]

In the year 417 Augustine finally makes time to answer a couple of difficult questions posed to him by the Gallic prefect of the praetorium, Cornelius Postumus Dardanus. Dardanus is already a practicing Christian and finds himself puzzled over (1) how Christ can promise the good thief paradise since he was still to descend into the underworld (*ep*. 187.1.1–6.21); and (2) how John could have leapt in the womb at his Lord's arrival (*ep*. 187.7.22-13.41). Augustine answers both of these queries by distinguishing between God's ubiquitous presence and God's indwelling in those Christians whom he makes his own.

48. Augustine will later revise the name of *ep.* 187 to *De Praesentia Dei liber*; cf., *retr.* 2.49.

Turning to his explanation of 1 Cor. 3:16, on how the human person becomes a divine temple, we find a helpful distinction between the presence of God, which is ubiquitous throughout all that is, and his special communication of himself into the filiation of the Son: "Hence we must say that God is everywhere by the presence of his divinity [*ubique esse deum per diuinitatis prasentiam*] but not everywhere through the indwelling of grace [*per habitationis gratiam*]. For, on account of this indwelling, in which we undoubtedly recognize the grace of his love, we do not say 'Our Father who art everywhere,' though this is also true, but *Our Father who art in heaven*."[49] Nature is to presence what grace is to indwelling. God may be *praesens* in all things (as we saw in chapter 1)—sustaining and ordering all of creation—but God takes up *habitatio* only in those he enables to be his children. This divine indwelling achieves a familiarity between created and divine persons, as the graced are brought into a new union with God which is evidenced by the human person's new ability to call upon God as "Father." The divine habitation achieves a filial relationship between creator and creature. The ever-present God who sustained all of creation from all time is now enjoyed and known in a much more personal and paternal manner.

Earlier in chapter 2 we saw that the erect posture of the human body best symbolizes the divine transcendence, but in the Holy Spirit the human body now becomes the place where the divine dwells personally on earth: "That temple [of Israel] was a shadow; the light came, and put the shadow to flight … [because] it is the body of Christ that is God's temple. What are our bodies? Members of Christ.… Let us trust the body of Christ and our bodies to be the temple of God, and we will

49. *ep.* 187.5.16; Teske, *Letters* (II/3), 237: "unde fatendum est ubique esse deum per diuinitatis praesentiam, sed non ubique per habitationis gratiam. propter hanc enim habitationem, ubi procul dubio gratia dilectionis eius agnoscitur, non dicimus: 'Pater noster qui es ubique', cum et hoc uerum sit, sed: '*Pater noster qui es in caelis*'"; CSEL 57.94.

be."[50] In a beautiful passage from the *Enchiridion*, the body is explicitly expressed as an indispensable part of becoming godly. Here Augustine relies on the Holy Spirit to argue for humanity's becoming gods, echoing Athanasius's dictum that the Son could not be the agent of divinization if he himself were not divine.[51] Augustine employs the same methodology to prove the divinity of the Spirit. If the Spirit were not divine by nature, the Spirit too would be a created temple and would hence be unable to dwell within other created temples:

> So neither the whole Church nor any part of it desires to be worshipped instead of God, nor does anybody want to be a god to those who belong to the temple of God which is built of those made into gods by the uncreated God. So the Holy Spirit, if he were a creature and not the creator, would certainly be a rational creature—for rational creatures are the highest of creatures—and so would not be placed before the Church in the rule of faith, since he also would be a member of the Church in that part of it which is in heaven, and would have no temple himself but be himself a temple. But he has a temple, of which the apostle says *do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God?* (1 Cor. 6:19).[52]

The sanctified human person, body and soul, becomes the created receiver of the Spirit's presence. He or she is made a god by the one God [*aedificatur ex diis quos facit non factus Deus*], a linguistic pattern common to Augustine's deification. This helps him again to explain how worship is, of course, due not to those made gods but should instead be offered solely to the one who has the power to deify. Now human activity,

50. *s.* 217.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 179.

51. Cf. *Contra Arianos* 1.27 and 2.61.

52. *ench.* 15.56; Harbert, *Enchiridion*, 307: "Vnde nec tota nec ulla pars eius uult se coli pro deo, nec cuiquam esse deus pertinenti ad templum dei quod aedificatur ex diis quos facit non factus deus. Ac per hoc spiritus sanctus, si creatura non creator esset, profecto creatura rationalis esset—ipsa est enim summa creatura—et ideo in regula fidei non poneretur ante ecclesiam, quia et ipse ad ecclesiam pertineret in illa eius parte quae in caelis est, nec haberet templum sed etiam ipse templum esset. Templum autem habet, de quo dicit apostolus: *Nescitis quia corpora uestra templum in uobis est spiritus sancti, quem habetis a deo?*"; CCL 46.79–80.

rendered through the body, becomes either an act of praise or an act of rebellion; certainly Paul's stress on tempering the senses as well as the strong sexual ethos surrounding 1 Corinthians 6 was not lost on Augustine. In becoming a temple, human flesh both receives and points to the Spirit. Texts such as *Enchiridion* 15.56 should dispel any doubt as to whether the human body is also caught up in the process of sanctification.

Here we see Augustine accounting for the union between God and participatory gods in a way that both accomplishes unity between the human and divine natures, as well as maintains the ontological difference between both divine archetype and divinized derivative. The key to this free identity is the Holy Spirit as love. One can only truly inhere in another with and through charity. This is how Augustine constantly melds Rom. 5:5 with this sense of personal union: "Let us love him and cling to him with the charity that has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us."[53] Only love can unite individuals while simultaneously respecting the alterity of the other. The presence of the Holy Spirit as *caritas* unites us with God and God with us. The Spirit is never presented by Augustine as absorbing or negating human individuality but rather fulfilling it by perfecting the love for which the human person has been created. We abide in God as he abides in us and we are remade in Christ only through the bond of charity [*connexione caritiatis*], uniting the body with the head into one living self.[54]

This inseparable connection between unity and charity is particularly Augustinian and he uses it on both a corporate and an individual level. Corporately, it fuels his polemic against what he sees to be the Donatists' fracturing of charity and unity, a theme we will return to when exploring Augustine's ecclesiology. For now, however, we can appreciate how

53. *Trin.* 7.3.5; Hill, *Trinity*, 223.
54. Cf. *en. Ps.* 30, *exp.* 2.3; cf. *ord.* 2.18.48.

he refuses to grant the Donatists a share in the Spirit's fullness because they have willingly broken true unity and have thereby broken the communion which only the communion of the Spirit's love [*compago caritatis*] can achieve.[55] At the personal level, divine union and holiness and love must also accompany one another. Let us therefore now turn to the Spirit as spiritual holiness, as these are inseparable for Augustine: as the bond of love and the gift of self between the Father and the Son, the Spirit manifests himself as a union realized as holiness in the lives of the elect.

THE HOLY SPIRIT AS SPIRITUAL HOLINESS

The Holy Spirit is the person of the Trinity who most particularly represents the holiness and the spiritual nature of divinity.[56] The Spirit of God is the Spirit of holiness and Augustine finds no more fitting name for him than *spiritus sanctus* because this epithet alone connotes the essential commonality between Father and Son: spirit and sanctity. Augustine suggests that whereas both union and love cannot help but predicate a bond between two others, the names "holiness" and "spirit" are not as easily identifiable with the Spirit individually as a nexus. In order to defend why "Holy Spirit" is in fact a fitting name, therefore, he shrewdly sees how these names actually do represent a commonality in that they are essentially what both Father and Son are, similar to what we saw earlier at *Sermon* 217:

> So the Holy Spirit is a kind of inexpressible communion or fellowship of Father and Son, and perhaps he is given this name just because the same name can be applied to the Father and the Son. He is properly called what they are in common, seeing that both Father and Son are holy and both Father and Son are spirit. So to signify the

55. *s.* 137.1; PL 38.754.
56. Cf. *Trin.* 5.11.12.

communion of them both by a name which applies to them both, the gift of both is called the Holy Spirit.[57]

We also argued earlier that the soteriological effects of the Trinity mirror the eternal processions. If this is true, then we should now be able to see how the Holy Spirit makes us both "holy" and "spiritual" as well.

The term *sanctitas* carries with it two fundamental meanings, particularly Augustinian in nature. The first has to do with a certain type of imperviousness to change, namely an immunity against the dissipation of sin. Heavily Platonic, where reality is equated with immutability, sanctity and stability in God are infused into both body and soul by the Holy Spirit: "By his gift which is also given to the soul, that is by the Holy Spirit, it is not only its recipient, the soul, that is rendered safe and peaceable and holy [*salua et pacata et sancta fit*] but the body too that will be quickened and in its own order will be of the utmost purity."[58] The Holy Spirit enters the created soul and makes the creature like himself. This transformation is not however limited solely to the incorporeal aspect of the human person, but here again we see Augustine's constant recognition of the bodily aspect of union with and in the Spirit.

The second meaning which Augustine associates with holiness is the creature's assimilation to God, a transformation attributed mainly to the Holy Spirit who enables creatures to behave divinely: to see as God sees, to know as he knows. Toward the end of the *Confessions*, for example, we read how Augustine clearly attributes a creature's ability to act like God to the Spirit himself. The Spirit is the one who conforms us

57. *Trin.* 5.11.12; Hill, *Trinity*, 197: "Ergo spiritus sanctus ineffabilis quaedam patris filiique communio, et ideo fortasse sic appellatur quia patri et filio potest eadem appellatio conuenire. Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur quod illi communiter quia *et pater spiritus et filius spiritus*, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus. Vt ergo ex nomine quod utrique conuenit utriusque communio significetur, uocatur *donum* amborum spiritus sanctus"; CCL 50.219-20.

58. *uera rel.* 12.25; Hill, *True Religion*, 45.

to the divine nature, thus enabling creatures to see and know divinely:

> It is different for people who see creation through your Spirit, for you are seeing it through their eyes … no one knows the reality of God except the Spirit of God. How, then, can we too know the gifts that God has given to us? This is the answer that comes to me: if we know something through his Spirit, it is still true to say that *no one knows* it *except God's own Spirit;* for just as it could rightly be said to people who spoke in the Spirit of God, *It is not you who are speaking* (Matt. 10:20), so too is it rightly said to those who know anything in the Spirit of God.[59]

A wonderful paradox is here realized. The Spirit dwells within the deified in such a way that it is still the Spirit who sees and knows but now through created eyes and mind. These two terms, *sanctus* and *spiritus*, are synchronically linked in Augustine's trinitarian as well as in his soteriological grammar: to become holy necessarily means to become spiritual. He develops this association by joining St. Paul in searching for a *homo spiritualis* (cf. 1 Cor. 3:1) as opposed to a carnal one.[60] To Augustine, Paul is looking for someone who has been raised above the mutability of the temporal and fallen order.

The spiritual person experiences such grace as the ability to embrace an eternal reality. In a set of important studies, Roland Teske has laid out how the spiritual man or woman is marked by two necessary characteristics: ecclesial commitment and Neoplatonic insight.[61] In his recent work, Philip Cary concurs. Cary presents Augustine's concept of grace in what he readily admits is "not a turn away from [Augustine's]

59. *conf.* 13.31.46; Boulding, *Confessions*, 375; CCL 27.269.

60. Cf. *conf.* 13.13.14.

61. Cf. Roland Teske, "Spirituals and Spiritual Interpretation in Saint Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 15 (1984): 65–81; "*Homo Spiritualis* in St. Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*," *Studia Patristica* 22, edited by E. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1989), 351–55; "'Homo Spiritualis' in the *Confessions* of St. Augustine," *Augustine: From Rhetor to Theologian*, edited by Joanne McWilliam (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1992), 67–76.

Platonism" and suggests that the initial effect of grace in one's life is the detachment from "lower (external, sensible, temporal) things and a conversion to higher (inner, intelligible, eternal) things."[62] We see how both of these elements, (1) the move away from the exclusively material and (2) the transition into the body of Christ are indeed related in Augustine's own story. It was his inability to conceive of a spiritual, nontangible substance which kept him from joining the *catholici* for over twelve years.[63] Furthermore, his confession that it was the church who taught him how to think of spiritual reality again connects these two requisites of becoming spiritual.[64] So what constitutes a spiritual person for Augustine?

First, the spiritual person is always a person of Christ's church. In Augustine's estimation, the Donatists and other sectarians cannot have the Spirit because, breaking from ecclesial communion, they have broken away from the Spirit of communion as well. Ecclesial membership is essential to holiness. For just as the old creation began with the carnal union of Adam and Eve, the new creation originates in the spiritual nuptiality of Christ and his church. Those outside of this marriage remain less than human, or as Augustine will call them, "beasts" [*pecora*] who are unwilling to be tamed and domesticated by Christ and his church. Instead, they are "given over to concupiscence like cattle [or] groping in the darkness and murk of curiosity as if they were snakes or soaring up on the wings of pride as if they were birds." The *spiritualis homo*, on the other hand, "is a good minister of Christ and imitates him to the best of his ability [and] feeds spiritually together with the people on the nourishment provided by the holy scriptures and the divine law."[65] The spiritual person is hungry enough to

62. Philip Cary, *Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7.

63. *conf.* 5.10.20; Boulding, *Confessions*, 129.

64. Cf. *util. cred.* 18.36.

65. *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.23.40; Hill, *Genesis*, 65.

be fed alongside others; willing to follow the same scriptures, the same law, the same teachings; and humble enough to be included in the same mystical body throughout the world.

Such meekness allows for the second characteristic of the spiritual person as one who understands and judges reality in terms of Christ the Word through whom all things are made and to whom all things tend. Without the first condition, Augustine would be able to call most Neoplatonic philosophers *homines spirituales*, but this he refuses to do, as they do not yet know Jesus Christ, and those who do are too proud to be identified with the Son and Spirit. From correctly understanding the nature of evil to right understanding of the divine nature, a *homo spiritualis* must be able to conceive of a spiritual reality, a level of being void of all circumscription and corporeality. This is not however an epistemological condition only. There is also an ethical component, summed up well by Teske when he writes that, "the spiritual is judged by no one, that is, no [human] person, because the spiritual has by this knowledge become identified with the Law, Christ, in accord with which things are judged. But *having become Christ* as far as possible, and thus being with God (the Father), each loves what is known with whole charity [*tota charitate* (*sic*)]—an odd expression, but surely one that refers to the Holy Spirit."[66] Once again we see how the love who is the Holy Spirit unites the Christian with Christ.

As mentioned, "becoming one spirit" with and in Christ effects a paradox: God's activity in the human will is what actually enables the true freedom of that will. Grace is what achieves the union for which all human operations were created in the first place:

> Therefore, the Lord makes those whom he wishes devout so that they have recourse to the Lord and desire to be ruled by him and

66. Teske, "'Homo Spiritualis' in the *Confessions*," 73; my emphasis.

make their will dependent upon his will and, by constantly clinging to him, become one spirit with him [*ei adhaerendo iugiter unus … cum eo fit spiritus*], and it is only devout persons who do all this! Hence, if God does not make them do this, who does?[67]

Grace does not erase human volition but unites it to the perfect will. It raises the human person from the enslavement of concupiscence to a life of adhering to God. This union [*adhaerendo*] spiritualizes the human person [*fit spiritus*], rendering all human operations oriented toward and in harmony with the divine.

It is imperative to distinguish how the Spirit's gift of spiritual holiness is different from his bestowal of unity and love. We mentioned earlier that the first two soteriological effects of union and charity closely mirror the union and the love within the Trinity. Now, however, the holiness and spiritual nature granted to us by the Spirit must be of a different sort than that realized within the Trinity. Why so? The holiness which the Spirit communicates to creatures must first purge us of sin and then elevate us to a nature that is never properly our own. In Augustinian terms, the Spirit must reorient our love by lifting us out of the decay we have freely brought on ourselves through divine disobedience.[68] Christ ascends into heaven so as to send his Spirit, bringing about a new type of divine union. Since Christ cannot enter the human heart with his own flesh, Pentecost allows him to possess the heart, "dwelling within, so that we may be converted inwardly and be brought to life from him, and formed from him, because he is the unformed form of everything there is."[69]

67. *gr. et pecc. or.*1.46–51; Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* (I/23), 428: "ergo ut currat ad dominum, et ab eo se regi cupiat, suamque uoluntatem ex eius uoluntate suspendat, eique adhaerendo iugiter unus secundum apostolum, cum eo fiat spiritus, deus quem uult religiosum facit: et hoc totum homo nisi religiosus non facit. quapropter nisi a deo fiat, ut hoc faciat, quis hoc facit?"; CSEL 42.162-63; cf. *ench.* 9.32.

68. Cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 32.9.

69. *s.* 264.4; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 230.

This process of elevation and transformation is not individualistic for Augustine, but communal. Unity with the Spirit is an ecclesial act, or in the words of John Rist: "It is appropriate that 'social' and 'communal' beings should be redeemed socially, and membership in a corporate body is appropriate for the redemption of that part of us which is not just 'our own life'. We need to be reformed and glued back together as members of the new Adam."[70] The Spirit thus unites us to a divinely human head and in so doing makes us into the body of Christ. Finally, if this body is anything for Augustine, it must be a body of love, a collection of charity. Let us now turn to the third predicate of the Spirit and see how the *caritas Dei* is also realized in the lives of his followers.

DIVINE LOVE POURED INTO HUMAN HEARTS

Augustine is the first to make this guiding principle explicit: whenever we hear the word "love," we are to understand the Holy Spirit.[71] Scripture never comes right out and makes this claim clear but Augustine realizes that the more restricted *Spiritus caritas est* instead of *Deus caritas est* (1 John 4:8) may have very well led some astray in failing to attribute charity to the Father and Son as well.[72] We should remember that whatever is said of the Father and Son with regard to substance is equally said of the Spirit; conversely, whatever is said of the Spirit with regard to substance is said of the Father and the Son. Why then is the Spirit considered the love between the two?

Augustine's answer takes the form of two distinct argu-

70. John Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 288.

71. Carol Harrison argues that Augustine is the first to identify love properly with the Holy Spirit; *Beauty and Revelation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 254.

72. Cf. *Trin.* 15.17.27.

ments. The first has to do with the very nature of love. The nature of love is triune: "love means someone loving and something loved and love."[73] Lover and beloved are united by a distinct third factor, namely the love between them. This is appropriated most properly to the Spirit because, as we have just seen, the Spirit is responsible for communion between persons. The second argument runs along two distinct lines in its own right. First Augustine proves the Spirit is divine love by eliminating the Father and then the Son. The first part of this argument distinguishes between the terms *est Deus* and *ex Deo*. He admits that before he learned that *Deus caritas est*, he first read that *caritas ex Deo* (1 John 4:7). Coming from God, *caritas* could be either the Son or the Spirit, but as a processional, the Father is clearly eliminated. Is *caritas* then the Son? The second part of the argument is sacramental. Heretics and schismatics [*mali*] are able to enter Christ's church, and are able to display gifts of prophecy (for example, Saul while persecuting David). They can even receive the sacraments (for example, the Donatists). No doubt all the Arians, Eunomians, Macedonians, and Novatians confess that the Christ has come in the flesh.[74] In effect, even the damned can partake of the Son: to receive the sacred body and blood of the incarnate Lord is possible and does in fact occur in schismatic and heretical communities. As such, Augustine points us to Paul's admonition against eating and drinking to one's own condemnation (cf. 1 Cor. 11:27). The one thing these *mali* cannot do is love truly.

But what then does Augustine mean by love? In the third book of *De Doctrina Christiana*, where he has been working out the difference between *uti* and *frui*, we learn: "What I mean by charity or love is any urge of the spirit to find joy

73. *Trin.* 8.10.14; Hill, *Trinity*, 255: "Amor autem alicuius amantis est, et amore aliquid amatur"; CCL 50.290.

74. Cf. *ep. Jo.* 6.12.

in God for his own sake, and in oneself and one's neighbor for God's sake; by cupidity or greed any impulse of the spirit to find joy in oneself and one's neighbor, and in any kind of bodily thing at all, not for God's sake."[75] Charity is an elevation of the person so as to equip him or her to find joy in God alone and thereby enjoy all else in God. This elevation is an inspiration as it is particularly the effect of the Holy Spirit's presence in the life of the elect. Only those who possess the Holy Spirit are capable of authentic love: "The Holy Spirit gives life to no one outside this body … one who is an enemy of unity has no share in the love of God. Those, therefore, who are outside the Church do not have the Holy Spirit."[76] Outside Christ's Catholic Church only a semblance of this unity and love exist. As we will see in the next chapter, the Son's incarnation has given his body on earth a visible and definite structure, and the Spirit is sent to work within this concrete plan and body.

To sum up, if love proceeds from the Father, and if the damned can to some degree share in the Son but if they cannot properly love, the *caritas* mentioned by the evangelist must be the Holy Spirit.[77] This way of elimination and argumentation raises an important point: the love which is God is the same love bestowed upon God's faithful. Christian charity is not a creature or simply a gift from God but is God himself. To what extent can we say that God himself dwells in the human soul and not simply an effect of God? Augustine approaches such a question by way of the charity found within the creature: "Embrace love which is God, and embrace God with love. This is the love which unites all the good angels and servants of God in a bond of holiness [*consociat uinculo sanctitatis*], conjoins us and them together, and subjoins us to itself.… And if a man is full of love, what is he full of

75. *doc. Chr.* 3.10.16; Hill, *Teaching Christianity* (I/11), 176.
76. *ep.* 185.50; Teske, *Letters* (II/3), 206.
77. Cf. *ep. Jo.* 7.6.

but God?" Here at *De Trinitate* 8.8.12 the three effects of the Spirit's presence are again obvious: unity, love, and holiness. The phrase "full of God" (*Deo plenus*) insists that the Spirit is clearly not some external gift independent of God but is presented as the very life of God now inhabiting the human soul. We saw above how Augustine allows us to maintain that God himself and not just an effect of God can dwell in the created soul. Now we see how this presence is ultimately charity: the love we have in Christ for our brothers and sisters is not only from God but is also simply God [*non solum ex Deo sed etiam Deus*].[78] The same love which unites Father and Son allows the human person to love the whole of the Trinity because the love with which we love God proves to be the Spirit himself. For Augustine, it is essential to note that none of the other virtues is so given. All other gifts come from God but they are in no way identified with God. God is neither *fides* nor *spes*, although these do come to us from him [*ab ipso nobis*].[79]

As mentioned, Augustine is not concerned about how this takes place and never ventures a metaphysical analysis of how the divine can inhabit a created soul, but rather quickly affirms that the Spirit fills us in a great and tremendous way [*magnopere implebimur Spiritu Sancto*] and only through his indwelling will we have charity in us.[80] This presence is so real and effective that, as the Spirit fills the faithful with himself, he leads them to the Father. This movement is how Augustine decided to conclude his great work on the Trinity:

> So the love which is from God and is God is distinctively the Holy Spirit; through him the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, and through it the whole triad dwells in us [*per quam nos tota inhabitet trinitas*]. This is the reason why it is most apposite that the Holy Spirit, while being God, should also be called the gift of God. And

78. *Trin.* 8.8.12; Hill, *Trinity*, 253.
79. *Trin.* 15.17.27; CCL 50A.502; cf., *s.* 156.5.
80. Cf. *s.* 272B.7.

this gift, surely, is distinctively to be understood as being the charity which brings us through to God [*perducit ad Deum*], without which no other gift of God at all can bring us through to God.[81]

Rom. 5:5 repeatedly appears throughout Augustine's corpus, over 200 times according to La Bonnardière.[82] This repetition emphasizes the love which identifies us with the love of the Trinity, conforming our humanity to the Son's divine self. It is most apposite, Augustine thinks, to see this union with the divine nature as the presence of the Spirit, the great gift of God now present in the creature leading [*perducit*] him or her through to God.

Such an analysis allows us to see how Augustine would have considered the *caritas Dei* of Rom. 5:5 as a subjective genitive. The charity here is nothing other than God's loving in us and not, as an objective genitive would have it, our purely human love reaching up to God. For it is the Spirit himself in us who brings us to a love of the Father. Far from a grammatical nicety, this question is central to Augustine's theology of union. Is the charity discoverable in the human soul actually the Holy Spirit himself or is it an infused supernatural virtue coming *from* the Holy Spirit? For the most part, Augustine's own words identify charity with the Holy Spirit, exhorting us: "Let us love God with God. Yes indeed, since the Holy Spirit is God, let us love God with God," and again, after quoting Rom. 5:5, "it follows that since the Holy Spirit is God and we cannot love God except through the Holy Spirit, we can only love God with God."[83] By stressing the *caritas Dei* as a subjec-

81. *Trin.* 15.18.32; Hill, *Trinity*, 421: "Dilectio igitur quae ex deo est et deus est proprie spiritus sanctus est per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris dei caritas per quam nos tata inhabitet trinitatis. Quocirca rectissime spiritus sanctus, cum sit deus, uocatur etiam donum dei. Quod donum proprie quid nisi caritas intellegenda est quae perducit ad deum et sine qua quodlibet aliud dei donum non perducit ad deum?"; CCL 50A.508.

82. Cf. Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, "Le verset paulinien *Rom*., v.5 dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin," *Augustinus Magister* 2, 657–665; 662–65.

83. Cf. *s.* 34.3; Hill, *Sermons* (III/2), 167.

tive genitive, we reinforce the Spirit's inhabitation within the created soul: it is God's own love which allows creatures to offer an infinite love to God, thereby elevating the faithful and allowing them to participate in the life of the Trinity.

Furthermore, if this divine *caritas* is dually processional in the trinitarian life, it is fitting that the Spirit also be realized in creatures as one *given*. Charity can never stem from our own capacity or from our own choosing. Augustine is provided with a model of how creatures participate in the divine life through the Spirit, the *donum Dei* (a term which Mayer finds over 1200 times).[84] Using the trinitarian relationships as the pattern of our own participation in divinity, we see how the Father begets the Begotten in Love and it is therefore fitting that we too are made sons and daughters in this same Love. Or to describe this transformation in Augustine's own words, the Son is *natus*-God, the Spirit is *datus*-God, while a human person becomes *factus*-God. In Augustine's own words, the Holy Spirit comes forth not as one born [*non quomodo natus*] but as one given [*sed quomodo datus*]. Furthermore, the Spirit is neither made God nor adoptively born divine like the Christian elect [*factus ut per gratiam in adoptionem nasceretur sicuti nos*].[85] This tripartite division of *natus-datus-factus* exhausts the various ways of coming from the Father: equal Begotten, equal gift, and a graced creature. A generation ago Joseph Ratzinger saw how the Spirit opens up a way of being God that is neither begotten nor given. He discerned that, as gift, the Spirit allows for a new movement [*Bewegung*] from the Father, extended even to creatures who, while never enjoying consubstantiality with the Father, are nonetheless made like him and united to the Father through the Spirit.[86]

84. Mayer, s.v. "Donum," *Augustinus Lexikon*, 660–67; 660, n. 4.

85. *Trin.* 5.14.15: "Exit enim non quomodo natus sed quomodo *datus*, et ideo non dicitur filius quia neque *natus* est sicut *unigenitus* neque factus ut per gratiam in adoptionem nasceretur sicuti nos"; CCL 50.222.

86. Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, "Der Heilige Geist als communio: Zum Verhältnis

As the eternal union between Father and Son, the Spirit is the gift-person of the Trinity [*donum*] who proceeds so as to be "giveable" [*donatum*].[87] The Spirit's presence creates the connaturality between the human soul and the Father. This unity is depicted as a new facility between creator and creature: for when Love speaks, God's ears are always attendant [*caritas roget et ibi sunt aures Dei*].[88] The Holy Spirit conforms the human to the divine and in so doing, releases the previously carnal person from the snares of the old self. The Holy Spirit reorders the inversion of sin: what was once subject to us has become our master but through God's Spirit we are restored to the top of creation as we become one like God:

> Love, then, will see to it that we are conformed to God and, having been conformed and configured by him and cut off from this world, that we are not confused with the things that ought to be subject to us. But this is done by the Holy Spirit. For the apostle says, *Hope does not produce confusion, since the love of God has been poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us* (Rom. 5.5).[89]

In this passage we again encounter the conflation of the love of the Holy Spirit poured into our hearts with our conforming to God. This is the natural effect of any love: it makes us what we cherish. Union and love for Augustine carry an inseparable component of formation and configuration.

Deifying union with God is the goal of humanity's exis-

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von Pneumatologie und Spiritualität bei Augustinus," in *Erfahrung und Theologie des Heiligen Geistes*, edited by Claus Heitmann and Herbert Mühlen (Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1974), 223–38; 230–31. See also the more recent, Joseph Ratzinger, "The Holy Spirit as Communio: Concerning the Relationship of Pneumatology and Spirituality in Augustine," *Communio* (Summer, 1998): 324–37.

87. *Trin.* 5.3.16; CCL 50.224.

88. *ep. Jo.* 6.8; PL 35.2024.

89. *mor.* 1.13.23; Teske, *The Manichean Debate* (I/19), "The Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of Life," 42; "Fiet ergo per caritatem ut conformemur deo et ex eo conformati atque figurati et circumcisi ab hoc mundo non confundamur cum his quae nobis debent esse subiecta. Fit autem hoc per Spiritum sanctum. *Spes enim*, inquit, *non confundit, quoniam caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis*"; CSEL 90.27.

tence and love is fittingly presented by Augustine as the result of our proper loving. Such charity always carries with it a component of human transformation realized as divine conformity. What we love, we will become [*amate quod eritis*].[90] Love changes everything except Love: for when we love God, we are changed; when God loves us, we are changed. The love of God actually changes us into love. For, by loving us when we were wicked, he made us loveable.[91] This type of identity between humanity and divinity, a matching of loves, is the only reality Augustine will dare to call perfection. It is the deified life which both begins with and is consummated by the charity who is the Holy Spirit.

This insight is found again in his exegesis of 1 John 4:12–16. Human perfection is possible only by appropriating divine love. We begin to realize such completion when we begin to love rightly. Augustine thus instructs:

> Begin to love; you will be perfected [*incipe diligere, perficieris*]. Have you begun to love? God has begun to dwell in you; love him who has begun to dwell in you that by indwelling more perfectly he may make you perfected. "In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit."… Ask your heart; if it is filled with love, you have the Spirit of God.[92]

Ultimate human flourishing is again located in Christ, in charity himself. To be filled with love is to be filled with God. With such an insistence on human perfection as the divine's transformative dwelling within the created soul, we discover one more aspect of Augustine's thought which deserves to be seen as an element of his theology of deification.

90. *s.* 216.8; PL 38.1081.

91. Cf. *s.* 336.2.

92. *ep. Jo.* 8.12; Rettig, *Tractates*, 5.243: "Incipe diligere, perficieris. Coepisti diligere? coepit in te Deus habitare; ama eum qui in te coepit habitare, ut perfectius inhabitando faciat te perfectum. *In hoc cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus, et ipse in nobis, quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis.*… Interroga uiscera tua: si plena sunt caritate, habes Spiritum Dei"; PL 35.2043.

CONCLUSION

We began this chapter by admitting that at first blush the Spirit's role in the Augustinian narrative pales. However, having identified Augustine's insistence that the economic role of each divine person reflects the role of each in the Trinity, we were able to focus on the Spirit's function in time. Using *De Trinitate* 6.5.7 as our guide, we saw how the Holy Spirit is God's union, God's spiritual holiness, and the love between the Father and the Son; in the economy, the Spirit is the glue which unites believers with God and with one another, the person who both renders holy and spiritually transforms Christ's followers, and the love of God poured into the hearts of his people. The Spirit is the charity which binds the church together and the church to Christ. As Augustine knew so well, unless one holds on tightly to unity, one cannot have Christ and one cannot know true unity unless one has charity.[93]

Such an insistence on unity is constitutive of Augustine's thought, a theme we will have to explore more deeply in the next chapter when we take up the body of Christ as a living, single organism. Why so? What lives from the Spirit of Christ? Augustine's answer is nothing but the body of Christ: *de Spiritu Christi non uiuit, nisi corpus Christi*.[94] Thus from the Holy Spirit emerges the church, a connection alluded to in the following section of the commentary just quoted where Augustine brings together the sacrament of faith, the sign of unity and the bond of love in proclaiming: *O sacramentum pietatis! O signum unitatis! O uinculum caritatis!*[95] As love the Spirit unifies: he is the loving union of the Father and of the

93. *s.* 89.1: "Non autem habet Christum, qui Christi non tenet unitatem, qui non habet caritatem. Ergo per hanc connexionem non habet fructum, qui non habet caritatem"; PL 38.554.

94. *Jo. eu. tr.* 26.13; CCL 36.266.

95. *Jo. eu. tr.* 26.13; CCL 36.266.

Son, now poured out into the hearts of those who have become other Christs. This love is not a product of the Spirit but the indwelling of his holy presence. It is a love which transforms mutable minds and elevates creatures out of the disparateness of fallen reality and into the church, that preeminent creature where God is contemplated perfectly and unceasingly. This spiritual holiness allows us to see as God sees and to love as he loves.

Augustinian union is thus comprised of the Son's enfleshment, as well as the Spirit's personal indwelling in the human soul. The living unity, charity, and spiritual holiness between the Father and the Son are given to those who are being deified. The same Spirit vivifies and unifies not simply individuals but the body of believers Christ has gathered to himself. This is why we must next take up the notion of divine unity within Augustine's ecclesiology. The fullness of the Spirit comes only to those gathered in a unifying love: "The Lord has shown, in the eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood, that we abide in him and he in us. But we abide in him when we are his members; but he abides in us when we are his temple. But that we may be his members, unity joins us together. That unity may join us together, what causes it except love?"[96] As such, the Holy Spirit propels us ecclesially. The Spirit is sent to unite all peoples into one living body of praise, and the church is the living organ of the Trinity on earth, the one place where the sinner is not only forgiven but sanctified.

96. *Jo. eu. tr.* 27.6; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.281.

Five

ECCLESIAL RECEPTION OF THE DIVINE LIFE

illi suspirat membrum est enim sponsae
et illi zelat amicus est enim sponsi
—conf. 13.13.14

INTRODUCTION

In his centenary address on Augustine at the University of Tübingen, Karl Adam argued that as Augustine grew as a pastor and theologian, he came to see how the sacraments were the necessary agents of unity. As we have seen, Augustine emphasized that it was the Son's corporeality which drew believers into God. This unity between enfleshed persons is what allowed Karl Adam to argue that Christianity for Augustine is necessarily sacramental: "… for it is by means of the sacraments that our union with Christ is established, renewed and deepened. In his early period Augustine had little use for the sacraments; he now sees in them the most speaking symbols and most perfect expression of Christianity. For the sacraments are exclusively concerned with the enactment of the central Christian 'mystery,' our essential union with the new man Christ."[1]

1. Karl Adam, *Saint Augustine: The Odyssey of His Soul* [*Die geistige Entwicklung des heiligen Augustinus*], translated by Justin McCann (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), 46.

Gerald Bonner echoes the same sentiment, labeling Augustinian deification "an ecclesial process [taking] place within the communion of the Church, to which the Christian is admitted by baptism. For this reason it can be called a sacramental process, in that the Christian grows in grace by being nourished by the eucharist, which he receives as part of the worship of the Church."[2] The Son's life is transmitted to his faithful by the Spirit in his church, and it is particularly through the sacraments of union the Christian sees in himself Christ.

The unifying power of the church and the sacraments celebrated therein cannot be overemphasized for Augustine. This is because the church is nothing other than "the whole Christ," a continuation of the incarnation where union with the perfect man Jesus Christ is made possible. For this reason we shall root our reflections on the church and the sacraments first in the union of humanity and divinity in Christ. Can the humanity of Christ unite human persons with the Godhead? Do the faithful become one with Christ in his humanity or in his divinity, or both? We must attempt to answer these questions before we move on to the nature and the function of the church and the sacraments celebrated therein.

In turning to Augustinian ecclesiology we incorporate the previous chapters. As we have seen, chapter 1 ended by discussing the "*quare fecerit?*" of creation. God freely chose to act *ad extra* in order to share his life with a wholly other order of being, and in this way the church appears as the fulfillment of all creation. God created in order to raise up a unified body of praise (chapter 2). In response to these creatures' disobedience and consequent shattering of the union God offered them, the Son of God took on humanity in order to bestow divinity (chapter 3). To communicate this exchange, he sent

2. Bonner, "Augustine's Conception of Deification," 383. For an excellent survey of recent works on Augustinian ecclesiology, see Michael Fahey, "Augustine's Ecclesiology Revisited," *Augustine: From Rhetor to Theologian*, edited by Joanne McWilliam, 173–81.

the Holy Spirit to unite all the divinized into one family of like-minded lovers (chapter 4). This new family is the church, where those now filled with grace and charity are united with both God and one another.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. We shall start by examining Augustine's understanding of the church as the called and gathered people of God. His multivalent notion of *ecclesia* is crucial to his understanding of deification. Appearing first as a chorus of angelic praise, the church continues in fallen time so as to draw all of humanity into a unified worship. The second section treats the notion of unity of the Godhead and humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. Although this section cannot serve as an exhaustive treatise on Augustine's Christology, the question of how the union of divinity and humanity in Christ achieves the union of human persons with God must be addressed. Here we shall explore the unity of God and humanity in Christ so as to better understand the union of the Son and the church in Augustine's reliance on the concept of the *totus Christus*, Christ's gracious admittance of his followers into himself. Finally, this mystical body of Christ on earth exists in order to unite believers sacramentally, both with God and with one another. For Augustine, this is why the church has been established and this is the goal of all the sacraments: to make Christ present and accessible to all. This new life begins in baptism and is sustained by the grace imparted in the Eucharist. We shall therefore concentrate exclusively on these two sacraments.

THE GENESIS OF THE CHURCH

The *ecclesia* is a very expansive reality for Augustine. When he speaks of the church he does not mean simply the clearly discernible body of believers before him. The church is much more than the walls of the local congregation, much more than any one group of people, and, perhaps surprisingly, much

more than historical Christianity. So, if the church precedes even its incarnate founder, what exactly is it? Augustine sees the church as the first instance of creaturely worship, where the good angels first bring forth their liturgical song of praise. From that original angelic adoration, the church continued through the Old Testament, up through Pentecost, and now extends throughout the entire world. The *ecclesia* reaches from the first creature to any present-day congregation. As such, the church is not simply the visible body of believers, but something much more. Augustine marks three distinct moments running throughout the church's expansion. First, the church is the primordial praise of all creation, concomitant with the first existence of creatures able to worship consciously and freely. Here the good angels first adored God in liturgical unison. The second use of *ecclesia* Augustine utilizes arises with the appearance of the human race. The church *ab Abel* is now the place where salvation is being worked out, the arena where God's chosen people hear of the Lord's ways and foreshadow his Son's perfect offering. This leads to the third and most comprehensive use of church for Augustine, the church as the body of Christ.

It may be startling to learn that the incarnation does not alone account for the existence of the mystical body. The Word's assumption of flesh is the church's consummation and perfection, but its beginning is traced to wherever spiritual beings yearn for fulfillment and completion. The church is understood to be the goal of all of God's activity *ad extra,* the culmination of all creation because it is here we are caught up personally and perfectly in the Son's response to the Father. In order to understand the mission of this divinely-appointed body, let us now take up each of the three instances of church found throughout Augustine's thought.

THE CHURCH OF THE ANGELS

Correct order in the profession of the faith (*rectus ordo confessionis*) demands that we speak of the church immediately after the Trinity. Given the *ordo confessionis* Augustine is following in the *Enchiridion*, we can reason that after professing belief in *Deum Patrem*, comes *Iesum Christum filium Dei unigenitum*, and then *Spiritum Sanctum*, ending with an exposition on the *unam, sanctam, catholicam et apostolicam ecclesiam*. It is most fitting, as Augustine suggests, to speak first of a lord and then immediately to take up the manor in which he dwells. Therefore, after the *Enchiridion's* detailed examination of the Trinity, Augustine turns to the church. What is most striking is that the church is approached first as a pan-cosmic, pre-historical reality. The church is first and foremost that earliest moment of creaturely praise in that abode, "… which has remained with God in heaven ever since its foundation and has never suffered any fall into evil. This part is found among the holy angels and continues in blessedness, giving generous help as it should to its comrades who are on pilgrimage, since they will together form one company in eternity, which is one already by the bond of charity, established to worship the one God."[3]

As we examined in chapter 1, all creation exists by adhering to God. Here the angels are represented as the first established body of rational creatures held together, not only by adhering to God (*cohaesit Deo*), as all creation, but also bound by the Spirit of charity (*uinculo caritatis*). There was never a creation when God's unparalleled goodness in creating was not recognized and praised. Unlike humanity's ecclesial pilgrimage which only in time and through struggle can

3. *ench.* 15:56; Harbert, *Enchiridion* (I/8), 307: "… ex illa quae in caelis semper ex quo condita est cohaesit deo, nec ullum malum sui casus experta est. Haec in sanctis angelis beata persistit, et suae parti peregrinanti sicut oportet opitulatur, quia utraque una erit consortio aeternitatis, et nunc una est uinculo caritatis, quae tota instituta est ad colendum unum deum."; CCL 49.79.

grow into the full headship of Christ (cf. Eph. 4:15), the angelic creature finds itself instantly in the celestial church. Here God's church is instantaneously and perfectly conformed to the Word. This immediate laud of creation only underscores the love and freedom involved in God's sharing his life with contingent being. The celestial church is essentially a repository of divine glory, the locus where the Trinity is first recognized as creator and bestower of being. The highest spiritual beings are held together by a bond of charity, a role Augustine normally attributes to the Holy Spirit, although not explicitly mentioned in the *Enchiridion* passage above. The good angels are ordered first because they are the most refulgent part of creation, constantly contemplating God perfectly and wholly without ceasing. As Augustine maintains elsewhere, these good angels are the light of creation's first moment.[4]

Such a reading of Genesis accounts for both the existence of the angelic host, not otherwise mentioned in the creation narrative, as well as the *lux* appearing before the stellar luminaries which were not created until the fourth day. Creation's zenith is this angelic abode alone in its consistency: only here are the distentions of time and the erosion of sin kept at bay. This first moment of *ecclesia* for Augustine retains an immunity from the struggle that persecuted humanity will come to know all too well; here is a body of believers characterized not by the process of forgiveness and sanctification but by instantaneous and eternal worship of the Trinity.

Is this pristine church not the *caelum caeli* which Augustine assiduously examines at the end of his *Confessions*? It is difficult to state confidently why most scholars have ignored the possibility of this connection, but it has escaped notice of three recent commentaries on the *Confessions*.[5] In his study,

4. *ciu. Dei* 11.9: "… ipsi sunt illa lux, quae diei nomen accepit …"; CCL 47.329; cf. *Gn. litt.* 2.8.16; *s.* 341.18.

5. Cf. *Die Confessiones des Augustinus von Hippo: Einführung und Interpreta-*

O'Donnell simply states that it is "far from clear whether the *caelum caeli* is to be identified with the angels at the time of the *conf*." But O'Donnell never entertains the ecclesial nature of this heavenly abode.[6] However, allow me to provide four properties which only the "heaven of heaven" and the church at its inception (as described in the *Enchiridion* passage above) could share, thus arguing that they could be regarded as Augustinian corollaries.

First, while neither is of course equal to the Trinity, both are depicted as God's first and supreme creature. In the *Enchiridion*, the church is treated immediately after the Trinity because the creed demands such an *ordo confessionis:* after confessing the creator, his dwelling must next be considered ("like a house after the one who lives in it"). In the *Confessions*, heaven's heaven is consistently portrayed as the very antithesis of the mutability out of which all visible creation comes: "two realities: one near to yourself (*prope te*), the other bordering on nothingness; one, *to which you alone would be superior*, the other, than which nothing would be lower."[7]

Second, both the church as represented in the *Enchiridion* and the "heaven's heaven" in the *Confessions* transcend any change, whether that be attributed to the distentions of time or the mayhem of sin. Neither have ever "fallen" and thus remain wholly intact. At *Confessions* 12.9.9 we read that the heaven's heaven "transcends mutability" and is thus without any lapse (*sine ullo lapsu … excedit omnem uolubilem uicissitudinem*); whereas at *Enchiridion* 15.56 we are pointed to that

tion zu den 13 Büchern, edited by Norbert Fischer and Cornelius Mayer (Freiburg: Herder, [1998] 2004); *A Reader's Companion to Augustine's Confessions*, edited by Kim Paffenroth and Robert Kennedy (London: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2003); Carl Vaught, *Access to God in Augustine's Confessions: Books X–XIII* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

6. James O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessions: Introduction, Text and Commentary*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), vol. III, 303.

7. *conf*. 12.7.7; Boulding, *Confessions*, 316; my emphasis.

part of the church which "has never suffered any fall into evil" (*nec ullum malum sui casus experta est*).[8]

The third significant commonality is the reason Augustine attributes to why these bodies of praise remain pristine: the fact that both remain in constant union with God. At *Enchiridion* 15.56 this union is represented by the terms *cohaesit Deo* and *uinculo caritatis*, while throughout *Confessions* 12 similar images of union—*cohibet*, *inhaerendo* (*conf.* 12.9.9), *inhaerendo* (yet again at *conf.* 12.12.12)—are given as the cause of this body's perfection. This creature alone enjoys such supremacy because it is defined by its unbroken union with the divine.

Fourth, both the church and the "heaven's heaven" are described communally. Creaturely worship is never merely individualistic and such a distributive collection of praise cannot help but bring ecclesial images to mind. That is why the church in the *Enchiridion* passage is no doubt described as a *domus*, a *templum*, and as a *consortio aeternitatis*, while the heaven's heaven in the *Confessions* is also a *domus* and a *ciuitas* (*conf.* 12.11.12).

Both the *caelum caeli* and the church indicate that singular sector of creation where the Spirit of charity has undisputed reign and where his effects are fully realized. The church of the angels and the *caelum caeli, is* known by the consummate union enjoyed by its members and their unceasing fidelity to God. Here the church never tires and never turns away from the pure joy of the divine. Because God is perfectly present here, the church is wholly united to the divine in its affection (*ad quem toto affectu se tenet*) and is thus one in concord (*concordissime*).[9] This is the same result we saw in the final instance of Augustine's use of deification with the change of the affection of those who have become participants in divin-

8. CCL 46.79.
9. *conf.* 12.11.12; CCL 27.222.

ity. Those deified in the church experience the same type of knowing as those instantaneously created in the *caelum caeli*. This aspect of divine conformity and effect reinforces my argument that the "heaven's heaven" at the end of the *Confessions*, can be read as "the church" in light of later ecclesial reflections, especially the *Enchiridion*.

In an excellent study on the mystical strands running through the *Confessions*, John Peter Kenney likewise shows how the *caelum caeli* is best understood as the first instance of the church. He sees how the angels perfectly model the Son's turn toward the Father and in their unwavering imitation, a spiritual body is formed, "an ecclesial locus for contemplation, [nested] within an institutional structure … the cosmic significance of the Church is drawn out in reference to God's own act of knowing."[10] The church is "cosmic" because it is more effulgent than the praise found on earth: the angels, although not properly members of the body of Christ, find themselves created freely and wholly in the Spirit within the Son's response to the Father. Here, and only here (as we argued in chapter 4) can creatures know as God knows, see as God sees, and judge as God judges, which is a creaturely assimilation of the divine attributes which can occur only in Christ's church.

As the perfect body of praise, the *caelum caeli* is rightly depicted by Augustine as the telos of all creation. As such, this definition of the completion of creation also provides him with the conclusion he needs for his own story. Is this not why the *Confessions* end on this note? After his exposition of Gen. 1:1–2, Augustine turns to this body of praise (the *caelum caeli*) where nothing is squandered away, but where creatures remain firmly established in God's grace. This is the desired goal of Augustine's own narrative and the end for which he

10. John Peter Kenney, *The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Rereading the Confessions* (London: Routledge, 2005), 107; slightly adjusted.

yearned throughout his own search. By way of a résumé of his own story, then, he fittingly (and finally) prays: "And in your Word, your only Son, we saw [creatures] severally as good and collectively as exceedingly good; for what we saw was heaven and earth, the Head and the body of the Church which you predestined before time began, when there was neither morning nor evening."[11] Unlike his own wanderings, the goal for which Augustine hoped is never challenged by the concupiscence of self but is wholly united with the divine immutability. As such, both the church and the *caelum caeli* represent the summit of creation. Here then is the answer to the *quare fecerit?* posed earlier. God's reason in creating is ecclesial: a collective body of creatures praising the divine glory through perfect, unceasing participation in the Trinity.

Creation and salvation once again converge in the Augustinian grammar of divine union. The interconnectedness of creation and the church bring all of God's activity into a single economy, thereby pointing us to the divine mandate that all be one. In their unceasing worship, the good angels provide those who follow with an imitable pattern. As the Trinity's created receptacle, this cosmic and angelic church is clearly something much more mysterious and ancient than even Christianity itself. However, the church does not remain solely a transcendent reality as experienced in the unsullied *caelum caeli* but will also be continued as a historical body with a future destiny. Having descended from heaven so as to unite human persons with the divine as well as with angelic persons, the church assumes a new form in Genesis with the appearance of God's chosen people. The *ecclesia ab Abel* materializes as the next instance of the church. Before the incarnation, the church was being built up through anticipation and foreshadowing. This does not mean there are multiple bodies

11. *conf.* 13.34.49; Boulding, *Confessions*, 305.

but only one body of Christ, "and not the Church of our own day alone, but that which began with Abel and extends to all who will be born and will believe in Christ.... There the angels are our fellow citizens; but while we are still toiling along on our pilgrimage, they, at home in the city, look forward to our arrival."[12] From the angels who anticipate our union with them in God, we now turn to the stumbling, persecuted church of the pilgrim.

THE CHURCH OF THE PATRIARCHS AND PROPHETS

After the *caelum caeli* comes the historical pilgrim church. If the church is how creation properly praises God and if the church is where all created persons experience union with God, it is fitting that God would make that church available to all humankind. Just as there was never a time without a celestial church, there never was a history without an earthly ecclesial dwelling. Many of the church fathers saw how a preparatory church ran throughout all of history and therefore had to explain how this pilgrim church's genesis could predate its head's incarnation.[13] The solution was to inquire into the holiness and the sanctity of the Old Testament patriarchs and prophets. Since all grace is Christ's through his church, wherever there are graced individuals they somehow belong to Christ's church.

But how can we attribute sanctification and holiness to those who predate Christ? Augustine's answer is to point to the Old Testament figures who are indispensable in the build-

12. *en. Ps.* 90, exp. 2.1; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/18), 330.

13. The Christian argument for the church's primordial roots hinges on the activity of the eternal Logos: all rational creatures share in reason and therefore in Reason himself. An idea which originally arose in Stoic circles, Justin was the first to give this idea Christian expression, cf., *1 Apol.* §46; cf. Heinrich Dörrie, "Das Gebäude spätantiker Bildung mit seinen religiösen Zügen," *Kirchengeschichte als Missionsgeschichte*, edited by H. Frohnes and U. Knoor (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1974), 247–61.

ing of God's kingdom. These Jewish men and women are sanctified through a proleptic faith in the Messiah:

> Now by Church, brothers, you must understand not only those who began to be saints after the Lord's advent and nativity, but all who have ever been saints belong to the same Church. You can't say that our father Abraham does not belong to us, just because he lived before Christ was born of the virgin… after all, the apostle says that we are *the children of Abraham* (Gal. 3:7) by imitating Abrahams' faith. If then we are admitted to the Church by imitating him, are we going to exclude the man himself from the Church? It is this Church that was also represented by Rebecca the wife of Isaac … also to be found in the holy prophets.[14]

The holy men and women of the Old Testament are worthy of Christian emulation. They already enjoy an uprightness of heart so as to lead them to Christ when he does in fact appear: "So, the ancients were justified before the Word's incarnation in so far as they had faith in Christ, and by a true justice who Christ is for us: they believed that Christ would indeed come, just as we believe he has come; the ancients were saved, like us through faith, not by their own works but by the gift of God."[15] The grace received through faith in God is a gift of his Spirit, and Augustine refuses to relegate it exclusively to those who explicitly bear the name of Christian and who just happened to be born after the advent of Christ.

The story of Tamar's twins provides him with an allegory of how this can be. A hand appears before the rest of the baby (cf. Gen. 38:28), yet that hand is obviously connected to and anticipates the head still to emerge. Thereafter we realize: "Before his coming in the flesh he sent ahead of him certain of his members; and after they had foretold his advent he came him-

14. *s.* 4.11; Hill, *Sermons* (III/1), 191.

15. *pat.* 18 (my translation): "Unde et antiqui iusti ante incarnationem uerbi, in hac fide Christi. et in hac uera iustitia, quod est nobis Christus, iustificati sunt; hoc credentes futurum quod nos credimus factum: et ipsi gratia salui facti per fidem. non ex semet ipsis, sed Dei dono; non ex operibus, ne forte extollerentur."; CSEL 41.683.

self … connected to them (*connexus eis*). Recall that episode during the birth of a child of which we spoke: the hand came before the head, but it belonged to the head and was under the head's command."[16] Although the hand is not the head, they are parts of the same person, and although the head obviously possesses the power and the superiority, the hand is nonetheless an organic and invaluable member. Israel is born before the Christian body and before the head takes on human flesh. Augustine nonetheless discerns an inseparable connection between head and body in this birth, and herein sees how God's activity in history aims toward unifying all peoples.

In this way, Old Testament figures become representatives of the foreshadowed church of Christ. Each character represents a particular narrative and therein Augustine sees some particular quality of Christ's church symbolized by way of prolepsis. Anticipating its constant martyrdom, the church at one time was present only in Abel; representing its singular goodness surrounded by a malicious foe, the church existed in Enoch; and it later shone through Noah and his family who stood for the safe destination promised only by Christ's church.[17] Although he will enlist many Old Testament figures as foreshadows of Christ's church in this way, the person of Abel is most often reformulated as an emblem of the church. Why so? Once the church began its pilgrimage in time and throughout all the nations, it was forced to deal with the struggle of sin. As the first victim of fratricide, would Abel's story not evoke images of both Remus and Jesus, the slain founders of the two cities?[18]

Using Abel as the fitting preamble and persecuted channel of the Messianic church founded by Christ is a very origi-

16. *en. Ps.* 61.4; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/17), 205. So as to stress the unity implicit in Augustine's *connexus eis*, Boulding adds the adverb "organically."

17. Cf. *en. Ps.* 128.2.

18. Cf. *ciu. Dei* 15.6.

nal Augustinian move. Abel connects the *caelum caeli* with the *ciuitas Dei:* the figure who serves as a bridge between the unfallen angelic church in heaven and the body of sinful believers making their way on earth. A new understanding of church enters history with Abel. The church is now those called out of the world, the *ecclesia*, to labor for and towards the kingdom of God. As a typological figure of the maltreated Christ, Abel also introduces us to the impending persecutions Christ's church would inevitably face. It highlights the fact that the historical church will not be able to avoid conflict during its earthly pilgrimage.

The church in time most fittingly finds its roots in the first Old Testament character who is portrayed as both a righteous man, as well as the first to be martyred for his love of God made manifest by his act of true sacrifice (for without true love in his heart, as Augustine properly sees, his sacrifice would not have been acceptable).[19] Abel best represents the persecution the post-Pentecostal body will suffer in full. He is called and chosen, while Cain is found unworthy. Abel's murder anticipates the martyrdom of Christ and his saints, thus becoming the prototype of Christ the good shepherd whose murder at the hands of sinners cries out to God (cf. Gen. 4:10). From this dual anticipation of Christ, his sanctity and his martyrdom, the *ecclesia ab Abel* hence proceeds on its pilgrim way in this fallen world. Its troubled course began not merely in the time of the bodily presence of Christ and the time of his apostles; it started with Abel himself, the first righteous man slain by an ungodly brother. The pilgrimage goes on from that time right up to the end of history.[20]

The *ecclesia ab Abel* highlights how the church can no longer be understood simply as the pristine angelic choir, nor is

19. Cf. *ep. Jo.* 5.8; *en. Ps.* 48, *exp.* 2.11; *ciu. Dei* 15.1.
20. *ciu. Dei* 18.51; Bettenson, *City of God*, 835.

it an exclusive place meant solely for the inviolable. From the first appearance of the human family up through Christ's second coming, the church will prove to be an *ecclesia permixta* of saint and sinner. It is a threshing floor where true praise is persecuted, sadly oftentimes by those within and closest to the church. This stress on the church of necessarily both saint and sinner was a key inclusion for Augustine's use of Abel. This also helps us to understand why he chose an *ecclesia ab Abel* and not, say, *ab Adam*.

Is there an anti-Pelagian apologetic in the eponymous church of Abel? Was there anything at risk in Augustine's depiction of an *ecclesia ab Abel?* As the first human person for whom no personal sin is reported, some followers of Pelagius used Abel to represent the possibility of human immaculateness. Eve disobeys. Adam concurs. Cain murders. Yet no sin is ever mentioned for Abel. The Bishop of Hippo acknowledges Genesis's silence but nonetheless understands that Abel is indeed a fallen son of Adam and has therefore contracted original sin like the rest of the human race. Abel represents the church because he too suffered the debilitation brought about by the *originale peccatum de Adam*, but whether or not he had committed sin in his own person (*non in seipso ipse commiserat*) is still open to debate.[21] Abel is enlisted to play a very complex three-fold role. First, as son of Adam, he represents all those tainted by original sin; second, in his alleged personal sinlessness, he is the anticipation of all the infants who carry about the stain of that same Adam unawares; and third, in the possibility of his having sinned, he becomes the prototypical recipient of Christ's redeemed church.

Augustine's providing for Abel's sin (despite the scriptural lacuna) emphasizes how no human heart escapes the conflict of warring loves. In this struggle the two cities become visible:

21. *ep.* 179.9; CSEL 43.696; cf. *nat. et. gr.* 37.43–44.

Jerusalem beginning with the church in Abel, and Babylon with Cain.[22] This is how Israel prepared the nations to be one in Christ. It is also where God first revealed in time his plan to gather all sinners under one savior and all peoples under one shepherd. Therefore the nations should no longer be called disparate peoples but now one single nation in Christ.[23] As the arena of God's sanctifying work, the church unifies all peoples into one Christ, a gradual incorporation of all the saints into the Son, which we can now see as predating even Christianity. The church can therefore never be said to be in only one place or time. That is why Augustine never means by *ecclesia* just the church visible before him, but, rather, "the Church both here and throughout the whole world; and not the Church of our own day alone, but that which began with Abel and extends to all who will be born and will believe in Christ to the very end, the whole people of the saints who belong to one city."[24] The spiritual Jerusalem has therefore never been limited to the Jews. For other saints of antiquity (*antiqui sancti*) have also been brought forth by God "to whom this mystery [of the incarnation] was revealed, and who were compelled to go on to proclaim what they knew," and although Augustine does admit the possibility that some have been deceived by the malicious demons, he is clear that God's grace in history should be seen both to envelop the Jews in a special way but also as overflowing into "other nations who lived by God's standards and were pleasing to God."[25] The church is the universal unfolding of Christ's mystical body: beginning with the angels, the church develops in and through all human persons insistent on righteousness. Persecuted but never defeated, the

22. Cf. *en. Ps.* 64.2: "Et uidete nomine duarum istarum ciuitatem, Babylonis et Ierusalem. Babylon confusio interpretatur, Ierusalem uisio pacis … Ierusalem accepit exordium per Abel, Babylon per Cain."; CCL 39.823; cf. *en. Ps.* 61.6.

23. Cf. *en. Ps.* 147.28.

24. *en. Ps.* 90, *exp.* 2.1; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/18), 330.

25. *ciu. Dei* 18.47; Bettenson, *City of God*, 829.

church will receive its fullness of power with the coming of its king.

This is why the signs and teachings of the old covenant must give way to the fullness of God's power incarnate in Christ Jesus. A growing, visible body demands a visible head and in the Christ the created order finds its perfection. For if creation is fashioned ecclesiologically, the Logocentric turn of all creation must now become a Christocentric worship as the Christ becomes the only answer to fallen creation's dissipation. Christ has come to send his Spirit on all people and thus make his church a visible and universal body of believers. What was only spiritually realized in the celestial church and what was imperfectly anticipated in the Old Testament church finds its fulfillment in the incarnation and in Christ's bestowal of his Spirit on the apostolic body.

THE CHURCH AS THE VISIBLE BODY OF CHRIST

With the *ecclesia ante ecclesiam* Augustine never suggests that the celestial church or the church of the holy patriarchs and prophets existed apart from the Son. There can be "saintly pagans" only because they too have been given some (albeit limited) participation in the Word: serving as signifiers foreshadowing what is to come fully in the Son's sacred humanity. Augustine's broadened use of *ecclesia* is used to highlight how a segment of creation has always recognized and praised God in the Son. However, with the Son's advent in time the church exists in its fullness. With the Old Testament prophecies fulfilled, the Lord begins to extend his visible headship throughout all of the earth. Given such a strong sense of "the Church before the Church" though, what does the church of Christ actually add to his ecclesiology thus far?

With the incarnation, the head now becomes present in history through his mediatorial body. At the Annunciation,

the divine physically broke into space and time in a manifest way, and it is now the same with the church. As the Word becomes visible at the incarnation, the body is rendered visible as well. Mary's "yes" enfleshes and particularizes the head, now made visible and subject to certain structures and expectations. The same is true of the mystical body. In the incarnation the church too becomes historically discernible, tangible, visible, and endowed with a particular structure. In and through the humanity assumed by the Son, God now exerts a direct influence on his members, imparting his own Spirit into his body. Such intimacy results in the union of divinity and humanity. Here these two become singular: only now can the Christ and his chosen people become two in one flesh, two in one voice (*duo sunt in carne una, duo sunt in uoce una*).[26] No longer merely spiritual nor existing in a primarily anticipatory environment, the church can now be pointed to and recognized as a universal path with a visible head and, as a result, with divinely intended structures and sacraments: "from the virgin's womb where the sacred marriage took place, Word and flesh, presented us with a miracle in time … [so] that human beings might eat the bread of angels, the Lord of the angels became a human being. This is our health and salvation; the medicine of the poorly, the food of the healthy."[27] This marriage between divinity and humanity in Christ brings about a new accessibility to God. Because of Christ's humanity, the Christian body on earth now has a definite and discernible structure. The head has become visible—and, as the head, so the body. Before we turn to this union of head and body, let us briefly treat a fundamental component of Augustine's understanding of the visible church: the clear fact that the church on earth is not impeccable.

Augustine's *ecclesia permixta* is a constitutive part of his

26. *s.* 129.4; PL 38.722.
27. *s.* 126.6, Hill, *Sermons* (III/4), 273.

understanding of the visible church. It enables him to navigate between equating visible membership in the church while on earth with automatic entry into the kingdom of God, and the *a priori* impossibility of defining and seeing the church at work in the world. This commixture of two loves, in both the visible church and in the invisible heart, is illustrated by Augustine in a variety of ways—wheat and weeds, grain and straw, and so on.

One of the more frequently employed images found in the Old Testament is that of the ark's carrying all of God's creatures, universally and indiscriminately: "the ark is the Church, constructed from the planks that cannot rot. The planks that cannot rot are the souls of the saints and the just. But it contains both clean and unclean living beings, because as long as the Church is living in this world, and being cleansed by baptism as by the flood, it cannot help having both good and bad members; and that's why that ark contained both clean and unclean animals."[28] Against both the Donatist and the Pelagian quoting of Eph. 5:27 and the church's having neither stain nor wrinkle, Augustine is able to understand how the church is still exhorted to pray *Forgive us our debts* (Matt. 6:21). At present, the pilgrim church staggers along by gathering in people of all kinds of vice and virtue. Yet "at present by God's mercy and truth the holy Church is being guided to that perfection in which it will remain for eternity without stain or wrinkle."[29] Mere membership in the church does not guarantee perfection but such a guarantee can be found only in the church of Christ which is oriented toward and being guided to perfect communion with God. This is not to say, however, that church allegiance in this historical realm automatically determines whether one belongs to God eternally or not. Membership is an equivocal term here. The church is never reduced to the

28. *s.* 264.5; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 231; for more on the *ecclesia permixta*, cf. *en. Ps.* 61.6, *ciu. Dei* 21.24.

29. *gest. Pel.* 13.28; Teske, *The Deeds of Pelagius* (I/23), 353–54.

sum of its enrolled members. As the mediator between permanence and dissolution, Christ has assumed humanity in order to conform all humans to himself. This is the church for Augustine: a mystical person comprised of both a divine and human head as well as angelic and human members. But the central question of Augustine's ecclesiology and unity remains: how does the incarnate Word join human persons to himself?

To answer this, let us now examine the formula which best encapsulates such unity for Augustine, the *totus Christus*. Augustine understands that in the incarnation, the Word of God united himself to humanity and in so doing made possible the union of each human with the Word. This is how Augustine chooses to interpret such curious scriptural lines as Matthew 25 and Acts 9 (as we saw earlier). In both instances Christ speaks about his followers in the first person. In Matthew 25 he proclaims, "Whatever you do to the least of these, you do to me," while in Acts 9 he inquires of Saul, "Why do you persecute me?" To make sense of such passages Augustine develops a hermeneutic of the "whole Christ" to be examined more closely below. As we shall see, while many statements in such a context may appear to be facile hyperbole, they nonetheless point to an attempt on behalf of our author to root the experience of each member of the church in the life of Christ himself. Augustine writes:

> Now, however, I wonder if we shouldn't have a look at ourselves, if we shouldn't think about his body, because he is also us (*quia et nos ipse est*). After all, if we weren't him, this wouldn't be true: *When you did it for one of the least of mine, you did it for me* (Matt. 25:40). If we weren't him, this wouldn't be true: *Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?* (Acts 9:4). So we too are him, because we are his organs, because we are his body, because he is our head, because the whole Christ is both head and body.[30]

30. *s.* 133.8; Hill, *Sermons* (III/4), 338: "Iam uero si nos ipsos attendamus, si corpus eius cogitemus, quia et nos ipse est. Nam etsi nos ipse non essemus, non esset uerum,

In the *totus Christus* Christ conjoins himself with his faithful: the humble, the lowly, and those whom Saul aims to persecute. Consequently, in the church's needs and maltreatments, one still encounters the humble Christ. His continued presence in humanity is thus portrayed as how we both become and serve Christ, the means by which we too are made Christian. Let us now turn to one of Augustine's most intriguing images of the church. Nowhere else in his ecclesiology do Christ and the Christian appear to enjoy such close unity as in the *totus Christus*.

HUMANITY TAKEN AND TRANSFORMED: THE *TOTUS CHRISTUS*

With this notion of the *totus Christus*, Augustine maintains that he is introducing a new way to interpret sacred scripture.[31] Hitherto there were only two ways of reading the scriptures christologically, both of which Augustine found in the Donatist scholar, Tyconius. The first exegetical rule was that the biblical text sometimes portrays Christ speaking as the perfect head of the church and at other times he converses in place of his stumbling and often sinful church.[32] Augustine accepts this (and six other rules) as reasonable: at times the

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Cum uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis (Matt. 25:40). Si nos ipse non essemus, non esset uerum, *Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris?* (Acts 9:4). Ergo et nos ipse, quia nos membra eius, quia nos corpus eius, quia ipse caput nostrum (Eph. 1:22), quia totus Christus caput et corpus."; PL 38.742. See also note 4 of the Introduction above for another instance of these crucial passages in Augustine's thought.

31. At *s.* 341.20 we hear of Augustine's impression that he may have been accused of faulty innovation when interpreting some of Christ's words and actions in terms of both head and body. After explaining how Christ and his members form one flesh parallel to such a declaration about husband and wife (cf. Gen. 2:24), he asks his congregation not to think he has conjured such a hermeneutic up himself: "Adtendite ipsum exponentem, ut non coniecturis nostris aliquid ausi dicere uideamur."; François Dolbeau, ed., *Augustin d'Hippone: Vingt-six Sermons au Peuple d'Afrique* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 572.

32. Cf. *doc. Chr.* 3.31.44. Despite his obvious disagreement with Tyconius's ecclesiology, his respect for Tyconius is evident in *ep.* 249 and in *retr.* 2.44.

head speaks and at other times the body. Since Christ brings the church into himself, he can now vocalize words of doubt and despair speaking not *qua* head but *qua* body, in the place of fallen humanity whose condition he has come to share so as to redeem. Such a hermeneutical principle allowed Augustine to understand how the whole of scripture (but especially his beloved Psalter) can still be read Christologically while at the same time also being able to affirm the cries expressing abandonment and confusion. Augustine came to see how in such moments Christ speaks not as a bewildered deity, but as the Son of God speaking on behalf of sinful humanity. Tyconius provided Augustine with the tools by which to transfer such creaturely predicates away from Christ as omnipotent head, but onto Christ who can also represent the experience of the members of his beloved and vulnerable body.

Seemingly unsatisfied with Tyconius's simplistic, binary distinction between body and head, Augustine comes to speak of Christ in a third way: as the *totus Christus*—the whole Christ who is the fullness of his church, both head and body: *id est caput et corpus, secundum plenitudinem perfecti cuiusdam uiri, in quo uiri singuli membra sumus*.[33] This "whole Christ" is the divinely human head inseparable from the body which he has assumed, now constituting one person. This third way of speaking of Christ has significant implications for our search into Augustine's theology of deification. Before proceeding any further, however, we must first treat the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ. While Augustine tries to show that the incarnate Word and the created church exhibit two essentially different types of divinity, the second type of participatory divinity must be somehow related to that perfect union of God and humanity in Christ.

33. *s.* 341.1; PL 39.1493.

THE UNION OF DIVINITY AND HUMANITY IN CHRIST

Both Johannes Quasten as well as Tarcisius van Bavel position Augustine's *totus Christus* in the personal unity of the Word made flesh. According to Quasten, at "the heart of Augustine's ecclesiology" is his notion of the *totus Christus*, "according to which Christ, as head, is always present and active in his body, the Church; the Church and Christ [form] one single person."[34] Van Bavel agrees, maintaining that the *totus Christus* idea is "more than a simple comparison or metaphor; it is a personal unity. . . ."[35] But how are we to understand this stress on the personal unity between Christ and his church? Is there a correlation between the way a human person becomes a Christian and the way the Word became human? Are the elect united to Christ in the same way he is united to humanity? Augustine was aware of this connection between the humanity of Christ and the dispensation of grace which brings others into the *totus Christus*.

In *On the Predestination of the Saints*, for example, he asks why the reality of grace should be different in the Word's humanity from the grace that brings about the new humanity Christians enjoy in Christ, as both the man Jesus and the rest of the elect share the same human nature. The Spirit who unites the Son to his humanity is the same Spirit who unites Christians to Christ.[36] So, if the humanity of the enfleshed Son did not merit such an elevated dignity (that is, not pre-existing as a man, and thus in no way deserving to be united personally to the Word by the merits of Jesus's foreseen works), it is preposterous for individual Christians to think they must somehow merit their new graced state. Still, while neither Christ

34. Johannes Quasten, *Patrology*, 4.447.
35. Tarcisius van Bavel, s.v. "Church," *Augustine Through the Ages*, 171.
36. Cf. *praed. sanct.* 15.31; PL 44.982.

nor Christians can be said to deserve their graced humanity, Christ's humanity is nonetheless unique precisely as cause and exemplar of the new creation.

Augustine rhetorically asks, "And did he not rather have it to a greater degree to the extent that he was more unable to be a slave to sin?" This "greater degree" (*tanto magis*) is next explained by the fact that in Christ, human nature, our nature (*nostra natura*), "was received in a singular manner, without any preceding merits on its part. . . ."[37] In this way we learn that in Christ's graced humanity Christians find the pattern of their own sanctity. His unique assumption of humanity is the cause of all grace received by men and women. As *On the Predestination of the Saints* 15.30–31 attempts to clarify, the human person is joined to Christ by the very same grace that united the Son to his humanity. As such, how creatures are enabled to share in Christ, their incorporation into the *totus Christus*, is patterned on the Son's incarnation. By assuming humanity to himself, the Son of God is thereby able to impart divine life to those sharing the same human nature.

While this text is one of the last things Augustine would compose (428–29), he began to delineate this distinction between the way in which divinity and humanity are united in the incarnate Son and the way the gift of grace unites the created person to God rather early on. In his study of patristic Christology, Aloys Grillmeier roots this very necessary distinction in an early phrase appearing in Augustine's commentary on Gal. 3:26 regarding the faithful who become children of God by "putting on Christ". While Grillmeier cites only one line, let us quote Augustine's thought more fully:

> . . . by *putting on Christ* through faith that all are made sons [and daughters]—not by nature (as is the case with the only Son, who is indeed the Wisdom of God), and not by superior or a unique as-

37. *praed. sanct.* 15.30; Teske, *The Predestination of the Saints* (I/26), 174.

sumption, accomplished in order to have and perform the role of Wisdom naturally. (Such was the case only with the Mediator himself, who has been made one with the very Wisdom that assumed him without the interposition of any mediator.) Rather, we are made sons [and daughters] by participation in Wisdom, with faith in the Mediator preparing and paving the way for it.[38]

Grillmeier sees in the phrase *ad habendam naturaliter et agendam personam sapientiae* the beginning of Augustine's coming to understand *natura* as that which is properly held in common with another, and *persona* as the individuating factor between those of whom the same nature can be predicated. In this passage, nature is the divine wisdom predicated equally of each divine person, while the person referred to is the Son who alone directly (*sine interpositione*) unites heavenly wisdom with earthly flesh. Subsequently, whereas the very being of the Son is wisdom (*naturaliter*), those he calls become wise by participation (*participatione*).

Another way in which Augustine distinguishes between the perfect unity of humanity and divinity in Jesus Christ and the unity Christians receive is here evident in the term "by means of a unique assumption" (*singularitate susceptionis*). It appears as if Augustine gave this term a special import only with reference to the incarnation. For in scanning his writings, one never encounters a form of *susceptio* used to describe Christ's taking the church to himself; conversely, it is never found to describe the church (or any of the church's members) as taking on Christ. To Augustine's mind, *susceptio*

38. Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, translated by J. S. Bowden (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 322, quoting *ex. Gal.* 27: "… sed per fidem induendo Christum omnes fiunt filii non natura, sicut unicus filius, qui etiam sapientia dei est, neque praepotentia et singularitate susceptionis ad habendam naturaliter et agendam personam sapientiae sicut ipse mediator unum cum ipsa suscipiente sapientia sine interpositione alicuius mediatoris effectus, sed filii fiunt participatione sapientiae id praeparante atque praestante mediatoris fide."; CSEL 84.92; cf. Eric Plumer, *Augustine's Commentary on Galatians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 172–73.

implies a perfect unity of divinity and humanity unique to the incarnate Son. For example, we hear how, "The truth is that he who is the only Son of God by nature, not by grace, took man (*suscepit hominem*) to himself by grace into such a unity of person that he was also the Son of Man."[39] This manner of union is reserved for the incarnate Son alone, for only he can be said to assume a once alien nature to himself. What distinguishes the unique unity of divinity and humanity in Christ from the manner of how the elect are made divine, is that the Son assumes humanity to himself in a way essentially different from how humans appropriate divinity. In other words, while the Son's union with humanity is explained as a *susceptio*, humanity's "contact" with divinity is explained in terms of, most often, *participatio*.

Many of these terms and images come into focus in a passage from the end of Augustine's well-known letter to Dardanus on the divine presence, which we treated in part in the preceding chapter. In explaining the essential difference between how Christ is divine and how divinity dwells in the saints, Augustine writes:

> Or, apart from the fact that the *fullness of divinity* dwells in that body as in a temple, is there another difference between that head and the excellence of any member? There clearly is, because the singular assumption of that man formed one person with the Word. For no saint could or can or will it be able to be said, And the Word became flesh (John 1:14). No saint by any excellence of grace has received the title "the Only-Begotten" in the same way that he who was the very Word of God before all ages bears this same title after assuming the man. . . . For who would be so sacrilegious as to dare to say that some soul could bring it about by the merit of his free choice that he be another Christ?[40]

39. *ench.* 11.36; Harbert, *Enchiridion* (I/8), 296: "Veritas quippe ipsa, unigenitus dei filius non gratia sed natura, gratia suscepit hominem tanta unitate personae ut idem ipse esset etiam hominis filius."; CCL 46.70.

40. *ep.* 187.13.40; Teske, *Letters* (II/2), 249: "an etiam praeter hoc quod, tamquam in templo, in illo corpore habitat omnis plenitudo diuinitatis, est aliud, quod intersit

When we examine this passage on how the Son's assumption of humanity is "singular," we can ascertain three important insights in helping us understand the different types of divine "presence" between the Christ and Christians.

The first involves the citing of Col. 2:9. Unlike any Christian, the Son is the entire fullness of divinity (*omnis plenitudo diuinitatis*); the elect participate in divinity and could never be said to be its fullness. Second, the Son's union of divinity and humanity is inimitable because it alone involves only one person both before and after the Assumption. Here again we encounter the importance of the term *susceptio* and how it is used solely in the union of divinity and humanity in the Word. In his line to Dardanus, *quod singulari quadam susceptione hominis illius una facta est persona cum Verbo*, Augustine is affirming that the Word's assumption of humanity did not result in a new person. There was one (divine) person before the assumption of humanity and one person after, something utterly unrepeatable and unique to the Word's becoming flesh. Third, only the Son is the *unigenitus*. While others may be made adopted sons and daughters, theirs is not the type of natural filiality Christ enjoys before the Father. We saw this back in chapter 3 when examining divine adoption: the first person of the Trinity is "Father" to his Son in a fundamentally different fashion from what the Father is to his created sons and daughters. As such, these three points are consistent with the rest of Augustine's Christology and soteriology, but does he not contradict himself here on one central point?

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inter illud caput, et cuiuslibet membri excellentiam? est plane, quod singulari quadam susceptione hominis illius una facta est persona cum uerbo. de nullo enim sanctorum dici potuit, aut potest, aut poterit: Verbum caro factum est, nullus sanctorum qualibet praestantia gratiae unigeniti nomen accepit, ut, quod est ipsum dei uerbum ante saecula, hoc simul cum adsumpto homine diceretur. singularis ergo est illa susceptio nec cum hominibus aliquibus sanctis quantalibet sapientia et sanctitate praestantibus, ullo modo potest esse communis. ubi diuinae gratiae satis perspicuum clarumque documentum est. quis enim tam sit sacrilegus, ut audeat affirmare aliquam posse animam per meritum liberi arbitrii, ut alter sit Christus, efficere?"; CSEL57.117.

In trying to state his case that the union of divinity and humanity in the Son's incarnation is fundamentally different from the union with Christ which Christians experience, does he appear to go back on his language that Christians are to become "other Christs"? He is clear that it is *sacrilegus* to declare that a Christian is an *alter Christus* (*quis enim tam sit sacrilegus, ut audeat affirmare aliquam posse animam per meritum liberi arbitrii, ut alter sit Christus, efficere?*). Yet, as we saw above, this was one of the great Bishop's homiletic tropes. What is behind this apparent inconsistency? It will be best to answer this later when we treat the limitations of Augustine's concept of the "whole Christ."

Before we take up the different way divinity and humanity are joined in Christ and how the human Christian participates in divinity, let us first examine what Augustine means by the *totus Christus*. Although the Son's union with humanity is dissimilar to the way the church is joined to God, this is not to say that the Son does not bring all of humanity to himself. This is one of the most important formulations of Augustine's ecclesiology. The church is best understood as the result of the unique assumption of humanity to divinity achieved in the Son's descent. As mentioned, while Augustine never calls this a *susceptio*, he does use very strong language to describe this union. Often this bond receives nuptial imagery, an assumption described as a marital union bringing the divine bridegroom and the human bride together: a *copulatio* whose union between God and the church was made possible by the prior *susceptio* of humanity by the divine Word.[41] Such conjugal imagery has the advantage of stressing the collaboration between humanity and divinity in the process of sanctification, allowing Augustine to describe salvation as the product of both God

41. *qu. Eu.* 1.31: "quod dominus dixit: simile est regnum caelorum homini regi qui fecit nuptias filio suo, nuptias dixit uerbum incarnatum, quia in ipso homine suscepto ecclesia deo copulata est."; CCL 44B.25.

and the church. Whereas one's human birth is from man and woman, one's divine birth is from God and the church.[42] Elsewhere Augustine is clear that Christ needed to undergo the first birth only and in so doing, effects a spiritual connection (*spiritalis connexio*) between himself and humanity, regenerating men and women in the sacrament of baptism.[43] These two related factors, ecclesial union with Christ and the role of the sacraments in achieving this, comprise the remainder of this chapter. Let us now turn to the first. Here is found perhaps one of the most striking aspects of Augustine's theology of deification, namely his understanding of the elect as belonging to the whole Christ.

THE NATURE OF THE *TOTUS CHRISTUS*

This query into the union of divinity and humanity in the Christ brings us to our next question: How are we to understand the dynamics of the *totus Christus?* How does Augustine utilize this novel concept? Is Christ incomplete without Christians? What implications does Christ's "including" others in himself have for Augustine's Christology?

Such a concept evidences yet another image of divine union, showing how the incarnation unites all human persons into Christ, "uniting us into one body with himself and making us his members, so that in him we too are Christ (*in illo et nos Christus essemus*).... From this it is obvious that we are the body of Christ, being all anointed. In him all of us belong to Christ, but we are Christ too because in some sense the whole

42. *s.* 121.4: "Prima natiuitas ex masculo et femina: secunda natiuitas ex deo et ecclesia."; PL 38.679–80; cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 11.6.

43. *ep.* 187.9.30: "... nec uiueremus nisi per spiritualem connexionem membra huius essemus. Ideo nobis opus fuit nasci, et renasci, illi autem propter nos tantummodo nasci. Nos enim a peccato ad iustitiam renascendo transimus; ille autem a nullo peccato ad iustitiam transitum fecit: sed in eo quod baptizatus est, nostrae regenerationis sacramentum, sua humilitate altius commendauit; ueterem tamen hominem nostrum passione, nouum autem resurrectione significans."; PL 33.843–44.

Christ is Head and body" (*et omnes in illo et Christi et Christus sumus quia quomodo totus Christus caput et corpus est*).[44]

As such, Christ is not incomplete without his believers (*non quia sine corpore non est integer*). Nevertheless Augustine stresses how it is the Lord's free decision to include created persons into his own self (*sed quia et nobis cum integer esse dignatum est*).[45] In the economy of salvation, Christ chooses to rely on his mystical body for a full and complete offering to the Father. Tarsicius van Bavel has shown how Augustine saw more than a simile or a mere comparison in 1 Cor. 12:12–27. In Augustine's use of Pauline "mystical body" imagery, van Bavel sees an illustration of how strong the union between Christ and Christian actually is: "Since the moment Jesus left this world, He needs our hands to reach out to the destitute, He needs our eyes to see the needs of the world, He needs our ears to listen to the misery of others, He needs our feet to go to the persons to whom nobody goes. Salvation cannot be 'extramundane'; Christians have to build up the very beginning of the Reign of God in this world."[46] An advancement has clearly been made over Tyconius's head and body dualism: the whole Christ is now understood to be both head and body, organic and inseparable, both divine and human, both Savior and sinner.

Commenting on the priestly prayer of Christ in John 17:14–19, for example, we hear how the Son brings the faithful to the Father: "For what is 'And for them do I sanctify myself' since they themselves, too, are myself?"[47] The Son is in no need of sanctification but his willingness to submit himself to such a process is achieved for those creatures now found within himself. In his own person he sanctifies himself in himself, thereby

44. *en. Ps.* 26, *exp.* 2.2; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/15), 275; CCL 38.155.

45. *s.* 341.11; PL 39.1499.

46. Tarcisius van Bavel, "The 'Christus Totus' Idea: A Forgotten Aspect of Augustine's Spirituality," *Studies in Patristic Christology*, edited by Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998), 84–94; 86.

47. *Jo. eu. tr.* 108.5; Rettig, *Tractates*, 4.281.

sanctifying the human in the Word (*. . . sanctificauit se in se, hoc est, hominem se in Verbo se . . . sanctificans hominem in Verbo*). He does this, Augustine argues, because he has come to identify himself with the human race and therefore longs to sanctify all in himself. This is why Christ says, "And for them," because in sanctifying himself, he heals all, "because in me they are also I" (*quoniam in me etiam ipsi sunt ego*).[48] Augustine here commits himself to the view that the historical Christ also reveals himself as the mystical Christ and thus able to include all who truly bear his name. Christ has chosen to involve each human person in his own birth, toil, persecutions, and his final victory over death. This kenotic movement from the sole son of Mary to the co-inherence of all her children is, in the words of van Bavel, the *seconde pauvreté* of Christ's initial descent into the human condition.[49] This humiliation thus becomes not only God's participation in humanity, but simultaneously humanity's participation in the lowliness of God. The Spirit's uniting of the human person to the humanity of Christ grants creatures a share in the head: "He must add to poverty a yet deeper poverty and transfigure our lowly body into himself; he must be our head and we his members; let us be two in one flesh."[50] This is obviously no mere moral union but a union of persons through an opening of the humanity of Christ toward all.

Phrases such as *nos ipse est* or *ipsi sunt ego* invite us to think of Christ as including ourselves. His sanctity is our sanctifica-

48. *Jo. eu. tr*. 108.5: "Tunc ergo sanctificauit se in se, hoc est, hominem se in Verbo se, quia unus Christus Verbum et homo, sanctificans hominem in Verbo. Propter sua uero membra, *Et pro eis*, inquit, *ego*, id est, quod prosit etiam ipsis, quia et ipsi sunt ego, sicut mihi profuit in me, quia homo sum sine ipsis: *Et ego sanctifico meipsum*, hoc est, ipsos in me tamquam meipsum sanctifico ego, quoniam in me etiam ipsi sunt ego."; CCL 36.618.

49. van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie de Saint Augustin*, 113: "L'Incarnation constitue le premier mode de notre inclusion dans le Christ et cette inclusion est plutôt physique, car elle a pour base l'unité de la nature humaine du Christ avec la nôtre. Mais voilà que le Christ a voulu ajouter une seconde pauvreté à son premier abaissement."

50. *en. Ps*. 101, *exp*. 1.2; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/19), 47.

tion. The Son of Man's perfect and integrated humanity can "become" all men and women's because all of humanity has been assumed by the divine Word. This is how in the church Christ has made us his own, "uniting us into one body with himself (*concorporans nos sibi*) and making us his members, so that in him we too are Christ" (*ut in illo et nos Christus essemus*).[51] Augustine's daring in positing such a theology of the *totus Christus* leaves us with three important implications: Augustine's understanding of Christian holiness, prayer, and community.

First, the *totus Christus* has to do with the nature of Christian holiness in particular and the attribution of all gifts in general. Holiness has become collective in the humanity of God: a charge to find—and become—Christ in the world in which the pilgrim church labors. As such, the pilgrim church is the place where the sanctified humanity and divine love coalesce in order to provide us with both the object of proper love and the means with which to fulfill the dominical command. Christians are to hear Christ's new command to love one another (cf. John 13:34) not as mere mortals care for one another, and "not as men love one another because they are men, but as they love one another because they are gods and all [of them] sons of the Most High, so that they may be brothers to his only Son, loving each other with the love with which he himself loved them. . . ."[52] Only in Christ and as Christ can human dignity be fully recognized and loved because only in Christ is love not mortal and solipsistic. That is, in the "whole Christ" fallen men and women need no longer rely only on their own selves but are rather brought into the perfect love of Christ for others.

The Holy Spirit unifies all Christian characteristics into Christ. This vital component of Augustine's ecclesiology safe-

51. *en. Ps.* 26, *exp.* 2.2; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/15), 275; CCL 38.155.
52. *Jo. eu. tr.* 65.1; Rettig, *Tractates*, 4.51; cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 111.6.

guards against any temptation to attribute Christian holiness or virtue to the creature. In the "whole Christ" the holiness of Christ and of the Christian are not separated. Augustine asks:

> "Must I exclude my holiness from Christ's?" The answer: "No; I can be certain that when he speaks, he speaks inseparably from his body. Shall even then I dare to say, *I am holy?* If I meant 'holy' in the sense of making others holy and standing in no need of anyone to sanctify me, I should be arrogant to claim it, and a liar; but if it means 'holy' in the sense of 'made holy' … then, yes, let Christ's body dare to say it."[53]

It is Christ's voice therefore when we hear someone claim "I am holy" because it is ultimately Christ's sanctity now alive in the created soul which renders that creature godly. Augustine's keen sense of participation again proves pivotal: by participating in its head, Christ's body receives all he is without ever being able to claim such graces autonomously as one's own.

The second factor is the nature of praise and prayer. The Christian cry upward is no longer construed as the lone individual calling out to a distant deity. Rather, in the *totus Christus* we come to recognize our own hearts. In Christ's utterance of "*Abba*" we perceive our own voices. Consequently, one never prays alone:

> … when we speak to God in prayer we do not separate the Son from God, and when the body of the Son prays it does not separate its head from itself. The one sole savior of his body is our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who prays for us, prays in us, and is prayed to by us. He prays for us as our priest, he prays in us as our head, and he is prayed to by us as our God. Accordingly we must recognize our voices in him, and his accents in ourselves.… We pray, then, to him, through him and in him; we speak with him and he speaks with us.[54]

Christ continuously prays in his body, thus uniting not only the Father with humanity but Christian with other Christian as

53. *en. Ps.* 85.4; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/18), 224.
54. *en. Ps.* 85.1; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/18), 220–21.

well: "Because there are many of us, we praise him all together, and because we are one, we praise him as one. The many are the same as the one, because he in whom we are one is himself always one, undivided."[55] The importance of unity in the Christian life continuously shapes Augustine's thought: prayer and praise are never isolated moments but originate from Christ's humble identification with his faithful as well as from the shared commonality of the ecclesial devotion of those faithful. Like charity, prayer can never be divided amongst individual worshippers but is assured a co-inherence by the concord between Christ and Christians.

This stress on Christian unity is also used by Augustine to highlight the organic unity of Christ's church. The *totus Christus* should elevate a Christian's understanding of friend and family. How this becomes obvious is found in an epistle to assuage the guilt of Laetus, who had intended to become a monk but who left the cloister to attend to his recently widowed mother. Augustine wrote to show him how Christian joy can come only when we learn to renounce everything that is temporal. This includes even family. After reading the missive Laetus sent back to his former brother monks, Augustine was moved to exhort him by reminding him that such pain over familial ties can actually become the first step in following Christ wholeheartedly, only through that pain finally understanding Christ's perplexing words to *hate his father, mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters, and even his own soul* (Luke 14:26). Knowing that this is a seemingly severe command, the good Bishop used his theology of identity to provide Laetus with the framework in which he could begin to make sense of his duties both to God and to his family.

What right does Augustine have to busy himself in the delicate affairs of a family whom he has never met? He takes it

55. *en. Ps.* 147.7; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/20), 449.

upon himself to impart such unsolicited advice because, as we surprisingly learn, Laetus's mother belongs to the Bishop of Hippo's own family as well. In opening up Luke 14, Augustine explains to Laetus that his Christian mother is not exclusively his own. Given the fact that most of the maternity lavished upon Laetus took place in the past, we come to see how maternal care is understood by Augustine to be a temporal and fleeting (*temporale ac transitorium*) good. Therefore, Augustine concludes,

> insofar as she is a sister in Christ, she belongs to you and to me and to everyone who is promised the one heritage in heaven and God as Father and Christ as brother. These are eternal; these do not wear out with the passing of time; these we more firmly hope to possess to the extent that we are taught that they are to be obtained not by a private but rather by a common claim.[56]

In defending this claim for common relationships, Augustine turns to Acts 4:32 and the apostolic church's unified soul and heart. He goes on to explain to Laetus that "your soul belongs not just to you but to all the brothers, whose souls are also yours, or rather whose souls are not souls along with yours but are one soul, that single soul of Christ."[57] This *sic enim anima tua non est propria . . . sed anima una est, Christi unica*[58] emerges out of this exhortation as the psychological corollary to the one Christ's love for himself.

In the unitive love of God, all Christian souls become one in that they form the one Christ. Neither love of self nor love of another human person is in question here. Rather, what Augustine cannot tolerate is the love of a creature which claims that my self or some other person is properly and exclusively *mine*. Exclusive love is ultimately not love at all, but a concupiscence that evaluates another person in terms of oneself and

56. *ep*. 243.3; Teske, *Letters* (II/4), 165.
57. *ep*. 243.4; Teske, *Letters* (II/4), 166.
58. *ep*. 243.4; CSEL 57.571-72.

not in terms of true charity, God. Attempting to love another before God is clearly an inversion of goods, an exclusive and ersatz love turned back onto the self. Love of God and love of neighbor cannot be separated and in this context one of John Burnaby's observations becomes especially poignant: "The love of God which is the desire for union with him, and the love of men which is the sense of unity with all those who are capable of sharing the love of God, are indeed bound up most intimately with one another."[59] Such intimacy is achieved in Augustine's theology of the *totus Christus*, but this communion is not without limitations.

LIMITATIONS OF THE *TOTUS CHRISTUS* LANGUAGE

In the passage to Dardanus quoted above, we read how Augustine wrote very strongly in order to defend the misconception that as the Son is united to humanity, humanity is united to divinity. Is this an inconsistency when juxtaposed with humanity's deification brought about by the Son's descent as examined back in chapter 3? No answer exists in the remainder of his answer to Dardanus and we must therefore look elsewhere.

Given such stress on the unity between Christ and his church, Augustine must be careful never to subsume one into the other. He is careful to avoid suggesting that the Christian suffers a personally absorptive identity in Christ: *sic iungit ut distinguat, sic distinguit ut non seiungat*.[60] While Christ and the Christian are not separated, their dignity is nonetheless distinct (that is, the head saving and the body being saved).[61] The dignity, co-heredity, and new operations the church enjoys are always derived and participatory. The perfections

59. John Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, (Norwich: Canterbury Press [1938] 1991), 104.
60. *Jo. eu. tr.* 21.3; CCL 36.213.
61. Cf. *en. Ps.* 37.6.

found throughout the created body can never be understood apart from their divine head. Christians can now be said to "become Christ" because the very characterization of *Christus* assumes the inclusion of particular others in the *totus*.

As we have seen, such a stress on the unity between Christian and Christ sometimes compels Augustine to border on hyperbole. However, he is often equally careful to remind us that this identity between Christ and Christians is not eternal but one that has been forged in time only. This is how Augustine can hold two truths together, one qualified, the other absolute: "Remember that Christ is Abraham's descendant, and, if we too are, that would mean that we are Christ. But we are Christ (*ergo et nos Christus*) … [yet] we are not the Word, we were not with God in the beginning, not through us were all things made. But when we consider the flesh, there we find Christ, and in Christ we find both him and ourselves" (*et ibi Christus et ille et nos*).[62] While it is clear that Christ and his church form one person, it becomes equally clear that the union here is with Christ in his humanity and not in his divinity.

Another instance of this dynamic is found in a sermon dated sometime around 400. Augustine the preacher again utilizes the nuptial imagery so important to his grammar of union between Christ and the church, to warn his listeners that,

> … bride and bridegroom are one person with reference to the flesh of Christ, not to his divinity—after all, with respect to divinity we cannot be what he is, because he is creator we are creatures, he the maker we what he made, he the composer we the composition; but so that we might be one thing with him in him, he was willing to be our head by taking flesh from us, in which he could die for us—so to convince you that this whole is the one Christ, he said through the Isaiah: "He wound a turban on my head as a bridegroom, he clothed me with ornaments as a bride (Isa. 61:10)."[63]

62. *en. Ps.* 142.3; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/20), 346–47; CCL 40.2062.

63. *s.* 91.8; Hill, *Sermons* (III/3), 463: "[Nam ut noueritis,] quia unus homo est sponsus et sponsa, secundum carnem Christi, non secundum diuinitatem: nam se-

This is an important step in our discovery of how Augustine sees human deification. He is adamant that no created person could ever cross the ontological distinction between God and creation so as to become divine the way Christ is divine. Situating Augustine's doctrine of deification here reinforces a central point: human perfection does not mean a transmutation of natures but communion with the living Son of God. Referring to this differentiating tricolon between God and humanity (*creator*/*creatura*, *effector*/*facti*, *conditor*/*conditi*), Pasquale Borgomeo argues that Augustine goes to lengths to mark the distance between the implied terms in the mysterious unity of the *totus Christus:*

> The double order, the historic (he willed) and the ontological (he who is) is always respected and more explicitly against an eventual and illegitimate application of identical terms (A = B, B = C : A = C), Augustine prevents this possibility by stating <<*aliter est unum cum Patre, aliter unum nobiscum:* he is one with the Father because there is one substance of the Father and of the Son . . . ; one with us because he became one with us, because he emptied himself, taking on the form of a slave (Phil. 2:7) . . . ; he became one with us according to the descendants of Abraham>>. Once again the ontological transcendence is safeguarded even within the historic mystery of the abasement of God. . . .[64]

When looking at the "whole Christ," Borgomeo recognizes an essential distinction between the Son in his being and the Son in his will. In and of himself (*lui qui est*), the Son is perfect and complete; he has, however chosen (*voulu*) to include his

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cundum diuinitatem quod est ille nos esse non possumus; quia ille creator, nos creatura; ille effector, nos facti; ille conditor, nos conditi: sed ut essemus cum illo unum in illo, caput nostrum esse uoluit, accipiendo carnem ex nobis, in qua moreretur pro nobis: ut noueritis ergo quia hoc totum unus est Christus, per Isaiam dixit: Sicut sponso alligauit mihi mitram, et sicut sponsam induit me ornamento (Isa. 61:10)."; PL 38.571.

64. Pasquale Borgomeo, *L'Église de ce temps: dans la prédication de saint Augustin* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1972), 220–21 (quoting *s.* 144.4; PL 38.790); my translation.

body, the church, in his own understanding of himself. In his graciousness, the Son of God has willed to identify himself with his followers. In so doing, natures are preserved. Regardless of how abased the Son becomes, he remains God; conversely, we are right to add, regardless of how holy men and women become, they remain human.

Borgomeo, while thus seeing how Augustine's *totus Christus* allows for great intimacy between Christ and his followers, continues to show how this is never a matter of complete identification. The Son of God may have become human so humans may become one with God, but that does not mean that humans will become God the same way the Son is God. As such, Christian sanctification becomes a matter of perfect and integrated humanity, a process Augustine may call deifying or "becoming godly" but one that never renders a saint equal to divinity. In this creaturely communion with the divine, we see how the *totus Christus* is always a matter of solidarity and dissimilarity: one with Christ in his will, yet other than Christ in his divinity.

In one of Dolbeau's newly-discovered sermons, we encounter much of this same pattern: God as Father, church as mother, Christ as the one in whom divinity and humanity uniquely meet, and his agency in bringing human persons into a new union with God. Found in the middle of his lengthy discourse against the pagans, what is now labeled as *sermo* 198 (Mainz 62), Augustine takes up the theme of divine mediation and naturally uses this opportunity to speak of Christ as the perfect mediator between heaven and earth. Augustine distinguishes malignant mediators from true by their willingness to unite: pagan demons only wish to divide, but Christ, the one true reconciler, and by extension Christians, long to unify all in God and in God's church. The world is moving from the former deceivers to the Christ and thus all are invited to seek the purification of Christ which can come only within his

church (*Nemo uobis aliquam purgationem extra ecclesiam promittat*). Augustine then goes on to develop a commonplace, delineating God as Father and church as mother especially among the congregations of northern Africa.[65] In this way he reminds those present of their dual births and exhorts them not to abandon their mother by offending their Father:

> If any, though, have cut themselves off from the Church by the division of schism, even though they may seem to themselves to be holding on to the Father, they are most perniciously forsaking their mother, while those who relinquish both Christian faith and mother Church (*fidem christianam et matrem eccleisam*) are deserting both parents. Hold on to your Father, hold on to your mother. You are a little child; stick to your mother (*inhaere matri*). You are a little child, suck your mother's milk, and she will bring you, nourished on milk, to the table of the Father.[66]

As *paruuli* Christians are to hold on to their mother so as to rise to the Father: milk before the table. Adherence to the church is thus the beginning of one's life with God and Augustine is intent on preserving ecclesial unity so as to ensure divine communion. Such adherence is rooted in the imagery of humility, addressed to "little ones" who are called to be humble enough to latch on to their mother. Such lowliness was first expressed, however, in God's becoming human.

Augustine next represents the Son's descent as not only the taking on of human flesh but the assumption of all those in the church: "Your savior took flesh to himself, your mediator took flesh to himself, and by taking on flesh he took the Church to himself" (*Adsumpsit carnem saluator tuus, adsumpsit carnem mediator tuus, et carnem adsumendo adsumpsit ecclesiam*).[67] Assumption language here characterizes both

65. The celebrated example here is of course Cyprian's phrase at *De Ecclesiae Catholicae Unitate* §6: "Habere iam non potest deum patrem qui ecclesiam non habet matrem."; CCL 3.253.

66. *s.*198.42; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 212; Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 398.

67. *s.*198.43; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 212; Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 398.

the incarnation and the relationship between the church and Christ. Augustine justifies this parallel by quoting Eph. 5:31–32 and the Pauline metaphor of the church as the bride of Christ. After a brief discursus on true mediation, Augustine explains why Christ has come into the flesh:

> And the reason why, for the sake of the purification that is effected by a mediator, the one who is equal to the Father wished to be the one mediator and himself become man was so that we through a related substance (because he is man) might attain to the supreme substance (because he is God).[68]

Divine mediation requires one who is naturally equal to the Father yet who has become humanly accessible by taking on our familiar substance (*cognatam substantiam*). In this is realized human purgation, explained here as approaching the supreme substance. This is a rather odd phrase for Augustine to employ here, *ad summam substantiam* (appearing nowhere else in his extant writings), yet it is used so as to form a contrast with both the *cognatam substantiam* and the lower regions (*inferioribus*) in which the human person would necessarily dwell without Christ. The Son has taken on flesh so as to communicate God's divinity and, as the whole of the sermon intends, Christ uses his mediatorial church to continue this mission of human elevation and transformation. We now turn to the two main channels of this grace, the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist.

This third section contains two distinct parts. Our overall aim is to understand the divine communion offered in and through the church. Was there a matter more pressing for the Bishop of Hippo than the integrity of God's church? Sanctity demands unity: holiness cannot fill the divided heart or a

68. *s.*198.49; Hill, *Sermons* (III/11), 218; Dolbeau, *Sermons*, 404: "Et ideo propter purgationem, quae fit per mediatorem, unus uoluit esse mediator et ipse homo fieri, qui aequalis est patri, ut per cognatam substantiam—quod est homo—ad summam substantiam—quod est deus—perueniremus."

body torn asunder by heresy and schism.[69] Augustine's love of the truth and his love of Christ's mystical body on earth cannot be separated: for both reflect the unity of the triune life and both attest to the single person Christ wishes to form in his own.

CHRIST'S SACRAMENTAL ECONOMY: BAPTISM AND EUCHARIST

The sacraments for Augustine are the created media through which God imparts his grace, being the primary means of humanity's incorporation into the mystical body of Christ. A sacrament must be a *similitudo* of the divine reality which it signifies and therefore the liturgical rite often receives the name of the reality itself: the Eucharistic liturgy is rightly called the sacrifice and the waters of baptism are referred to as the gift of faith.[70] Similar to his notion of the church, Augustine's understanding of what constitutes a sacrament begins quite broadly. With its etymological character consistently retained, a sacrament is something sacred (*sacer*) which has been made perceptibly manifest and divinely instituted (*signum diuinitus institutum*).[71] A sacrament does not simply point us to a deeper, spiritual reality but rather *is* something corporeally present effecting spiritual fruit (*speciem habet corporalem, quod intelligetur, fructum habet spiritalem*).[72] A sacrament for Augustine hence contains two inseparable elements: the created visible reality which is encountered bodily and the invisible divine grace which is received spiritually. If the church existed before the incarnate Christ, should it surprise us that his sacraments also somehow existed?

Throughout the history of salvation, God has used many visible signs to elevate the soul. Augustine can therefore eas-

69. Cf. *s.* 250.3.
70. Cf. *ep.* 98.9.
71. *doc. Chr.* 3.9.13; CCL 32.85.
72. *s.* 272; PL 38.1247.

ily recognize *sacramenta* in the Old Testament as temporary types which foreshadowed the manner by which Christ would institute a lasting sacramental structure. Accordingly, the flood points us to the sacrament of baptism, the genealogies point us to the coming of Christ, the manna in the desert to the Eucharist within the church, and the crossing of the Red Sea to Pentecost.[73] All of these Old Testament "sacraments" have been fulfilled in the enfleshed Word of God and consequently a sacrament can now only be understood as a divine Word made flesh. Presented in terms of an extension and prolongation of the Word's own incarnation, Augustine likewise calls a sacrament a *uisibile uerbum*.[74] Furthermore, as he will repeatedly emphasize, take away the words of the presbyter spoken at the sacrament and you have only ineffectual matter; take away the matter and the words are left with no point of contact with the creature.[75] Creation and the history of Israel have been filled with such sacred signs (in that God can use any visible reality to lift the human soul up to him). However, with Christ's incarnation the church is now able to celebrate very few, yet very evident, sacraments (*paucissimis et manifestissimis celebrationum sacramentis*), with Augustine limiting his examples here to baptism and Eucharist.[76]

The letter to Januarius from which we have just quoted provides a helpful illustration for what constitutes a sacrament for Augustine. Let us examine a rather curious instance of how he distinguishes between what is and what is not a sacrament. The main question posed throughout these two letters is the importance of local custom when celebrating the universal church's sacraments. From within this discussion,

73. Cf. *diu. qu*. 58.2.

74. *Jo. eu. tr*. 80.3; CCL 36.529.

75. Cf. *Jo. eu. tr*. 15.4; *s.* 272.

76. *inq. Jan*. 1.19.35; CSEL 34.210. Note that *ep.* 54 and *ep.* 55 are brought together, following Augustine's suggestion at *retr*. 2.46, as the *ad inquisitiones Ianuari libri duo;* therefore *ep*. 54 is cited as *inq. Jan*. 1 and *ep*. 55 as *inq. Jan*.2.

however, a question arises at the beginning of his answer to Januarius: Why is Eastertide a sacrament while the festival of Christmas is not? Augustine's answer is illuminating.

The Pasch (Augustine's term for the time from Easter to Pentecost or Eastertide) is a sacrament because it renews humanity by both recalling the descent of the Holy Spirit as well as effecting that presence in the lives of the church today. Christmas, on the other hand, simply recalls the historical truth of Christ's birth but there is, say, not another birth taking place on that very day. Devotion fittingly marks the annual anniversary of the savior's birth but it is not as if the Christ child is physically born again; during the Pasch, on the contrary, the Holy Spirit descends and continually confirms the Christian faith on earth:

> Here you must first realize that the birthday of the Lord is not celebrated as a sacrament, but we only recall to memory that he was born, and for this reason there was no need to do anything else but mark with the festive devotion the day of the year on which the event occurred. But there is a sacrament in a celebration when the commemoration of the event is carried out in such a way that it is understood also to signify something that must be received in a holy manner. In that way, therefore, we celebrate Pasch.…[77]

Entailing both a visible and plain celebration inaugurated by the Lord *as well as* a hidden holiness to be received continually by his faithful, Pentecost fulfils Augustine's requirements for a sacrament.

But what do the sacraments achieve? Augustine knew that any religious community, Christian or not, must be held together by visible signs and sacraments.[78] The sacraments of Christ's church, however, have been given so as to enable unity between nations and between humanity and God. This

77. *inq. Jan.* 2.1.2; Teske, *Letters* (II/1), 216; cf. *s.* 272B.

78. *c. Faust.* 19.11: "… coagulari homines possunt, nisi aliquo signaculorum uel sacramentorum uisibilium consortio colligentur."; CSEL 25.510.

is the nature of true sacrifice: "every act which is designed to unite us to God in a holy fellowship (*ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo*) … which makes possible our true felicity."[79] Humanity's union with God can take place only as the result of sharing in the chrism of Christ: the priesthood which acts *in figura corporis Christi* brings about a salvation realized as an embrace of salvific unity (*unitatis compage fit saluum*).[80] In this anointing received in becoming Christians (presumably at baptism although Augustine does not make this explicit in the following text), human persons are brought into the chrism of Christ's own priesthood and therefore the "priests" of the church are not simply the bishops and presbyters, "but just as we call all Christians 'Christs' in virtue of their sacramental anointing (*chrisma*) so we call them all 'priests' because they are members of the one Priest."[81] Christ's priestly sacrifice is thus aimed at uniting his church with one another and with himself: there is one Christ composed of many Christians (*christos*), one high priest, composed of many baptized priests (*sacerdotes*).

Noticing this distinction, Henry Chadwick argues in a similar fashion when examining the limits of the church's union with Christ. Chadwick maintains that the elect "remain creatures and consequently cannot become God in the sense of how God is God, but we can become one with his flesh. There is no doubt that there is here an allusion to the gift of the eucharist."[82] Norman Russell picks up on Chadwick here and likewise quotes Augustine's admission in *De Natura et Gratia* 33.37 that he does not understand how creator and creature could ever

79. *ciu. Dei* 10.6; Bettenson, *City of God*, 379; CCL 47.278; cf. *ep*. 102.17.

80. *c. litt. Pel.* 2.104.239; CSEL 52.152.

81. *ciu. Dei* 20.10; Bettenson, *City of God*, 919; "… sed sicut omnes christos dicimus propter mysticum chrisma, sic omnes sacerdotes, quoniam membra sunt unius sacerdotis …"; CCL 47.720.

82. Chadwick, "Note sur la divinisation chez saint Augustin," *Revue des sciences religieuses* 76.2 (2002): 248.

be equal, or how a human (despite his or her level of sanctity) could ever be changed into the divine nature.[83] Russell thus qualifies any participation in God language for Augustine, calling his understanding of creaturely participation in the divine life "analogical," a life which will "be experienced fully only eschatologically" and one that "still remains a mystery."[84] While it is true that human perfection may be realized only in heaven, by what means are Christians on earth brought into the *totus Christus?* Here Augustine relies on the sacraments as the channels which unify men and women with Christ's body, church, and life.

Such unity between heaven and earth is a sign of charity. If one desires to remain united with Christ, one must ensure that he or she remains in Christ's catholicity. Playing off the etymology of *catholicus*, Augustine delves into his Greek to make this point: "As a Catholic keeps a firm grip on the whole; *holon*, you see, means whole, and that's why the Church is called Catholic, because it is throughout the whole. Was it ever called *Katamerike*, and not Catholic? *Meros*, you see, means part, *holon* means whole; the Church is called Catholic from a Greek word, meaning 'according to the whole.'"[85] The homilies for Pentecost (266–72B) are particularly replete with references to the unity God wills for his church. As we discussed in previous chapters, the work of the Holy Spirit is to unify persons—both divine and human—and at Pentecost this unity reaches its ecclesial culmination in history.

It is particularly telling that the newly ordained bishop aimed his first ever Pentecost sermon (23 May, 397 A.D.) against the Donatist schism (*in uigiliis pentecostes contra Donatistas*) in this way: "Each individual was speaking in all tongues, because

83. cf. *nat. et gr.* 33.37.

84. Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 332.

85. *s.* 162A; Hill, *Sermons* (III/5), 162.

the church that was going to exist in all tongues was being foretold. One individual was the sign of all unity; all tongues in one individual, that meant all nations in that unity."[86] The Donatist problem confirmed Augustine's conviction that civic peace and personal integrity can be experienced only in communion: "And so it is those people have absolutely no share in this gift of the Holy Spirit, who hate the grace of peace, who do not hold on to the fellowship of unity."[87] Peace and unity are not only analogues in the political sphere but in the psychological sphere as well.

Within the church such reconciliation is brought about primarily through the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist. Through the former, one becomes a child of God, and through Eucharistic communion, one is brought further into enfleshed godliness. As we have just seen, these are the exemplary *sacramenta* for Augustine but we should here note that this does not suggest that these are the only two sacraments. As Norman Russell has rightly observed, however, the divine life—while analogically understood, experienced only fully in heaven and one that now remains a mystery—is "to be appropriated through baptism and the Eucharist."[88] So let us now isolate these two sacraments to show how Augustine understood the unitive effect they have in the life of a Christian.

Augustine's first focused treatment of any of the sacraments was not until after 400 and the appearance of *De Baptismo*. Of all the sacraments, most attention is paid to the work Christ achieves through the waters of baptism, a precedent set by the other great African fathers. Both Tertullian and Cyprian developed rich theologies of baptism by stressing how the Spirit-filled waters bring about both the unity between God and the

86. *s.* 266.2; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 267; for more on this type of unity, cf. *en. Ps.* 142.2, *ciu. Dei* 15.1, *epp.* 43, 58, 108.

87. *s.* 271; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 299.

88. Russell, *Deification*, 332.

soul as well as the unity which is Christ's church. Augustine is clear that the baptismal rite is equivalent to dying for Christ, making those willing to lay their lives down for Christ members of Christ's own body (*nemo fit membrum Christi nisi aut baptismate in Christo, aut morte pro Christo*).[89] He accordingly shows no problem in agreeing with the Pelagian Julian that the human soul was created good and is made even better by baptism because here the soul is given "spiritual enlightenment, adoption as children of God, citizenship in the heavenly Jerusalem, sanctification, transformation into members of Christ, and possession of the Kingdom of heaven."[90] Of course, where Augustine sees himself diverging from the Pelagians is on the remissive or purgative nature of baptism: before it can accomplish the transformation and incorporation of the Christian into Christ, baptism must first wash away the sin of Adam which has come to taint every human soul since. Again, this disagreement is over the nature of "unity" and the solidarity all humans have in Adam. Therefore, given the stress Augustine places on humanity's unity in Christ, it follows that he would be more apt to emphasize our commonality in the first Adam as well. In Christ we are all redeemed because in Adam we have all sinned and the crying of infants is nothing other than attestation to their inherent wretchedness (*miseria*), life in this world beginning not with laughter but with a wail.[91]

Whereas Augustine viewed Pelagius as teaching that Adam left posterity only a bad example but never maliciously tainted

89. *an. et or.* 1.9.10; CSEL 60.311. Here Augustine suggests that dying for Christ is as valid for making one a member of Christ's body as is baptism (*aut* . . . *aut*) and makes this point more explicitly at *ciu. Dei* 13.7: "For whenever men die for confessing Christ (*pro Christi confessione moriuntur*), even though they have not yet been reborn in baptism, their death is of the same value for the remission of their sins as if they had been washed in the sacred font of baptism."; Bettenson, *City of God*, 516.

90. *c. Jul.* 1.53; Teske, *Pelagians* (I/25), 82.

91. *s.* 293.10: "Postremo et in ipso paruulo miseriae ipsius testis est fletus. Quantam potest, testatur natura infirma, parum intelligens: non incipit a risu, incipit a fletu."; PL 38.1333.

human nature, he argued that all human persons are, rather, *ueteres nascuntur* on account of Adam's transgression. In our sin we are all born "old" and all are therefore in need of the rebirth which only baptism can bring.[92] Baptism is understood in a complex relationship of both dying to self and union with Christ. First, it is the putting to death of one's Adamic sinfulness, namely a life-giving death clearly meant for both infant and adult alike.[93] In adults, it can also have the secondary effect of removing all actual sins—"in baptism there is not a single past sin that is not forgiven."[94] Second, it is what joins us to the body of Christ and makes us members of the *totus Christus*. Immersion into the waters of baptism makes us Christ's own, regardless of age or disposition of virtue.[95] And while the efficacy of baptism is permanent and unrepeatable, the renewal into Christ which it initiates should never be construed as a single moment of conversion.

Baptism removes all sin but the work of the sacrament does not end here. Ever the pastor of souls, Augustine is insistent that the healing and the renewal of baptism must be lived out each day. Analogies help: it is one thing to be rid of the heat of a fever, another to be rid of all the debilitating effects of one's illness; it is one thing to remove a foreign object from the body (Augustine's example here is that of a spear or arrow, a *telum*), another to heal the wound it left. While baptism may be essential to Christian unity, it still remains the initial step in humanity's divine communion: "The first stage of the cure is to remove the cause of the debility itself, and this is done by pardoning all sins; the second stage is curing the debility itself, and this is done gradually by making steady progress in the renewal of this image … by daily advances while the im-

92. Cf. *ep.* 190.16; cf. *ciu. Dei* 16.27; *ench.* 13.45–46.
93. Cf. *ench.* 14.52.
94. *ep.* 185.39; Teske, *Letters* (II/3), 200–201.
95. Cf. *pecc. mer.* 3.4.7.

age is being renewed."[96] Although baptism initiates a new and graced participation in God, it must be nurtured and renewed daily. For this, Augustine offers us the daily regimen of prayer, of charity, and of the Eucharistic sacrifice.

In this way the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist are linked because they are both sacraments of unity: unity between both God and humanity as well as between all human persons. Augustine uses the tripartite baptismal rite of exorcism, water, and chrism to illustrate the Eucharistic people Christ yearns to form. Reminiscent of *Didache* §9 where the unity of the bread and the unity of the Christian people is highlighted, Augustine encourages us to "remember that bread is not made from one grain, but from many. When you were being exorcized, it's as though you were being ground. When you were baptized it's as though you were mixed into dough. When you received the fire of the Holy Spirit, it's as though you were baked. Be what you can see, and receive what you are."[97] Let us now turn to the church's celebration of this sacred bread, the body of the Lord, and Augustine's notion of how union with God is realized through the proper reception of the Eucharist.

The imagery Augustine uses to describe the union between the Eucharistic Lord and the sacrament's recipient proves to be much more explicit than the communion achieved in baptism. Augustine's insistence to eat and drink Christ abounds, yet almost always coupled with a pastoral admonition to be sure not simply to eat and drink Christ but thereafter to live his life in the Spirit. In a relatively late homily (417), for example, we hear him instruct those present to: "Eat life, drink life; you will have life and the life is complete and entire. However, this will be the case, that is to say, the body and blood of Christ will be life for anyone, if what is taken visibly in the sacrament is spiritu-

96. *Trin.* 14.14.23; Hill, *Trinity*, 389.
97. *s.* 272; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 301.

ally eaten, spiritually drunk in very truth."[98] The sacraments are neither magic nor instantly transformative. They must be received in a spirit of truth, lived out in the spirit of love.

We again see how the Spirit unites believers to the body of Christ. Having just seen how the major ecclesial construct for Augustine is the "whole Christ," this should not surprise us. The "whole Christ" is constituted by the spiritual incorporation of the saints into the perfect humanity of the mediator Jesus Christ and thus brought into contact with living divinity. The *conuersio* of all creation becomes the *communio* of the faithful as Christ draws them into his own sacrifice, not as mere spectators but as participants in this supreme act of worship: "because he also suffered for us, he also presented us in this sacrament with his body and blood, and this is what *he even made us ourselves into as well*."[99] Through the Eucharistic sacrifice, Christ continues to be with his faithful on earth, thus uniting them to his offering of self to the Father and even, as Augustine stresses, make the Father into his own self.

In fact, Augustine sees the same unity between the Father and the Son in the union between the Son's sacred flesh and its recipient. Interpreting John 6:57 Eucharistically, he argues that the life that the Father gives the Son is transmitted from the Son to those who approach his body and blood. Christ is thus depicted as saying:

> That I may live because of the Father, that is, that I may refer my life to that so much greater one, my emptying in which he sent me effected that, but that anyone may live because of me, his participation by eating me effects that. And so I live, humbled, because of the Father; he (i.e., the recipient), elevated, lives because of me.[100]

98. *s.* 131.1; Hill, *Sermons* (III/4), 316–17: "Manduca uitam, bibe uitam, habebis uitam et integra est uita. Tunc autem hoc erit, id est, uita unicuique erit corpus et sanguis Christi: si quod in sacramento uisibiliter sumitur, in ipsa ueritate spiritualiter manducetur, spiritualiter bibatur."; PL 28.729.

99. *s.* 229.1; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 265; emphasis mine.

100. *Jo. eu. tr.* 26.19; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.275.

The Son's descent into infirm humanity is necessary in the Augustinian framework because it is only here that God is able to assume that which affects us the most. In Christ God's ability to die becomes the unique cure to restore humanity's godliness. By taking on humanity, he is able to take on our fallen passions; by freely taking on a vulnerability which is not his by nature, the now-enfleshed Son summons us to share his own divinity. And this is why

> he became in his passion the slayer of passions, and dying he was hung on the tree in order to put death to death. He made a food for us, which we were to take, and be cured. Where does this food come from? Having died, he rose again. And whom does it nourish? Those who have imitated the Lord's humility. You won't even imitate the humility; how much more will you fail to imitate the divinity![101]

The Eucharist renders Christ's sacrificial presence available throughout history and thereby offers all the occasion to receive the divinely humble flesh. At times Augustine is very explicit in stating that this is why God became human, so we humans could consume God at the altar: "God became man so that man might become God. The Lord of angels became man today so that man could eat the bread of angels."[102] The eternal life which is the Son's by nature becomes ours through humble reception of the Eucharist. Imitating the Son's humility is hence presented as a propaedeutic to participating in his divinity.

Scholars and churchmen have admittedly detected two Eucharistic tendencies evident in the thought of Augustine, containing both a figurative (implying a separation between the visible elements of bread and wine and the invisible mysteries they represent) as well as a realistic strand (wherein the visible elements are transformed into the divine presence).

101. *s.* 341A; Hill, *Sermons* (III/10), 30–31.
102. *s.* 13 de Tempore; PL 39.1097–98; cf. *s.* 126.6, *s.* 130.2, *s.* 225.3.

Are we able to reconcile these two divergent idioms? At times, Eucharistic communion is merely spiritual and in no way involves a visible or physical dominical presence: "He who believes eats; he is nourished invisibly because he is reborn inwardly."[103] Terms such as *secundum quemdam modum*, *signum*, and *figura*, or the reception of Christ's body *mystice* can at times dictate Augustine's sacramental theology. However, as Frederick Van der Meer states, Augustine "wrote at an epoch when the worship of the body and blood of Christ consisted simply in reverent reception … [a]nd in consequence the words *figura* and *signum corporis Christi* sound otherwise in their ears than they do now."[104] J. N. D. Kelly here agrees. After tracing the arguments of those who show Augustine's symbolical doctrine only (viz., Friedrich Loofs, Adolph Harnack, and others who attribute only a receptionist view), Kelly argues: "There are certainly passages in his writings which give a superficial justification to all these interpretations, but a balanced verdict must agree that he accepted the current realism."[105] Augustine himself sheds light on this modern quandary when he distinguishes between the various degrees of signs which the church uses to proclaim Christ.

The divine presence is signified in myriad ways throughout the economy of salvation. To illustrate this, Augustine turns to how Paul has brought the Christian message to the world. At times the Apostle would have utilized his tongue, at other times the written letter, but at other times he would celebrate the Lord's body and blood. This latter act is a qualitatively different type of signification, however, because "that

103. *Jo. eu. tr*. 26.1; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.260.

104. Frederik van der Meer, *Augustine the Bishop: The Life and Work of a Father of the Church*, translated by B. Battershaw and G. R. Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1961), 312.

105. J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London: Adam & Charles Black, [1958] 1965; 3rd ed.), 446.

which is taken from the fruits of the earth" has been changed by being "consecrated by mystic prayers" (*prece mystica consecratum*) in a way that the spoken and written word cannot be. In the Eucharist a unique divine causality is at play in a way that does not exist in preaching and letter writing wherein signs still only point to God but do not themselves become divine. The bread and wine of the Eucharist, however, have been consecrated and thus changed from visible created goods into the body and blood of Christ (*corpus Christi et sanguinem*).[106] This is signification at an entirely different level than the other Christian signs used to proclaim the Kingdom of God.

Augustine's Eucharistic spirituality never underscores the divine presence independent of the human person's reception and communion with the consecrated elements, but this should not lead to the conclusion that his Eucharistic theology is purely symbolic. He instead stresses the reception and effect of the subsequent union between recipient and Christ's body and blood in the lives of the Christian. As we have just seen, there are different levels and types of divine signs, and the bread and wine consecrated in the Eucharist alone is called the body and blood of Christ because it alone is uniquely divine in a way other sacraments and signs are not. For example, one incident attests to the Eucharist as the continuation of Christ the great physician's incarnate presence on earth, but also lacks the type of piety and care much more evident later on in the church's life and worship.

Augustine tells us about young Acatius whose blindness was a puzzle to the local doctors. These men wanted to try a savage medical procedure and to pry the young boy's eyes open with a metal scalpel. Instead of submitting her son to such an ordeal, Acatius's pious mother instead had his eyes cured by bathing them in some sort of Eucharistic paste. Hav-

106. *Trin.* 3.4.10; CCL 50.136.

ing been born with eyelids that would not open, the then five year old boy's eyes were healed when touched with this Eucharistic *cataplasmate*.[107]

Such a Eucharistic realism comes out less spectacularly when Augustine exhorts his flock to become the body of Christ on earth. This is why his strongest words claiming that the Eucharist is literally the body and blood of Jesus Christ come when he urges his congregation to see, to touch, and to become the one they see before them: "That bread which you can see on the altar, sanctified by the word of God, is the body of Christ. That cup, or rather what the cup contains, sanctified by the word of God, is the blood of Christ .... If you receive them well, you are yourselves what you receive."[108] Within the Eucharistic liturgy itself, the Christian faithful are encouraged to meet their Christ under the guise of bread and within a cup, and in so doing to become the one they encounter there. At times, Augustine also relies on this union of Christians with Christ in order to goad his congregation to moral virtue and heroic action. In the hope of prohibiting any promiscuity among his people (*abstine te a fornicationibus*), the Bishop of Hippo directs all eyes to the Lord who gave everything for their own lives and, as is his tendency, stresses the real and sacrificial presence before them, soon to be living inside them: "You know very well what price was paid for you, you know very well what you are approaching (*quid accedis*), what you are about to eat (*quid manducas*), what you are about to drink (*quid bibas*), or rather whom you are about to eat (*immo quem manduces*), whom you are about to drink (*quem bibas*)."[109]

In chapter 4 we saw how the Holy Spirit is depicted as the

107. *c. Jul. imp.* 3.162; PL 45.1315.

108. *s.* 227; Hill, *Sermons* (III/6), 254.

109. *s.* 9.14; Hill, *Sermons* (III/1), 271: "Iam nosti pretium tuum, iam nosti quo accedis, quid manduces, quid bibas; imo quem manduces, quem bibas. Abstine te a fornicationibus."; PL 38.85.

agent responsible for uniting Christians with the divine and Augustine relies on the same Spirit to explain the unity effected by the church's sacraments. We therefore learn that reception of Holy Communion is nothing other than eating to our own participation in the Spirit, a move Augustine makes at John 6 in order to stress that reception of the Eucharist is indispensable but not sufficient for eternal salvation:

> … let all of this have this effect on us, most beloved people, that we not only eat the flesh of Christ and the blood of Christ in the sacrament as many evil men also do, but that we eat and drink for participation in the spirit [*ad spiritus participationem*], that we may abide as members in the body of the Lord, that we may be enlivened by his spirit and not be scandalized even if many now eat and drink the sacraments temporally with us, who will have eternal torments at the end.[110]

While the body of Christ is what we are to become, this is achieved not merely through receiving that body but living it out in spirit and in truth, namely in and through the charity that only the saints can exhibit. Both the unrepentant sinner as well as the sanctified can approach God's altar and the body of Christ, but only the sanctified can be truly enlivened by the spirit of this body.

Charity and unity again prove convertible. Those who have willingly cut themselves off from the body of Christ cannot utter a unified *amen* but have instead removed themselves from the universal altar, preferring their own sequestered sanctuary. Scandal is a concern for the great Bishop but he encourages his faithful to observe an integrity in both worship and living that their *amen* authenticates:

110. *Jo. eu. tr.* 27.11; Rettig, *Tractates*, 2.286: "… ut carnem Christi et sanguinem Christi non edamus tantum in sacramento, quod et multi mali; sed usque ad spiritus participationem manducemus et bibamus, ut in domini corpore tamquam membra maneamus, ut eius spiritu uegetemur, et non scandalizemur, etiam si multi modo nobiscum manducant et bibunt temporaliter sacramenta, qui habebunt in fine aeterna tormenta."; CCL 36.276.

So if it's you that are the body of Christ and its members, it's the mystery meaning you that has been placed on the Lord's table; what you receive is the mystery that means you. It is to what you are that you reply *Amen*, and by so replying you express your assent. What you hear, you see, is *The Body of Christ*, and you answer, *Amen*. So be a member of the body of Christ, in order to make that *Amen* true.[111]

The Christian's Eucharistic "Amen" corroborates his or her free membership in the *Christus totus*. The *Amen* we utter in fact is a sign of our dignity in Christ, the affirmation of our adoption and recognition of the great ransom paid for us in the body and blood which are available only in the sacrament of the altar.[112]

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to illuminate the process by which creaturely sanctification can take place only as a process realized in the church of Christ. Only here can both the Son and the Spirit transform creatures: the Son through his sacraments and the Spirit through enabling true charity. As we saw in chapter 3 deification is possible only through the flesh of the enfleshed Son. While explicit language of *deificare* and its cognates is never used apart from the incarnation, chapter 5 argued that one of the conditions for a human person to become a *homo spiritualis* is that he or she be incorporated into and guided by God's church. In this way, we can say that Christian deification is always communal and sacramental for Augustine. The filial life of the Son and the power of the Holy Spirit must be communicated to their created members. The lives of the divine persons must somehow be extended to the lives of rational creatures, and for this end God founded a collective body of praise beginning with the good angels. The church is thus the place where God gathers in his elect and offers them a type of union available nowhere else.

111. *s.* 272; Hill, *Sermons* (III/7), 300; PL 38.1247.
112. Cf. *en. Ps.* 32, *exp*. 2.4.

Both the metaphysical as well as the pastoral importance of unity cannot be overstressed in Augustine's ecclesiology. As anyone trained in the basic principles of Neoplatonism would have insisted, unity gives fleeting reality intelligibility by imparting cohesiveness and structure to an otherwise disparate creation. Here Augustine's philosophical training and Christian creed came into harmony. Or as William Mallard rightly observed, "How much better could the philosophy of a single universal truth harmonize with religion than with a single worldwide Church, drawn without discrimination from all nations and races? … Augustine came to see in the worldwide unity of the Catholic movement an entranceway into the worldwide unity of wisdom."[113] Likewise, in his important study into the nature of Augustine's ecclesiology, Jörg Trelenberg makes the point that unity is both the origin and the goal of the church: it is an ideal realized only in the universal, Catholic community.[114] This community is the unified body of the elect, no longer many but now one in Christ. The deified know no division, the sanctified know no schism.

The church for Augustine is ultimately the mystical body of Christ traversing toward full communion with God and those already sanctified in his everlasting kingdom. Such an ecclesiology aimed toward the transformation of the human person and the "whole Christ" best depicts the ultimate purpose of God's church. For this to occur, the mediator between divinity and humanity must be more than a historical figure. Therefore, Christ continues to live through his church, making himself available through his sacraments. Given Augustine's developed theory of the human need for transformation this is a much needed move. By mediating divinity with all

113. William Mallard, *Language and Love: Introducing Augustine's Religious Thought Through the Confessions Story* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 170.

114. Cf. Jörg Trelenberg, *Das Prinzip "Einheit" beim frühen Augustinus* (Lübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 166.

of humanity, Christ has united all Christians into "the whole Christ, which means Christ in this universal sense, Christ with his Church … he became man to re-create us. He is God to make us, but man to make us anew."[115] The *totus Christus* is thus one single organism animated and amalgamated by grace: from the head to all members, Christ expands his life into all those who humbly follow him.

The theology of this "whole Christ" allows Augustine to make some very strong statements of identification between Christ and Christian. As we saw, for example, it is how Christ can reproduce himself in his persecuted church as in Acts 9 or command that his faithful serve him through their own destitute brothers and sisters, as recorded in Matthew 25. However, given this sense of unity as expressed in the *totus Christus*, Augustine must be careful never to confuse Christ and Christian.

When examining this concept of the "whole Christ," we observed how the assimilation which the elect enjoy is with Christ's perfect humanity and not his divinity. This helps to clarify Augustine's language: we become one with Christ insofar as he is the perfect man and can thus expect the same kind of excellence; we do not become one with him insofar as he is God. Just as the divine kenosis did not annihilate the Son's divinity, a Christian's deification will not take away his or her humanity. While we can nonetheless say, with scripture and Augustine and many other Fathers, that we "participate in divinity," such participation is always through and with the human flesh of Christ. Furthermore, such participation in God is eternal. Regardless of the level of sanctity reached by a creature, that creature's total dependence upon God never comes to an end.

115. *en. Ps.* 90, *exp.* 2.1; Boulding, *Expositions* (III/18), 330.

CONCLUSION

et uiua erit uita mea tota plena te
—conf. 10.28.39

SUMMARY OF STUDY

To conclude this work, let us review the preceding arguments and raise some possible ways this thesis might prove advantageous, as well as reveal some questions for further study. These pages have set out to argue that Augustine of Hippo understands humanity's deification to be the primary purpose of Christian salvation. We began by looking at the Trinity as the supreme and unmatchable instance of alterity in unity. There we saw that communion with a divine person does not obliterate but actualizes the other and, as such, Augustine analogously presented all of creation as a *conuersio ad Deum*. That is, all creation must imitate the Word's (eternal) turn toward the Father in order to receive existence and definition. In this way, union with God is what establishes and actualizes all that is, showing how all creation without exception is essentially deiform (ch. 1).

Within that good creation the human person is encountered as God's unique image; only Adam and Eve have been created in order to be fashioned freely similar to their creator. Adam is thus presented as a microcosm of the entire universe in whom all human persons find their primal origin. When humanity's protoparents turned away from God, *all* men and

women likewise withdrew from divine communion. Augustine's hamartiology was accordingly treated at the end of his anthropology because it can come only after the goodness of Genesis and before the Son's descent where all evil is defeated. Locating the origin of human sinfulness in Gen. 3:5, Augustine saw how only something as great as a promise of divinity could have shaken Adam and Eve out of the bliss of Eden. Promising a divine life which was never his to give, Satan provides us with the matrix of all divine aversion, that innate longing to be "like gods" while proudly refusing participation in God (ch. 2).

Salvation from this false deification is achieved only through the Son's descent into the human condition. It is in this context (and this context alone) that Augustine ventures to use the term *deificare* in order to describe what happens when one lives in Christ. Proving disobedient and thus unable to participate in such a transforming way in God without a visible mediator, the Son of God becomes human so humans can conversely become sons and daughters of the same heavenly Father, to become other "gods" able to participate in and live in accordance with the divine nature (ch. 3). Chapter 4 then examined how the Holy Spirit brings humans into this new life, redeeming sinners in Christ by imparting his own holiness as the result of his unifying indwelling. Over and against what he perceived to be the Pelagian inability to require the internal renewal of a sinful human race, Augustine saw grace as an inner renovation enabling the human person to receive the divine and thus become a new creature in Christ. Realized as indwelling grace, the Spirit effects a real transformation, raising the human person out of sinfulness and rejuvenating his very being.

The final chapter showed how Augustine's sense of the church was pivotal in understanding how the Son and Spirit work. Providing a very wide-reaching image of *ecclesia*, Augus-

tine saw the church concomitant with creation (*ecclesia ante ecclesiam*), as the good angels first turned to God in resplendent light. Augustinian creation has thus never been without a chorus of praise. Analogous to the Son's body made visible and enfleshed at his incarnation, the church too became a perceptible body: now sustained and extended through its visible sacraments, agents of unity binding the faithful to God and to one another. We now therefore understand how such unity with God can be used synonymously for both the church as the *societas sanctorum* as well as the fruit of one's participation in the Eucharist.[1]

At the center of this study was Augustine's supreme image of Christian salvation, human deification. Understood as one soteriological metaphor among many, deification assumed its proper place within Augustine's overall theology: it is neither something disregarded by the Bishop of Hippo, nor is it something that begins to exhaust how he sees Christian salvation. We introduced this argument by tracing much standard opposition to this view, showing how many scholars have dismissed Augustine on this very point. When they examined his reliance on the use of *deificare* and its Latin cognates (for example, Joseph Mausbach, Myrrha Lot-Borodine, or Patric Ranson), they argued that the divinization was not a central component in his theology; accordingly, they concluded, the West's anthropology and subsequent soteriology paled in comparison to the East where the human person's divine likeness and eventual glorification were wonderfully stressed.

While Augustine does not stray away from presenting one's new life in Christ as an act of deification, he is reticent to highlight such language, I argued, for two reasons. First, because *deificare* might be easily misconstrued by the faithful, and, second, this same reality of deification can be just as easily described by more standard Christian metaphors, such as divine adoption or

1. Cf. *Jo. eu. tr.* 26.17.

becoming "more" than human. This second point is more readily understood when we moor Augustine's soteriological uses of deification in the wider context of his overall presentation of the Christian life as something new and relational, transformative and consummate. For when we read those passages where Augustine chooses to describe salvation in terms of deification, we come to see how each time (apart from the first "Neoplatonic" and the next six literary uses) deification language functions as an equivalent for a more common Christian image of salvation, thus opening up how the faithful can understand their new dignity: becoming the Father's adopted children, becoming co-heirs with Christ, becoming gods, and so on.

POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF THIS STUDY

By recognizing how these varied images of deification run throughout the theology of Augustine, we are able to offer a more robust and consistent reading of his understanding of the Christian life. We might, for example, reenvision how Augustinian "justification" is understood. It of course falls outside of the scope of this study to take up the debates of the 16th century on this pivotal Augustinian doctrine. Nonetheless, we must mention that redemption for Augustine is a matter of healing and the forgiveness of sins, but that this is not all he means by justification. To be justified is to become pious, devout, and dutiful before God: "Whoever believes in the one who justifies the ungodly, who makes a godly person out of the ungodly; so whoever believes in the one who justifies the ungodly, who makes just the one who was ungodly, his faith is counted as justice."[2] Despite his ability to weave such concepts of forgiveness and reconciliation into the big-

2. *s.* 292.6; Hill, *Sermons* (III/8), 143; "Quisquis crediderit in eum qui iustificat impium, qui de impio facit pium: quisquis ergo crediderit in eum qui iustificat impium, qui iustum facit eum qui impius erat, deputatur fides eius ad iustitiam"; PL 38.1324.

ger picture of freedom and transformation, Augustine is still too often read as offering a soteriology fixated on reconciliation and escape from the *massa damnata*, having given rise to such overly facile divisions—such as we saw in Mausbach and others—but which are also still at play in much contemporary theology.

Take William Rusch, for example, whose essay on justification in the early church was included in a set of important studies advancing Lutheran and Catholic dialogue. Rusch argues that *iustificare* was for the West what *theosis* was for the East and concludes his essay with four points which should be taken into account in any contemporary Lutheran-Catholic dialogue. The third of these points is that the "process of *theosis* cannot by validly translated into the categories that lie behind the sixteenth-century debate on justification." While this is a fair enough statement, Rusch then continues to advance how no "attempts" should be "made to fit *theosis* into an Augustinian framework. (This is not to say that Augustine was unaware of *theosis*)," thereby concluding that Augustine must have had some awareness of deification but it cannot be said to find a place in his "framework."[3] Scholars such as Rusch err when granting Augustine a simple "awareness" of deification, while concluding that such awareness never makes its way into his theology. As we have seen, while the term *deificare* itself may be minimal, the reality of such transformative union with Christ in the Holy Spirit abounds.

Or consider a recent essay by a more illustrious Augustine scholar, Patout Burns. In his Festschrift contribution for Fordham's Fr. Joseph Lienhard, SJ, Burns offers three theories of atonement running through Augustine's thought: (1) ransom from the enemy, (2) assumption and renewal of sinful flesh,

3. William G. Rusch, "How the Eastern Fathers Understood What the Western Church Meant by Justification," *Justification by Faith: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII,* edited by H. George Anderson et al. (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Publishing, 1985), 131–42; 142.

and (3) a sensible inciting of sinners toward repentance.[4] Burns nowhere entertains the possibility of Augustine's explaining the Son's incarnation in terms of humanity's divinization, and at times even suggests against it. His essay is brilliant in that it shows how Augustine weaves the best of Antiochene and Alexandrian soteriologies into a North African idiom, but what further insights could have been offered if the awareness that Augustine's ascribing "the recreation of an immortal humanity to the divine power operative in the resurrection of Christ" could also be understood as a process of deification?[5]

The second way my work may contribute to wider theological concerns is in its ecumenical potential. In *Augustine and Russian Orthodoxy*, Myroslaw Tataryn aims to show how there has been much in Augustine's thought that has been overlooked by his students. Consequently, Tataryn bemoans that we have a stunted view of the great Bishop today. From the organic unity between and mutual action of body and soul to redemption as *theosis*, Tataryn shows the many ways Orthodox theologians have relied on aspects of Augustine not appreciated even in his own Latin tradition.[6] While admitting that there have been and are still many ambiguous approaches and appreciations of Augustine (especially, Tataryn notes, in the disparaging remarks made by Pavel Florensky), Tataryn encourages us to rediscover Augustinian deification. Overcoming the bias against Augustine on this point can only help to advance ecumenical dialogue between the East and the West as well as the various Christian communities within each.

4. J. Patout Burns, "How Christ Saves: Augustine's Multiple Explanations," *Tradition & The Rule of Faith in the Early Church: Essays in Honor of Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J.* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 193–210.

5. Burns, "How Christ Saves," 210.

6. Myroslaw I. Tataryn, *Augustine and Russian Orthodoxy: Russian Orthodox Theologians and Augustine of Hippo: A Twentieth Century Dialogue* (Oxford: International Scholars Publication, 2000), 16–17; 114–18. See also the recent essay by A. G. Roeber, "Western, Eastern, or Global Orthodoxy? Some reflections on St. Augustine of Hippo in Recent Literature," *Pro Ecclesia* 17.2 (2008): 210–23.

FURTHER QUESTIONS

If the doctrine of humanity's transformative union with the divine is an inextricable element of Augustine's theological macrostructure, what implications could this hold for how we read him? Too many studies have allowed the clear division between Augustinian nature and grace to distort the deiformity of nature and the glory the human person achieves in Christ. As this thesis has set out to show, the language of *deificare* may not be pervasive in Augustine's words and writings but the reality of a renewed humanity is.

First, would not reading Augustine as one neither lacking nor hostile to a theology of deification help his students estimate his impact on later theologians? In the past decade or so, many scholars have sought to rediscover deifying elements in the West's most renowned Christian thinkers. Various Finnish scholars, for example, have published a monograph interpreting Martin Luther's understanding of Christian salvation as essentially divinizing. The traditional forensic understanding of Lutheran justification, these scholars argue, simply does not account for all Luther had to say about the Christian life, the role of grace, and the "great exchange" achieved by the Son's incarnation.[7] Similar studies have likewise attempted to bring deification to the fore in the Western tradition. Take the recent collection of essays, *Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Tradition*. Here are essays treating not only the more standard theologians of antiquity (the Cappadocians, Maximus the Confessor, etc.) but also intriguing studies on Anselm, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, as well as twentieth-century theologians, such as Sergius Bulgakov and Karl Rahner.[8]

7. Carl E. Braaten and Robert Jenson, eds., *Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Press, 1998).

8. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery Wittung, eds., *Partakers of the Divine Na-*

Although unacknowledged, at the foundation of these studies lies Augustine's understanding of deification. As we saw when we examined his critics, much of the West's thinking on the Christian divinization of the human person has been influenced by Augustine's own thinking. Today, however, most scholars can at least state that deification is an important theme for the Bishop of Hippo, the Father of Latin theology. That is, in the words of Andrew Louth: "In the West, the theme of deification became less important (though it is still significant for Augustine), being overshadowed by an understanding of the human relationship based on the distinction between nature and grace."[9] If this is so, perhaps Augustine is not the "villain" he has been made out to be (Ben Drewery's term above). Furthermore, perhaps the West's suspicion (or, at least, the lack of a robust theology) of deification cannot be blamed on Augustine; likewise, perchance the divide between nature and grace is not as pronounced or as stifling in his thought as traditionally made out to be. Therefore, if Augustine can be "reformed" on this question, maybe much of the Western theological tradition could also make room for some doctrine of Christian deification.[10] An Augustinian theology of deification could help to achieve some level of rapprochement between East and West, as well as within the various Christian traditions in the West.

Second, understanding the dynamics and implications of Augustinian deification allows his students to notice subtle

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ture: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Tradition (Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007) includes many essays on theosis in modern thought; for more on these various studies, see my, "The Consummation of the Christian Promise: Recent Studies on Deification," *New Blackfriars* 87 (2006): 3–12.

9. Andrew Louth, "Deification," *The New SCM Dictionary of Christian Spirituality* (London: SCM Press, 2005), 229.

10. Take, for example, such an influential twentieth century theologian as Karl Barth who could only contrast deification with Christian humility: "That the Christian is wholly and utterly … sanctified by the God of peace (1 Thess. 5:23), that he may live to God in Jesus Christ (Rom. 6:11), has nothing whatever to do with deification, but everything with humble subjection to God."; *Church Dogmatics* 4.2, translated by G. W. Bromily (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), 377.

contours of emphasis and stress otherwise undetected throughout the whole range of his theological concerns. For example, Gerald Bonner has argued in his latest work that it was the Pelagian controversy that led Augustine to emphasize the human person's need for grace and for a source of salvation outside of himself, instead of emphasizing participation in the divine nature and the consequent transformation of the human person in Christ.[11] Thus reading Augustine as a theologian of deification would help his students better situate the various debates in which he wrote, enabling his readers to understand better the tones and nuances brought about by the situation and the polemic in question.

These and certainly other questions remain. In these pages, I have however sought to display how deification can and should be read as part of the Augustinian project. Louth is correct: it is a "significant" theme in his writings, and in surprising and pluriform ways. For this the Son has entered the creation that has always imitated his turn to the Father: to make possible the "great exchange" of humanity's graced share in divinity through his humble union with humanity. For Augustine, the work of the incarnate Son is thus one of divine adoption and renewal and transformation. He who is Son by nature has come into humanity so as to make humans sons and daughters of God by grace, and the divinely adopted are not only freed from their sinfulness, they are made living temples of the Holy Spirit, enabled to live a new humanity of sanctity and charity in Jesus Christ.

11. Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity*, 97–117.

Appendix

AUGUSTINE'S WORKS

These items are taken from the standardizing list in *Augustine Through the Ages*, edited by Fr. Allan Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), xxxv–xliii. Reprinted by permission. When an English translation has been used, its citation appears.

Abbreviation	*Latin title*	*English title*	*Translation*	*Latin edition*	*Date*
c. Acad.	*Contra Academicos*	*Against the Skeptics*		CCL 29	Nov. 386–Mar. 387
c. Adim.	*Contra Adimantum Manichei discipulum*	*Against Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani*		CSEL 25.1	394
c. adu. leg.	*Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum*	*Against Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets*		CCL 49	419/20
an. et or.	*De anima et eius origine*	*On the Soul and its Origin*		CSEL 60	419–20
quant.	*De anima quantitate*	*On the Greatness of the Soul*		CSEL 89	387/88
Bapt.	*De baptismo*	*On Baptism*		CSEL 51	400/01
b. uita	*De beata uita*	*On the Happy Life*		CCL 29	Nov. 386–Mar. 387
cath.	*Ad catholicos fratres*	*To the Catholic Members of the Church*		CSEL 52	402/05
ciu. Dei	*De ciuitate Dei*	*City of God*	Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 1984)	CCL 47–48	413–27
conf.	*Confessiones*	*Confessions*	Maria Boulding (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1997)	CCL 27	397–401

(*Appendix continues*)

Abbreviation	*Latin title*	*English title*	*Translation*	*Latin edition*	*Date*
cons. Eu.	*De consensu Euangelist-arum*	*On Agreement among the Evangelists*		C.SEL 43	399/400
correpт.	*De correptione et gratia*	*On Admonition and Grace*		PL 44	426/27
Cresc.	*Ad Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati*	*To Cresconius, a Donatist Grammarian*		CSEL 52	405/06
diu. qu.	*De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*	*On Eighty-Three Different Questions*	Ronald Teske, *Responses to Miscellaneous Questions* (I/12) (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2008)	CCL 44A	388/96
doc. Chr.	*De doctrina Christiana*	*Teaching Christianity*	Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1996)	CCL 32	396; 426/27
en. Ps.	*Enarrationes in Psalmos*	*Expositions of the Psalms*	Maria Boulding (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press), 6 vols: Ps 1–32 (III/15), 2000; Ps 33–50 (III/16), 2000; Ps 51–72 (III/17), 2001; Ps 73–98 (III/18), 2002; Ps 99–120 (III/19), 2003; Ps 121–50 (III/20), 2004	CCL 38–40	392 (1–32 through 406/07 (119–33), sporadically up through 422
ench.	*Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide spe et caritate*	*The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity*	Bruce Harbert, *Enchiridion as in Christian Belief* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2005), 264–343.	CCL 46	421/22
ep.	*Epistulae*	*Letters*	Roland Teske, *Letters* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press) 4 vols: 1–99 (II/1), 2001; 100–55 (II/2), 2003; 156–210 (II/3), 2004; 211–70 and Divjak 1–29 (II/4), 2005	CSEL 34, 44, 57,58,88	cf. Fitzgerald, s.v., *Epistulae, Augustine Through the Ages,* 299–305

Abbreviation	*Latin title*	*English title*	*Translation*	*Latin edition*	*Date*
ep. Jo.	*In epistulam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus*	*Tractates on the First Letter of John*	John Rettig, *Tractates on the First Epistle of John* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995); second half of vol. 5	SC 75	406/07
c. ep. Man.	*Contra epistulam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti*	*Against the "Foundation Letters" of the Manichees*		CSEL 25	397
c. ep. Parm.	*Contra epistulam Parmeniani*	*Against the Letter of Parmenian*		CSEL 51	400
c. ep. Pel.	*Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*	*Against the Two Letters of Pelagius*		CSEL 60	421
ep. Rm. inch.	*Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio*	*Unfinished Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*	Paula Fredriksen Landes, *Augustine on Romans: Propositions from the Epistles to the Romans and Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982)	CSEL 84	394/95
ex. Gal.	*Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas*	*Commentary on the Letter to the Galatians*	Eric Plumer, *Augustine's Commentary on Galatians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)	CSEL 84	394/95
ex. prop. Rm.	*Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula Apostoli ad Romanos*	*Commentary on Statements in the Letter to the Romans*	Fredriksen Landes, *Augustine on Romans*, see *ep. Rm inch.* above	CSEL 84	394/95
c. Faust.	*Contra Faustum Manicheum*	*Against Faustus, a Manichee*		CSEL 25.1	397/99
c. Fel.	*Contra Felicem Manicheum*	*Against Felix, a Manichee*		CSEL 25.2	Dec. 7/12, 404
f. et op.	*De fide et operibus*	*On Faith and Works*		CSEL 41	413

(*Appendix continues*)

Abbreviation	*Latin title*	*English title*	*Translation*	*Latin edition*	*Date*
f. et symb.	*De fide et symbolo*	*On Faith and the Creed*		CSEL 41	Oct. 8, 393
gest. Pel.	De gestis Pelagii	*On the Deeds of Pelagius*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 1(I/23), (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1997)	CSEL 42	416/17
Gn. litt.	*De Genesi ad litteram*	*On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*	Edmund Hill, *On Genesis* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2002)	CSEL 28.1	401/15
Gn. litt. imp.	*De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*	*On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, an Unfinished Book*	Hill, *On Genesis*	CSEL 28.1	393/94; 426/27
Gn. adu. Man.	*De Genesi aduersus Manicheos*	*On Genesis, Against the Manichees*	Hill, *On Genesis*	CSEL 91	388/89
gr. et lib. arb.	*De gratia et libero arbitrio*	*On Grace and Free Will*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 4 (I/26) (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1999)	PL 44	426/27
gr. et. pecc. or.	*De gratia Christi et de peccato originale*	*On the grace of Christ and Original Sin*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 1(I/23)	CSEL 42	418
haer.	*De haeresibus*	*On Heresies*	Roland Teske, *Arianism and Other Heresies* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1995)	CCL 46	428
imm. an.	*De immortalitate animae*	*On the Immortality of the Soul*		CSEL 89	387
inq. Jan.	*Ad inquisitiones Januarii* (=*ep.* 54–55)	*Responses to Januarius* (=*Letters* 54–55)	Roland Teske, *Letters;* see *ep.* above	CSEL 34.2	400
Jo. eu. tr.	*In Johannis euangelium tractatus*	*Tractates on the Gospel of John*	John Rettig, *Tractates on the Gospel of John* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press), 5 vols: 1 (1–10), 1988; 2 (11–27), 1988; 3 (28–54), 1993; 4 (55–111), 1994; 5 (112–24), 1995	36	406/21?

Abbreviation	*Latin title*	*English title*	*Translation*	*Latin edition*	*Date*
c. Jul.	*Contra Julianum*	*Against Julian*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 2 (I/24) (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1998)	PL 44	421/22
c. Jul. imp.	*Contra Julianum opus imperfectum*	*Against Julian, an Unfinished Book*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 3 (I/25) (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1999)	CSEL 85.1 (bks. I–III)	429/30
lib. arb.	*De libero arbitrio*	*On Free Will*		CCL 29	387/88–395
c. litt. Pet.	*Contra litteras Petiliani*	*Against the Letters of Petilianus*		CSEL 52	400/03
loc. in Hept.	*Locutionum in Heptateuchum*	*Sayings in the Heptateuch*		CCL 33	419/20
mag.	*De magistro*	*On the Teacher*		CCL 29	389
c. Max.	*Contra Maximinum Arianum*	*Against Maximinus, an Arian*		PL 42	427/28
mor.	*De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum*	*On the Catholic and Manichean Ways of Life*		CSEL 90	387/88
mus.	*De musica*	*On Music*		PL 32	387/91
nat. b.	*De natura boni*	*On the Nature of the Good*		CSEL 25.2	399
nat. et gr.	*De natura et gratia*	*On Nature and Grace*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 1(I/23)	CSEL 60	415 spring
nupt. et conc.	*De nuptiis et concupiscentia*	*On Marriage and Concupiscence*		CSEL 42	419/21
ord.	*De ordine*	*On Order*		CCL 29	Nov. 386–Mar. 387
orig. an.	*De origine animae* (= *ep.* 166)	*On the Origin of the Soul* (= *Letter* 166)		CSEL 44	415
pat.	*De patientia*	*On Patience*		CSEL 41	417/18
pecc. mer.	*De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum*	*On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on Infant Baptism*		CSEL 60	411
perf. just.	*De perfectione justitiae hominis*	*On the Perfection of Human Righteousness*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 1(I/23)	CSEL 42	415
perseu.	*De dono perseuerantiae*	*On the Gift of Perseverance*		PL 45	428/29

(*Appendix continues*)

Abbreviation	*Latin title*	*English title*	*Translation*	*Latin edition*	*Date*
praed. sanct.	*De praedestinatione sanctorum*	*On the Predestination of Saints*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 4 (I/26)	PL 44	428/29
praes. Dei	*De praesentia Dei* (= *ep.* 187)	*On the Presence of God* (*Letter* 187)	Roland Teske, *Letters*; see *ep.* above	CSEL 57	417
qu.	*Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*	*Questions on the Heptateuch*		CCL 33	419/20
retr.	*Retractationes*	*Reconsiderations*	M. Inez Bogan (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1968)	CCL 57	426/27
rhet.	*De rhetorica*	*On Rhetoric*		PL 32	387
s.	*Sermones*	*Sermons*	Edmund Hill, *Sermons* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press) 11 vols: 1 (1–19); 2 (20–50), 1990; 3 (51–94), 1991; 4 (94A–147A); 5 (148–83), 1992; 6 (184–229Z); 7 (230–72B), 1993; 8 (273–305A); 9 (306–40A), 1994; 10 (341–400); 11 (Dolbeau's newly discovered), 1997	CCL 41	cf. *Aug. Through the Ages*, 774–89
c. s. Ar.	*Contra sermonem Arianorum*	*Against an Arian Sermon*		PL 42	419
s. Dom. mon.	*De sermone Domini in monte*	*On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount*		CCL 35	393/95
Simpl.	*Ad Simplicianum*	*To Simplicianus*		CCL 44	396
sol.	*Soliloquia*	*The Soliloquies*	Kim Paffenroth, *Soliloquies* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2000)	CSEL 89	Nov. 386–Mar. 387
spir. et litt.	*De spiritu et littera*	*On the Spirit and the Letter*	Roland Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians* 1(I/23)	CSEL 60	412
Trin.	*De Trinitate*	*The Trinity*	Edmund Hill, *The Trinity* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1991)	CCL 50/50A	399–422/26

Abbreviation	*Latin title*	*English title*	*Translation*	*Latin edition*	*Date*
un. bapt.	*De unico baptismo contra Petilianum*	*On the One Baptism against Petilian*		CSEL 53	410/11 winter
util. cred.	*De utilitate credendi*	*On the Advantage of Believing*		CSEL 25.1	391/92
uera rel.	*De uera religione*	*On True Religion*	Edmund Hill, *True Religion as in Christian Belief* (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2005), 15–104	CCL 32	390/91
uid. Deo	*De uidendo Deo* (= *ep.* 147)	*On Seeing God* (*Letter* 147)	Roland Teske, *Letters*; see *ep.* above	CSEL 44	413

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